The Us V. Rodriguez-Moreno

1. In the case of The United States v. Rodriquez-Moreno the defendant was hired by a drug distributor to retrieve stolen drugs. During this process the defendant kidnapped a middle man, transporting the victim through the states of Texas, New Jersey, New York and Maryland in his attempt to retrieve the stolen drugs. While in Maryland, the defendant came into possession of a revolver, which he used to threaten the victim. Shortly after the victim was able to escape and he called the police. The defendant was tried at a New Jersey Court, where along with other charges, he was charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (1). 18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1) states that if an individual possesses or uses a firearm during an act related to violence or drugs,

the individual will receive an additional five year sentence along with the sentence time of their other crimes.
The defendant moved to dismiss the violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (1) on the grounds that he had only been in possession of the firearm in Maryland, therefore this was the only venue where he could be charged with the infraction. The defendant’s motion to disclaim violation 924 (c)(1) was denied by the district court and he was convicted of conspiring to kidnap, kidnapping, and violation of 924 (c)(1).
The Appellate Court reviewed the defendant’s claim and reversed his 924(c) (1) conviction, a decision based on a ‘verb test’. In the statute it states, “Whoever, during and in relation to a crime of violence…uses or carries a firearm…will be sentenced to imprisonment for five years… (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1))”. The Appellate Court took the words “uses or carries” to mean that an individual is only in violation of the statute in the venue that they possess the firearm and commit the violent crime. They deemed that only in Maryland was the defendant in possession of a firearm while committing the violent crime of kidnapping, therefore the individual only violated the statute in the venue of Maryland and could not be convicted of violation of 924 (c)(1) in the venue of New Jersey.
The Supreme Court then overturned the Appellate Court’s decision. The Supreme Court believed that the Appellate Court had relied too much on the use of verbs in the statute and failed to note the relation to violent acts mentioned in the statute. The Supreme Court noted that the statute stated, “…during and in relation to a crime of violence… (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)).” The Court interpreted this to mean that a defendant only had to be found guilty of using a firearm and using that firearm ‘during and in relation’ to the underlying crime of violence. The defendant had completed all the necessary steps to be charged with the underlying crime of violence, kidnapping. Kidnapping is a crime that is continuous as it does not end until the victim is free, therefore when the defendant used the firearm in one state the firearm was used ‘during and in relation’ to the crime of kidnapping.
The Court found that since the violation of 924 (c)(1) occurred ‘during and in relation’ to the crime of kidnapping; it was in a sense attached to the kidnapping crime and therefore carried over into the same venues that the kidnapping occurred. The kidnapping occurred in the venues of New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Maryland. The Supreme Court decided these states were all venues that the defendant could be charged with violation of 924 (c)(1) and the defendant was guilty of violation of 924 (c)(1) in the state of New Jersey.

2. Was the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the decision justified?

I believe that the Supreme Court was justified in reversing the decision of the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court established that the statute 924 (c)(1) is interpreted to mean that a violation occurs when a weapon is used “during or in relation to a crime of violence”(18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)). The Supreme Court identified the crime of kidnapping and that a firearm had been used during this violent crime. The Court also established that the violent crime was one of continuance and not a crime that had occurred separately from the firearm violation.
In terms of establishing that the crime of kidnapping in U.S.

v. Rodriguez-Moreno was a crime of continuance and not a crime that occurred only at one point and time we look to United States v. Cabrales. In this case we see a money laundering scheme in which the defendant deposited $40,000, revenue from cocaine sales in Missouri, to her bank in Florida. The defendant was found to only be guilty of money laundering in the state of Florida and not Missouri, “the court said that Cabrales was not accused of a continuing offense, but was charged with money laundering transactions that began, continued, and were completed only in Florida (U.S. v. Cabrales,

1998)”.
The court decided their holding based on the fact that the crimes of money laundering and cocaine sales were two separate criminal activities; with the cocaine sales having been an already completed crime by the time the money laundering occurred in Florida. Therefore the crime of money laundering can only be tried in Florida. This case demonstrates that when there are two separate crimes the different charges are to be sentenced in their separate venues.
In the case of U.S.

v. Rodriguez-Moreno the kidnapping offense was ongoing, while the cocaine sale in United States v. Cabrales was a completed action by the time the money laundering crime occurred. After the sale was final the defendant took profits from the drug distribution and committed the crime of money laundering. In U.S. v. Rodriguez-Moreno the kidnapping was an ongoing crime that was still in occurrence when the violation of 924(c)(1) occurred. For that reason kidnapping and possessing a firearm are not two separate crimes, but are attached. Consequently if one crime took place in one venue, the violation of a firearm is attached and the defendant must be charged with a violation in the same venue, “the underlying crime of violence is a critical part of the 924 (c)(1) offense (U.S. v. Rodriguez-Moreno,

1998)”.
In terms of establishing that the statute 924(c)(1) is interpreted as meaning “during and in relation to a crime of violence” we look at United States v. Pomranz. In United States v. Pomranz the defendant, a drug dealer, had drug deals occurring in Oklahoma and Texas simultaneously when he was arrested in a sting operation. The drug dealer was in the midst of dealing drugs in Oklahoma with a firearm when he was arrested. Concurrently in Texas he had also arranged for a drug deal to occur in the same time frame that he was dealing in Oklahoma. The defendant was charged with violation of 924 (c)(1) in both Oklahoma and Texas, even though the firearm was only present in Oklahoma. The Supreme Court decided this conviction based on, “we hold that a defendant who is indicted for using or carrying a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense may be prosecuted and convicted for violating § 924(c)(1) in the same venue as the underlying drug offense (U.S. v Pomranz, 1995)”. The Court decided that the drug deals occurring in Oklahoma and Texas were not separate offenses as they were deals arranged and set up by the same dealer, the defendant. The deals were also set up on occur on the same day and within the same timeframe. Since the defendant was responsible for the occurrence of both drug deals and the deals were happening simultaneously, only one in a different state, the defendant was guilty for both drug deals. His possession of a firearm at one drug deal was also therefore transferable to the drug transference that was occurring in the other venue, as the weapon was present “during and in relation to a crime of violence”. The Court recognized that the drug crimes were of continuance, and that if a firearm was used at any point during the violent crime then the violation is carried across the whole crime, not matter the venue. In this case the defendant used a firearm in only one state, but the Court decided the defendant had violated 924(c)(1) in the both the venues of Oklahoma and Texas where the drug distribution had occurred. Likewise in U.S. v. Rodriguez-Moreno the crime of kidnapping had been established as a crime of continuance, when the defendant possessed the firearm in one venue it was a transferrable violation that happened in all the venues that the crime of kidnapping took place.
The Supreme Court made their decision to overturn the Appellate Court’s decision concerning the violation of 924 (c)(1) regarding the defendant Rodriguez-Moreno. The Supreme Court made this decision by deciding the statute 924 (c)(1) is interpreted to mean that a firearm is “present during and in relation to a crime of violence” The Supreme Court then verified that the ‘crime of violence’ mentioned in statute 924(c)(1) must be an ongoing crime when the violation of 924(c)(1) occurs, and not a crime that had ended when the violation of 924(c)(1) occurred. Once these two critical elements were determined by the Court then the Court was able to rule that a violation of 924(c)(1) that occurs during a crime that is in continuance is able to be prosecuted in all the venues that the violent crime occurred. Therefore the defendant Rodriguez-Moreno had violated the statute 924(c)(1) during the ongoing violent crime of kidnapping. Despite the firearm only being physically present in Maryland, the defendant is able to be charged with violation of 924 (c)(1) in New Jersey where the kidnapping had also occurred.