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Question of appeasement
Question of appeasement
Question of appeasement
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This essay analyses the responsibility of Neville Chamberlain and his highly controversial Appeasement theory which hypothetically prevented the outbreak of the Second World War. The policy of Appeasement epitomised by the Munich agreement, is a pact signed in 1938 between Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, which allowed Hitler to annex Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland (area along Czech borders) to prevent the onset of a major war. Appeasement has been drastically criticised since it ended in a “humiliating failure” when Germany attacked Poland in 1939 (McDonough, 2002). This essay also evaluates two significant appraisals of the Munich agreement, described in McDonough’s (2002) exhaustive book: a first, which asserts that it was an utterly unwholesome policy of despicable capitulation and a second, instigated by the ‘revisionist historians’ — exemplified by Taylor’s (1963) controversial book — which comprehends it as an elaborated policy enabling Chamberlain to prevent an imminent war while he was opportunely preparing for it (McDonough, 2002). This essay concurrently criticises and evaluates these assessments of Chamberlain’s contentious acts, since each of them imply one consequent solution which could have impeded the suddenly onset of the war. Two core solutions are therefore criticised below: first that Chamberlain should have initially constrained Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum — German desire to enlarge their living space — and second, that Chamberlain should have maintained his appeasement policy (McDonough, 2002).
Since Trevor-Roper (1961) and Bullock (1998) (both cited in McDonough, 2002) assert in their analytical and exhaustive books that confronting Hitler earlier could have avoided war, the appeasement th...
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...reak of the second world war depends therefore on whether Hitler had the genuine intention to conquer the world (‘Hitlocentric interpretation’) or was simply a master of opportunism (‘Revisionist historians’). Whereas some argue that appeasement and the Munich agreement caused the outset of the war, ‘Revisionist historians’ assert that the radical change of policy which occurred after the invasion of Poland was a great opportunity that Hitler did not hesitate to seize. This evaluation is therefore more ideological than empirical since the lack of convincing evidence impede historians to reach a consensus. However, blaming Chamberlain for the beginning of the war is unreasonable since he did not have access to the information we have — interpretation of the pas could be influenced by the moral judgements some would have when examining Hitler’s actions (Taylor, 1963).
These were pivotal times in the annals of world history in the 20th century. Mussolini and Hitler’s rise to power was clearly a threat to the freedoms of the United States and its Allies. Through God’s grace and omnipotence, the US alliance, industrialization and intellectual might, we have the resources required to overcome the fierce and mighty threat of Fascism in the Free World. In the 1930s, European governments found it necessary to appease Hitler and Mussolini. Appeasement is the word that clearly sums up the policies and actions that were taken by the European governments.
before he came to power, he just used World War II as his golden opportunity to turn his dream into a reality. Others, with Andreas Hillgruber, argue Hitler was the only reason genocide even happened. If Hitler had not been in control, the Holocaust would have ceased to exist. His key sources include the Nuremburg Trials, quoting him saying “this struggle will not end with annihilation of Aryan mankind, but with the extermination of the Jewish people of Europe.” By using Hitler’s own words against him, Hillgruber makes it easy to prove Hitler’s malicious intent clearly and depict him as the mastermind behind the mass murder of the Jewish population. Gerald Fleming creates the last sub-argument in his book, “Hitler and the Final Solution,” provides an in-depth historical evaluation of German fascism and the mechanization behind the Nazi Party bureaucracy. His main point of reference is David Irving’s, “Hitler’s War,”
It failed to produce the desired results, but rather added fuel to the fire. At the Munich Conference the Big Four discussed the demands for the territory of Czechoslovakia and ultimately gave into Hitler’s request. While many people like Neville Chamberlain argued that appeasement was the best option Winston Churchill viewed it as a consequential decision. Churchill stated that he, “thinks of all the opportunities to stop the growth of Nazi Power which have been thrown away.” No action was taken to establish the security of Czechoslovakia making the Nazi’s more powerful. Appeasement did not defer the hostility that the desire for expansion brought on, but made it escalate. When Ethiopia was invaded by the Italians the emperor, Haile Selassie, was denied assistance from the Leage of Nations. He warned them what would happened if the aggressors were not stopped and wrote, “It is us today. It will be you tomorrow.” Haile Selassie knew that aggressors were going to continue to seek for more land and that any nation could be attacked next. Not only was appeasement an effort to satisfy the demands of dissatisfied powers in hope of maintaining stability, but it was also the disregardance of possibly serious conflict. The League of Nations incapability to be a forceful united front allowed for the Axis Powers to become even more willing to break boundaries. Appeasement was used to be the path of least resistance, but it would never stop the
Hauner, Milan. "Did Hitler Want World Dominion?" Journal of Contemporary History 13.1 (1978). JSTOR. Web. 19 Mar. 2010.
This investigation will address the research question, to what extent was Germany’s post-World War I economic depression a causal factor in Hitler’s rise to power from 1919 to 1934? With the Treaty of Versailles, the German government was required to pay 132 billion gold marks of war reparations, drastically worsened with the US Wall Street crash. This effectively crippled the German economy and created a desperate people. For this investigation, Hitler’s private life history and pre-military career will not be analyzed. His political rise will be examined from the perspective of economic and social factors. Several primary sources will be explored, including the Hitler’s Mein Kampf and Hitler’s 25-Point Program. In addition, tertiary sources covering Hitler’s non-personal life and rise to power will be studied.
Gesink, Indira. "Fascism, Nazism and Road to WWII." World Civilizations II. Baldwin Wallace University. Marting Hall, Berea. 3 April 2014. Class lecture.
The invasion of Poland by Germany in September 1939 is regarded as the trigger that unleashed the Second World War. After an analysis and study of the causes of the conflict, from my point of view I consider that the depiction of hostilities that would trigger this great war were developed long before and were only a matter of time before this war began. I consider it this way, because Germany as the defeated nation of the World War I, in which the victorious nations, imposed conditions within which Germany ceded part of its territory and its colonies, reduce its army and pay annual compensation to the victorious nations.
The debate as to whether Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’ or ‘Master of the Third Reich’ is one that has been contested by historians of Nazi Germany for many years and lies at the centre of the Intentionalist – Structuralist debate. On the one hand, historians such as Bullock, Bracher, Jackel and Hildebrand regard Hitler’s personality, ideology and will as the central locomotive in the Third Reich. Others, such as Broszat, Mason and Mommsen argue that the regime evolved out from pressures and circumstances rather than from Hitler’s intentions. They emphasise the institutional anarchy of the regime as being the result of Hitler’s ‘weak’ leadership. The most convincing standpoint is the synthesis of the two schools, which acknowledges both Hitler’s centrality in explaining the essence of Nazi rule but also external forces that influenced Hitler’s decision making. In this sense, Hitler was not a weak dictator as he possessed supreme authority but as Kershaw maintains, neither was he ‘Master of the Third Reich’ because he did not exercise unrestricted power.
David Reynolds has written and enlightening book named “From Munich to Pearl Harbor” discussing three main objectives dealing with World War II. The first of the three objectives is to provide a detailed and clear narrative story from the years between Munich to Pearl Harbor. The second of the three purposes or objectives of the book is to analyze and show how President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led the American people into a new perspective on international relations that were different from anything Americans had known. The last of the three objectives of the book is to show the developments between the years of 1938 through 1941. Many of these developments were very important later for the foreign policy of the United States not only during the Second World War but also during the Cold War complications with Russia and today with President Bush’s war on terror currently taking place in Iraq.
Bernhardi, Friedrich von, and Allen H. Powles. Germany and the next war. Authorized ed. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.
Appeasing Hitler was primarily done for one goal; to avoid war and the many terrible things that came along with it. When World War I finally ended in 1918, millions of lives and dollars were lost. As a result, discussing problems seemed to be in everyone’s best interest. No one should ever be blamed for not wanting war because it’s very serious and not something that should be dealt with lightly. With saying that, appeasement was simply a negotiation, a way to solve problems without fighting, and nobody had a way of knowing what Hitler planned to do in the future. As Mackenzie King stated “Hitler appeared to be ‘a man of deep sincerity and a genuine patriot” (King, 1937) meaning that he seemed like the type of person who could obey rules and negotiate his problems, without causing conflict. Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of Great Britain once said, “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is, that we should be digging t...
Historians are often divided into categories in regard to dealing with Nazi Germany foreign policy and its relation to Hitler: 'intentionalist', and 'structuralist'. The intentionalist interpretation focuses on Hitler's own steerage of Nazi foreign policy in accordance with a clear, concise 'programme' planned long in advance. The 'structuralist' approach puts forth the idea that Hitler seized opportunities as they came, radicalizing the foreign policies of the Nazi regime in response. Structuralists reject the idea of a specific Hitlerian ideological 'programme', and instead argue for an emphasis on expansion no clear aims or objectives, and radicalized with the dynamism of the Nazi movement. With Nazi ideology and circumstances in Germany after World War I influencing Nazi foreign policy, the general goals this foreign policy prescribed to included revision of Versailles, the attainment of Lebensraum, or 'living space', and German racial domination. These foreign policy goals are seen through an examination of the actions the Nazi government took in response to events as they happened while in power, and also through Hitler's own ideology expressed in his writings such as Mein Kempf. This synthesis of ideology and social structure in Germany as the determinants of foreign policy therefore can be most appropriately approached by attributing Nazi foreign policy to a combination as both 'intentionalist' and 'structuralist' aims. Nazi foreign policy radicalized with their successes and was affected by Hitler pragmatically seizing opportunities to increase Nazi power, but also was based on early a consistent ideological programme espoused by Hitler from early on.
The Origins of the Second World War, by A.J.P. Taylor, proposes and investigates unconventional and widely unaccepted theories as to the underlying causes of World War Two. Taylor is a British historian who specialized in 20th century diplomacy, and in his book claims that as a historian his job is to “state the truth” (pg. xi) as he sees it, even if it means disagreeing with existing prejudices. The book was published in 1961, a relatively short time after the war, and as a result of his extreme unbias the work became subject to controversy for many years. Studying history through his lens of objectivism, Taylor’s theory is that Hitler’s design wasn’t one of world dominance; rather his methods, especially his foreign policies, didn’t differ from his predecessors.
Throughout history, negotiation has been a powerful tool used by world leaders to avoid violence and solve conflict. When negotiation succeeds all parties can feel that that have achieved their goals and met their expectations, but when negotiations go awry countries and relationships can be damaged beyond repair. The Munich Agreement of 1938 is a primary example of this type of failure, which was one of the catalysts to the start World War II and Czechoslovakia’s loss of independence. The Czech people were greatly overlooked during this agreement process, which still in some instances affects the country today. The 1930s were a challenging time for Europe and the powers within it due to the aftermath of WWI and the worldwide economic depression. Meanwhile, Fuhrer Hitler and the Nazi party were continuing their domination of Europe and threatening to invade Czechoslovakia, which many felt would most likely incite another World War. To prevent this England, France, Italy and Germany entered into an agreement, which would allow Germany to seize control of Sudetenland and is today known as the ‘Munich Pact’. Sudetenland had a large German population and its borders were in strategically strong areas for the German military. For negotiations to be successful there are many components that one must be aware of such as personalities of all parties, end goals of each person and the history from the country. England led the process with an appeasement policy as an attempt to mollify Hitler and the Nazi party and prevent war, which this pact did not. The Munich Pact is a perfect example of how negotiation can fail when all of the pieces do not fall correctly into place.
It could be argued that appeasement was a mistake because Hitler would have been defeated if Chamberlain had intervened at an earlier stage; for example, if Chamberlain had shown greater threat and opposition in response to Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland, Hitler would most likely not have proceeded in his plans to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, if Chamberlain had not allowed Hitler to reclaim the Rhineland, not only would Hitler have felt discouraged to further disobey the Treaty of Versailles, he would not have regained the useful coal, steel and iron resources of the area. This meant that Hitler was harder to stop as he expanded more and more, and