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Introduction to understanding the self
Introduction to understanding the self
John Locke philosophy about self
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Myself, yourself, herself and himself are words we, as humans, often use to refer to our ‘selves’. It is extremely important to understand what constitutes the self because it gives us our personal identity. But what is the self? Jerry Fodor argues that the self is the brain and there is no immaterial self. John Locke claims that the self is our consciousness. Sigmund Freud says that a transcendental unifying principle of consciousness. For me, I come to believe that the self is immaterial and multi-layered.
Firstly, I will address my view of the self being immaterial.
Fodor, a functionalist, argues that “there is no immaterial self that exists independently from the brain or the body ”. To him, “mental states are explainable in terms of
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This lead me to think that there is an immaterial self governing the human body to explain why humans can come up with different solutions to give the same answer to the same mathematical problem. The cause affects the immaterial self. The immaterial self governs the brain by shaping its mental state with immaterial thoughts and makes the decision to adopt a certain behavioural method. Various behavioural methods can arise from the same mental state and lead to the same effect to the cause.
Thus, I believe in the presence of an immaterial self that governs the brain and the body. I disagree that “mental states are explainable in terms of physical brain states”. This is because mental states cannot be reduced to physical brain states. Physical brain states can only give rise to a definitive method to an outcome while immaterial thoughts of a mental state can give rise to various methods to an outcome. These immaterial thoughts of a mental state are made possible by the immaterial self.
Secondly, I address my view of the self being
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I disagree with Locke as there are instances when we are able to do things without being conscious of our self. Suppose that I am thirsty and I pick up a cup. My ‘self’ is focused on drinking to quench my thirst. In the midst of willing my ‘self’ to drink, I not consciously pick up information of the cup – the colour of the cup with my sense of sight, the shape of my cup and the material of the cup with my sense of touch, and more. I was not aware that I had picked up all these information about the cup at the moment when I was drinking. It is our five senses of sight, taste, touch, hearing and feeling that actively perceives but the self may not be aware. This shows that while the self has consciousness, it also has the potential to be conscious as it can at times be not conscious of itself. Thus, I disagree with Locke that the self is merely
Self could be defined in different ways. In John Perry’s “dialogue on personal identity and immorality”, both characters Weirob and Cohen are correct on their argument of personal identity, there are just some imperfections on each of the views. My view of “persons are identical with brains” fills the gaps of ideas of them. Brain is the junction that could bring mind and
The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often designated as a weakness when present in an argument, can remain in valid arguments from qualia.
Taylor, Richard. "The Mind as a Function of the Body." Exploring Philosophy. 4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. 131-138. Print.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
They reasons the one contains the self consciousness is because of reasoning with himself and the world and ...
The Egocentric Predicament is a problem associated with our ideas and how we perceive the world. Locke believes all knowledge come from personal ideas; these ideas are based upon our perception of the world. However, if we only see the world based on our own ideas how can there be any external or objective world. This begs questions similar to; can I really know an objective world exists? If there is no external world do any other minds –or ideas- other than my own exist? How can we ever test reality if it is our own mental construction? Locke concludes that we do have some knowing in relation to the subjective and objective reality that they do exist, but that we do not have a clear idea between one and of the other.
The first main argument for physicalism, and in this case identity theory, is the argument of neural dependence. This argument states that if mental states were distinct from physical states then they would not be affected when the brain is damaged or manipulated. Since scientific research and observation have shown that they are, then it is logical to conclude that mental states are not distinct from physical states.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
Two-way interactive dualism accurately describes the connections between our bodies and minds because we can see they causally affect each other. As a result, we as human beings cannot always determine what physical state we are in, but we always know where we stand
The mind body problem is the controversial idea of the connection between the mind and the body. Physicalism is a solution to the mind body problem, providing the idea that there is nothing above the world and accepts the mind to be a physical essence, nothing above the body. Physicalism provides different approaches in search of the mind and its constituents. By approaching the mind as a physical entity, behaviorist, a type of physicalism, view the mind as a category containing emotions, sensations and feelings. Another approach within physicalism is functionalism, the idea that the mind is a series of input and output of mental states. These and other approaches to physicalism, display the mind as something not out of the physical world and an entity that is not separated from the body. Physicalist believe the mind could be explained by physical sciences in the future. Some physicalist portray the mind through all the sciences while others reduced the
The what it is like to undergo an experience is essential to understanding that experience. Known by philosophers as subjective qualia, these characteristics are part of what makes a felt experience exactly that experience. If we introspect our own mental states, this seems apparent and incontrovertible. Most philosophers are unwilling to grant that subjective qualia are non-physical states, and attempts to face this problem and maintain physicalism must address arguments from qualia. While differing physical explanations for these subjective qualia exist, I will only briefly refer to them here as qualia will serve only as a means of leading the reader to the Explanatory Gap(1). The Explanatory Gap is a uniquely puzzling problem for physicalist philosophies of mind.
“a person does not ‘inhabit’ a static object body but is subjectively embodied in a fluid, emergent, and negotiated process of being. In this process, body, self, and social interaction are interrelated to such an extent that distinctions between them are not only permeable and shifting but also actively manipulated and configured”
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
This does raise the question of what exactly makes a consciousness the same from moment to moment. What is guaranteeing that the consciousness I am experiencing right now is the same one, and I am therefore the same person, as the consciousness at any other moment? When someone goes to sleep and wakes again in the morning, isn’t it possible that the consciousness could have been swapped out with one from a completely different person during the night? Each person shares in being able to perceive that they are thinking or perceiving, but what distinguishes one person’s perception of perceiving from any other? Locke, I think, gives the answer of a consciousness being defined by the finite body or mind it is connected to.
...have struggled with the nature of human beings, especially with the concept of “self”. What Plato called “soul, Descartes named the “mind”, while Hume used the term “self”. This self, often visible during hardships, is what one can be certain of, whose existence is undoubtable. Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am” concept of transcendental self with just the conscious mind is too simplistic to capture the whole of one’s self. Similarly, the empirical self’s idea of brain in charge of one’s self also shows a narrow perspective. Hume’s bundle theory seeks to provide the distinction by claiming that a self is merely a habitual way of discussing certain perceptions. Although the idea of self is well established, philosophical insight still sees that there is no clear presentation of essential self and thus fails to prove that the true, essential self really exists.