Introduction: The argument contends: “To what extent was the Stinger Missile (S.A.M missile) Beneficial to the Mujahedeen against the USSR in Afghanistan 1986 – 1989. The Stinger missile downed enemy aircraft and did advantage the Mujahedeen against the USSR The counter-argument holds: “To what extent was the Stinger missile (S.A.M missile) not beneficial to the Mujahedeen against the USSR in Afghanistan 1986 – 1989. The Stinger missile did not down enemy aircraft and did not advantage the Mujahedeen against the USSR.” The argument is correct because the stinger missiles did advantage the Mujahedeen against the USSR in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989.It downed both Soviet aircraft and Afghan aircraft with minimal failure. …show more content…
Analysis: The image provided in source 11 does not give any information regarding the stinger missiles effectiveness, it only conveys and proves that the USSR did use helicopters to transport soldiers and supplies and is therefore rejected as a source because it does not support the argument or the counter argument. Source 12 is another image that does not provide any significant information besides the fact that the Mujahedeen used Stinger Missiles which was known and does not prove visually that the Stinger missile was used to down enemy aircraft.
Source 12 is therefore rejected because it is a photograph and was taken from a photographer’s perspective which is biased. A review of Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf's book (source 16) only provides information of Yousaf's disapproval of the weapon transactions between the CIA and Mujahedeen.” He was especially bitter both about the waste of money on the Oerlikon guns and about them being forced on the Mujahedeen” this statement has no relativity to any of the arguments and is therefore rejected. The statement made by Mark Urban in source 9” Mujahedin Stinger kill ratios reported by the U.S. Army were grossly inflated” reinforces the counter-argument but source 10 disproves source 9 by saying that Urbans sceptical views were made on the “anecdotes of TV journalists” that reported having “great difficulty in videotaping successful missile hits” therefore making both these sources of no use because they are contradictory and are made of false …show more content…
assumptions. A extract from the Bear Trap pages 183 - 184 (source 8) states Yousaf's disappointment of the stinger missile “Yousaf reports that, to his knowledge, the army "fired twenty-eight Stingers at enemy aircraft without a single kill. ” This source supports the counter-argument because it proves that the stinger missile had miserable results in attempting to down Soviet aircraft and wasn’t as effective as claimed by the USA. Source 13 by Leonard Leshuk confirms the counter-argument by disputing the stinger missiles alleged performance in the Afghanistan war. Leshuk says that the stinger missile was not the most successful weapon “aircraft continued to be downed by less sophisticated weapons”. Lesuk goes on to say that the stinger missile was not the reason for the Soviets abandoning the war and did not advantage the Mujahedeen against the Soviets “The Soviets’ decision to withdraw from Afghanistan which evidence indicates had been made before the deployment of the STINGERs. Another source by Leonard Leshuk (source 14) accuses the USA and westerners of “immediately jumped to the conclusion that it was a cause and effect relationship”. Again, this source reinforces the counter-argument by providing information that the stinger missile was not that effective and had not "turned the tide of the war". Leshuk clearly refutes the ideas of the stinger missile being successful. He believed that the Stinger missiles results were wrongly used and resulted in false glorification. Source 15 by Leonard Leshuk supports the counter-argument. Lesuk states “Stingers did not play a decisive role” reinforcing the idea that the stinger missile was not the reason for the Mujahedeen’s victory against the Soviet Union. The Stinger Missiles only played a fractional role according to Leshuk. The sources are from a Soviet author (Leonard Leshuk) and are bias and against the ideas of the USA therefore these sources are not taken as too reliable and has no other real reinforcing back-ups. Source 7 by Selig Harrison a former U.S. Army analyst rejects the statement made by a Soviet Commander that said “the United States "greatly exaggerated" Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses during the war”. Selig provided plausible statistical information that proves the stinger missile was effective against both Soviet and afghan forces and therefore validates the argument. Selig Harrison who was a former U.S. Army analyst had to provide accurate and true evidence and states that they used "several levels of verification" making his argument more believable. In source 3 it states “1986 was the year of the missiles' greatest effectiveness” because pilots had still needed to adopt counter measures regarding stinger missiles. This source reinforces the argument proving that the Stinger missile had challenged pilots and thay had to adapt in order to survive. ”The Stinger's effectiveness was due mainly to six technological advantages” as stated in source 5 which supports the argument. This source only provides information that proves the stinger was technologically advanced and could easily down an aircraft. The Mujahedeen had therefore gained access to advanced weaponry that could easily aid their cause. Source 2 confirms the argument and states that “the missile unquestionably shot down Soviet and especially Afghan aircraft at an unprecedented rate in its first few months of use.” The source is from the U.S.
intelligence cables and supports the idea that the Stinger missile changed the tide of the war. McMichael states: "During the first two years of the war, the great majority of Soviet aircraft losses (75-80 percent) must be attributed to non-combat causes, plus losses suffered on the ground due to raids, rocket attacks, and sabotage. . . . There can be no doubt at all that the Stinger turned the ratio on its head."(Source 4). This statement and source reinforces the argument proving that the Stinger missile was a key instrument for the Mujahedeen fighters. Source 6 confirms the argument because a rigorous U.S. Army analysis was conducted in early 1989 by a team that had first-hand experience with the mujahedeen fighters and stated that “approximately 269 kills in about 340 engagements with the Stinger, for a remarkable 79 percent kill ratio.”, because the analysis was made from an eyewitness encounter and had to provide accurate information it is a strong
source. Yousaf states: “Without question, the Stinger had an immediate military impact” (source 1). He states how useless and unreliable previous means of air defence were and says that Stinger missile downs were overblown but the stinger missile did indeed have a military impact and that it was an “improvement in the rebels' air-defence capability”. Source 1 validates the argument that the Stinger missile did advantage the mujahedeen. Conclusion: The stinger missile did in fact advantage the Mujahedeen fighters against the Soviet Union by providing a more reliable form of air defence to down Soviet and Afghan aircraft. Most of the sources do in fact support the argument but few of the Sources do rebut it and support the counter argument. The Stinger missile was technologically advanced for it age of use and could only logically have been useful and have made a difference, there is not a possibility that a weapon of its calibre and advance weaponry and targeting system could not have downed enemy aircraft therefore it must have advantaged the Mujahedeen and their Jihad.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States was incredibly eager to strike back at the nations thought to be responsible for this horrific tragedy. These attacks were quickly attributed to the terrorist group al-Qa’ida, led by Osama bin Laden, and to the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qa’ida. In response, Washington approved a covert plan led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to directly attack those responsible in their Middle East safe haven. Initiated on 26 September 2001 with the approval of the warlords of the Afghan Northern Alliance, with whom the CIA had formed an intelligence liaison relationship, Operation Jawbreaker resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, the killing and capture of a significant amount of al-Qa’ida leadership, and elimination of a terrorist safe haven by early December 2001. Moreover, the Taliban’s collapse denied al-Qa’ida a pseudo-nation-state partner, serving to reduce the organization’s sanctuary to areas residing along the Pakistani border. Operation Jawbreaker, one of the first post-9/11 covert operations carried out by the United States in support of its national security interests, had proved successful. Word of the operation’s swift success astounded those back in Washington; dubbed the CIA’s “finest hour,” it signified the first of many victories by deposing the Taliban’s control of Northern Afghanistan.
Lengel, Edward G. “Spymaster in Chief”. Military History, Jun/July 2009, Vol. 78. 26 Issue 2, p. 26-35. Langguth, A. J. & Co., Ltd. Patriots.
During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, European Command (EUCOM) air defense units from 32d Air Defense Command deployed with the mission to provide security for the back door of Iraq from locations in Israel and Turkey. (Global Security) The threat the US and coalition forces faced was Sadaam Hussein’s chemical weapons arsenal. Intelligence suggested that Iraqi Forces filled both chemical and biological payloads to the Scud missiles. (Rostker) The concern was if a warhead would explode, it would release airborne agents on the US and coalition forces. US Commanders had additional concerns. Could Patriot engage the warheads successfully? Patriot capabilities were not for the purpose of the mi...
1. What do you think of when you drive by that big B-52 at the museum? Being the history buff that I am, I think about Vietnam, where that old “Buff” was used the most. “Why should I care about Vietnam?” you ask yourself. Well, last time I checked there’s a history section in the PFE guide, so there might be a test later! The intent of this paper is to inform you about Operation Linebacker II. I’ll explain the events leading up to the operation, discuss the strategy, and finally I’ll sum up the results of a bombing campaign Sir Michael Knight characterized In the book Strategic Offensive Air Operation as “...may have played a role not unlike two B-29s over Japan 27 years earlier”. (Knight: 77) I’ll start by explaining why President Richard Nixon gave the order to begin this new bombing campaign.
Army. Unfortunately fratricide was a reoccurring issue during this battle as well. Due to the lack of training and knowledge of aircraft identification, American AAA gunners and infantryman shot down several friendly planes in the heat of this battle, including several easily identifiable P-38 fighter planes. Those mistakes could have easily been avoided had the soldiers of that time been instructed of proper identification of both friendly and enemy targets. The primary focus of the battle of Kasserine was that of a technical aspect, and in no form tactical. Aside from poor aircraft identification, there was also minimal training in combining air support with maneuvering ground troops on the battle field. This supreme poverty of training in turn led to yet more fratricide and loss of friendly life. A positive lesson learned was that the most effective means of Air Defense during the battle was the use of mounting two and four .50-caliber M2 machine guns on half-tracks. One aspect that proved to be ineffective was the 37mm guns, which failed to stop or destroy the German tanks. Aware of this fact, the U.S. Army began the development of armor piercing shells and anti-tank guns. The U.S. Army was mindful of the shortcomings during the battle of Kasserine Pass and only weeks after refined and revamped its tactics and strategies in air support, amour fighting, and artillery. Due to weapon
September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.” The US immediately sent SOF units and CIA officers to recon the area and meet with the Northern Alliance. The primary battle leading up to this operation was Tora Bora, which was absent of conventional forces. Up until this point, the war on terror was predominantly a Special Operations fight along with Air Force for overhead support.3 SOF and the Northern Alliance had already displaced Taliban forces out of many towns and villages in northern Afghanistan to gain control of key terrain. Key towns in northern Afghanistan including Taloqan, Konduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif took only three weeks to clear.4 The SOF units were making huge impacts across the country calling in air strikes. At the same time the SOF units were diligently...
Kelly, D. M. (2011). The Kunar Adt and the Afghan Coin Fight. Bloomington: AuthorHouse. Retrieved November 05, 2010, from books.google.co.ke/books?isbn=1456753045
Wirtz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991. Print.
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
The United States Air Force is a key part of America’s mission to spread and assist democracy throughout the world. Air Force Special Operations Command, or AFSOC, is the elite force of the United States Air Force. The assistance of AFSOC is vital to the Air Force’s duties as well as the entire US military. The presence of special operations teams, working with foreign militaries, in Central Asia before the 9/11 terrorist attacks aided the US in gaining Air force bases in that region. AFSOC teams had made connections with the foreign militaries in several places, one of which led to the use of Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan, as a major mobility hub (Air Force Magazine).
... army of the enemy and the capacities they had. Although US intelligence said they had improved their efficiency so another Pearl Harbor doesn’t happen again, the true is that there are still imperfections on the structure of the agencies, and the rival relationship between those, makes things worse.
The sensitive subject of whether the 7th Calvary killed innocent men, women, and children at No Gun Ri arose years after the end of the Korean War. Some sources argue that the killings were unprovoked, while others claim that the Communist enemy was mixed within the refugee lines. One source claims the killings numbered over 350 innocent people and others claim it was a mere 35. Although there is a major discrepancy in the number of civilians killed, the fact that innocent men, women, and children were murdered does not disappear. Therefore, whether the casualties were 35 or 350, the United States army engaged in a massacre of innocent Korean refugees. Therefore, the killings at No Gun Ri can not be denied, whether they casualty count is high or low.
air combat losses were split almost evenly between aerial combat (46%) and air defenses (54%). By the Korean and Vietnam wars however, combat losses due to enemy air defenses had risen to approximately 90 %”( Bolkom, 2004). During the Vietnam War, the enemy air defense outshined that of the U.S. Army. Soviet Union forces helped in both equipment and workers. Surface to air missile sites, teaching air defense tactics and strategy to Vietnamese soldiers, and funding played a large factor in the capabilities they
Smith, William Y and Anatoli I. Gribkov. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, 1994.
This source provided a very good counter-argument to the usual interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It gives an insightful criticism of the Cuban Missile Crisis as seen through American propaganda. This internet article was able to give an opposite interpretation of the events and portray the U.S as the aggressor in some ways, which helped make my paper more well-rounded.