Station Nightclub Fire Case Study

71 percent of the people that were at The Station Nightclub Fire, which occurred in West Warwick Rhode Island on February 20, 2003, that either died or was injured. This paper will look at the contributing factors in this shocking number as it pertains to fire prevention. When breaking down a case study, this case being The Station Nightclub Fire, there are three main factors you must look at. Those factors are fire behavior, human behavior, and building behavior.
How the fire started and what it did after is fire behavior. The fire started just seconds into the band's opening song when pyrotechnics set off by the tour manager ignited flammable acoustic foam on both sides of the drummer's alcove at the back of the stage. The pyrotechnics

that were chosen for use were gerbs, which are cylindrical devices that produce a controlled spray of sparks. The band manager decided to used three gerbs each set to spray sparks 15 feet over a 15 second span of time. Twoof the gerbs were at 45-degree angles, with the one in the middle in a vertical position. The two 45-degree angled gerbs were the main cause for the ignition of the fire. The foam was in two layers and was the first thing that caught fire. The foam used was the highly flammable urethane foam over polyethylene foam. Polyethylene foam would have been the better choice because it is difficult to ignite although it does release much more heat once ignited than the less dense urethane.
How the people involved reacted to the fire is human behavior. The flames were initially thought to be part of the act; it was only once the fire reached the ceiling and smoke began to bank down did people realize it was uncontrolled. A few seconds after the pyrotechnics ended, the band stopped playing and lead vocalist of the band performing made a remark into the microphone, "That's not good." In less than a minute, the entire stage was consumed in flames, with most of the band members and crew fleeing for the exit that was by the stage. Rob Feeney, one of the survivors, said he and his fiancée tried to flow them through that exit but a bouncer stopped them and forced them towards the main exit like everyone else. Multiple other survivors had the same thing to say of the bouncer. This caused a backup of to many people trying to use the same doorway. On top of that, those same doors opened inwards only further compounding the problem of overcrowding at the main entrance. This is where most of the deaths and injuries took place.
How the building itself contributed to the lack of proper fire prevention during this fire is building behavior.

The foam used to pad the walls to help absorb the sound was made of highly flammable material. It is believed that this was a major contributing factor in why the fire spread at such an accelerated rate. The alarms did not go off until after 30 seconds after the fire had already started. A National Institute of Standards and Technology investigation of the fire, using computer simulations with Fire Dynamics Simulator and a mock-up of the stage area and dance floor, found that a fire sprinkler suppression system would have contained the fire for enough time to give everyone a chance to get to the exit safely. However, because of the building's age (it was 57 years old) and size (4,484 square feet), many believed the nightclub was exempt from sprinkler system requirements. This was a practice that was referred to as being grandfathered in. The building had an occupancy change after it was converted from a restaurant to a nightclub. This change removed its exemption from the law, a fact that West Warwick fire inspectors seemingly overlooked. The night of the fire, the Station was actually legally required to have a sprinkler system but it in fact did not. This led to a movement for a national Fire Sprinkler Incentive Act but unfortunately those efforts have so far

failed.
Based on the results of the model and the findings of the investigation in the article http://magazine.sfpe.org/fire-modeling/nist-station-nightclub-fire-investigation-physical- simulation-fire, National Institute of Standards and Technology made a number of recommendations to improve safety in nightclubs. The key recommendations that would call for changes to the national model building codes are:
Require the installation of an NFPA 13-compliant automatic fire sprinkler system in all new nightclubs regardless of size and in all nightclubs with an occupancy limit greater than 100 people.
Materials that ignite easily and propagate flames rapidly, such as non-fire-retarded polyurethane foam, should be clearly identifiable and be specifically forbidden as an interior finish material in all nightclubs
NFPA 1126 standard on the use of pyrotechnics before an audience to be strengthened by addressing the need for automatic sprinkler systems; minimum occupancy/building size levels; the posting of pyrotechnic use plans and emergency procedures; and setting new minimum clearances between pyrotechnics and the items they potentially could ignite.
Increase the factor of safety for determining occupancy limits in all new and existing nightclubs. This includes setting a maximum permitted evacuation time (90 seconds for nightclubs similar in size to or smaller than The Station), calculating the number of required exits and permitted occupancies (assuming that at least one exit will be inaccessible during an emergency), increasing staff training and evacuation planning, and improving means for occupants to locate emergency routes when standard exit signs are obscured by smoke.
I believe if these changes are implemented and enforced going forward that the loss of life and damages would be greatly reduced if not altogether prevented. It's a shame that it takes great loss to bring about change in most cases. We must learn from our mistakes so that we do not repeat them.