Six Day War Analysis

Since its inception in 1948, Israel’s position in the international system has been precarious due to its geopolitically vulnerable position. Located in the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East, Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab neighbors begrudged by the fact that Israel’s territorial boarders were carved out of their own countries. These neighboring states have actively sought the destruction and dismemberment of the new Jewish nation since it received its statehood. In the subsequent two decades, Israel was harassed by the surrounding countries; there were numerous skirmishes, terrorist attacks, and bombardments perpetrated with the goal of provoking Israel into a conflict. Israel got the message that war was inevitable. In June, 1967

Israel launched a series of preemptive attacks against the surrounding Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Utilizing a far better trained and equipped military, Israel demolished an astounding amount of Arab military arms and equipment. By the end of the short conflict, soon to be known as the Six-Day War, less than one thousand Israeli soldiers were dead compared to more than twenty thousand Arab casualties. Scholars have studied this conflict for decades in order to understand the motivation and rationale of the states involved.

Many argue that Realism or Neorealism explains the war most efficiently, however Constructivists claim that Realism’s disregard of the missing link between nation and state, identity and sovereignty, and statesmen and the international system shows that Realism is incapable of explaining the causes of the Six Day War (Wendt). Although both Realism and Constructivism explain most of the causes of Middle Eastern conflict, I argue that studying the Six Day War from a Neoclassical Realist viewpoint provides a more thorough working analysis because it clarifies aspects of the conflict included in all three levels of analysis to explain the motives, rationale, and behavior of the states and individuals involved. Neoclassical Realism provides the most thorough explanation of the conflict through its inclusion of relative power, state capacity and intentions, domestic politics, and, most importantly, the ability of state leaders to perceive the capabilities, intentions, and relative power of states in an effort to explain foreign policy

decisions. Viewing the Six Day War through this lens clarifies the fact that the conflict was inevitable due to the decisions of individual state leaders reacting to the structural environment imposed by the international system. To provide evidence to my claim, I first explain Neoclassical Realism and its different variables, then use each of these variables to explain the motives and causes of the conflict, then discuss problems with applying this theory to the conflict and provide counterarguments to other theories, and conclude with the implications of this theory.
Neoclassical Realism, a relatively new theoretical approach to international relations, is primarily concerned with how relative power creates the basic constraints of a particular state’s foreign policy.

Created by Gideon Rose in the late 1990s, Neoclassical Realism combines the Classical Realist and Neorealist theories, specifically Defensive Realism. This new form of Realism is an addition to Waltz’s model of Neorealism, which fails to explain foreign policy. Rose describes the theory in his 1998 article titled Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy: “It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables… The scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why it is realist. The impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why [it] is neoclassical” (Rose

146).
Neoclassical Realism has numerous variables that compose the model of the theory. To understand how Neoclassical Realism explains the causes of the Six Day War, the different variables must first be clarified. The independent variable of Neoclassical Realism is the Realist idea of an anarchic international system. The main state motivators in this structural system are the concepts of power balancing and self-help. Rose argues that relative power determines a state’s actions, writing that “instead of assuming that states seek security, states seek to control and shape their external environment. They are likely to want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so” (Rose 147). The first “intervening variable” is the individual or “unit” level, which is represented by state leaders or decision makers. State foreign policy actions are the result of a state leader’s decisions, and are affected by the leader’s ability to perceive their state’s respective relative power and security in the international system. Rose notes that the influence of structural factors is often unclear, so occasionally a state’s foreign policy does not correspond with its systemic environment because it is up to the state leader to interpret the often vague influences in order to respond (Rose 147). The second intervening variable is a state’s domestic power and capabilities. States have different internal capacities, characteristics, and abilities, and this plays a key role in how they can act and react in the systemic environment. This allows foreign policy to not simply be the result of a state leader’s decision, but also to be dependent on that state’s internal capacity. The use of ideology or nationalism, degree of a nation’s unity, level of agreement between state leaders, and the quantity and quality of state institutions impact and constrain a state’s ability to respond. However, Rose argues that “there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour” (Rose 147). While states aspire to simultaneously increase both their position of relative power and security, in order to comprehend the exact capacity of a specific state to actually accomplish these policies its domestic power and individual leaders must first be examined. Therefore, for a war to happen the international system must present a scenario where an individual state leader perceives he can increase his state’s relative power or security by attacking another state. In the context of Neoclassical Realism, war is the result of the first and second intervening variables responding to the independent variable. The Middle East, and especially the Six Day War, provides an excellent case study to utilize Neoclassical Realism because of the region’s history of interstate conflict, varying state power levels, and the constant presence of vastly influential leaders.
Due to its hazardous location, Israel’s position in the international system has been threatened for the entirety of their statehood. Israel is surrounded on all sides by Arab states, states they have been in constant conflict with. A key ideology in the Middle East at the time was Arab nationalism, the belief that all Arabs constitute a single nation. This belief shaped the demographics of the war; Israeli Jews were automatically the enemy simply because they weren’t Arabic. Israel was completely alone in the region, the only ally they could turn to was the United States. But the United States was preoccupied. In 1967 the Vietnam War was raging on in Southeast Asia, and the American leaders were primarily focused there. They had a good reason to be focused on Vietnam, too: in 1967 alone, twenty-six Americans were dying every day and the Pentagon was spending $38,052 every minute. However, even though Vietnam was “far less important to Western interests than the Middle East,” America maintained their hands-off approach to the Middle East conflict (Wawro 286-287). This lack of ally support and need for self-help, coupled with its geographical location and inability to maintain a long-term military operation, caused Israel to start developing a military doctrine of preemptive strikes that could satisfy the need to win a quick and decisive victory in enemy territory.
Israel had been constantly increasing their military power and security immediately following their independence. The United States, in a bid to increase their power and influence in the region, provided Israel with the latest military equipment, training, and advising. Israel was also developing a nuclear arms program, which Structural Realists believe to be one of the most effective ways to increase a state’s security. Enter the Soviet Union. The Russians saw this crisis in the Middle East as a way to create another “trouble spot” for the United States and to force the Americans to back Israel, which would ruin their already strained relationship with the Arabs (Wawro 262). Moscow feared a massive American retaliation if they directly attacked Israel, so instead the Russians supplied Arab states with military equipment in an attempt to bolster the Arab power and security. However, the Russian military supplies were not adequate enough to “allow contemplation of successful first-strike or total victory (Glassman 36). So although the Arab military was larger and more fully equipped, the Israeli military was better prepared for long-range preemptive strikes. Nasser, who had previously maintained relationships with both the United States and the USSR, increasingly aligned himself with the Soviets during the 1960s due to his Pan-Arabic decisions and rhetoric. This changed America’s view of Egypt from an ally to a Soviet client state, which directly opposed the United States’ goal of Communist containment (Hinnebusch 169-170). Nasser’s Soviet actions had singlehandedly spited the US enough to inhibit them from any peace-keeping objectives between Israel and Egypt. The international stage was set, and action was following close behind.