Similarities Between R. V. Dix And R V Jobidon

The Trial Court

The essence of the case was the argument that whether consenting to a fight was an enough defense to indicate the accused’s innocence in regards to assault, (which resulted in manslaughter). The accused claimed that he was not guilty since all the criteria for an act to be considered as an assault were not met; the deceased has consented to the fight.

When deciding the case, His Honor Campbell had discussed, in length, the scope of the ability of using consent as a defense against the accusation of assault, and whether or not the inability of the crown to prove lack of consent is sufficient enough to prove Mr. Jobidon’s innocence. Since, as the defendant stated, the crime of assault was only a crime if the party being assaulted

did not consent to the touching.

Judge Campbell found that the Jobidon case had many similarities with other previous cases.

It has met the res gestae tests set out in R. v. Cohen, R. v. Clark, and R.v. Andrews. However, after extensive thought and study, Judge Campbell found that this case was bound by the decision in the R. V. Dix case.

R. V. Dix and R. V. Jobidon have some similarities that pertain to both of them, both were cases where both parties had entered into a consensual fight, and both of the defendants had used the argument that the injured party had consented to enter into this fight. However, there was one major difference, which is embodied into the fact that in R. v. Dix, even though serious injuries were inflicted, it was not a case of manslaughter. Judge Campbell had reluctantly found himself bound to the decision of R. v. Dix in regards to the fact that consent can be used as a defense against being accused of assault.

Mr. Jobidon had argued that due to the fact that Mr. Haggart, had voluntarily entered into a fight with him, he cannot be charged with assault. The Criminal Code in Section 244 states:

“ 244. (1) A person commits an assault

when
(a) Without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly;
(b) He attempts or threatens, by an act or gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe upon reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or
(c) While openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs.
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual assault.”

His argument was fixated on Section 244 (a), which evolves into the fact that the presence of consent negates the presence of assault.

An argument that had won him the case and resulted in his acquittal.

I understand the reluctance of the judge to uphold this precedent, because in doing so, he would be opening the floodgates to having consent be used as a defense whenever serious bodily harm was inflicted, or as in this case, death. By accepting that consent is a good enough reason to apply force (whether deadly or not) on the consenting party, Judges will have set rules that allow people enough leeway to beat each other up with the only deterrence of how to prove consent, or how The Crown is unable to prove lack thereof.

As reasonable the defense of consent can be in this regard, I believe that Jobidon went beyond the consent given to him in the fight. It is unreasonable to think that a person getting into a fight would consent to his demise. The English court of Appeal had discussed this by saying that, excluding minor struggles, it is not in the public interest that people decide to cause each other actual bodily

harm.

Even though the Trial Judge believed that the precedent bound him, and by issuing the verdict he openly contradicted Section (14) of the Canadian Criminal Code, which states:

“No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on him, and such consent does not affect the criminal responsibility of any person by whom death may be inflicted on the person by whom consent is given.”

Judge Campbell had removed the criminal responsibility that Jobidon had to face if this article had been applied. Moreover, by doing so, the judge had actually created a new (wrongly decided) precedent allowing people to consent to their death (since R. V. Dix was concerned with serious bodily harm) and by doing so, I believe that this judgment had included other situations, where the law was clearly trying to avoid, to submerge.

These situations may include, but is not necessarily limited to, cases of doctor-assisted suicide, extreme martial arts where the object of the match is to cause serious bodily harm or the fights to the death that have no social significance or worth, and other cases where people intentionally inflict pain upon each other for sexual pleasure, which some have actually cause death, some countries, such as Switzerland has actually constituted some of these sexual practices as criminal offences. In R. V. J.A., The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it is only a criminal offence if the sexual act was performed on an unconscious person, even if the person had consented prior to losing consciousness.

His Honor, Campbell J, had found that Jobidon did not intentionally exceed the limitations of consent given to him by Mr. Haggart. Mr. Haggart had consented to a fair fight between him and Mr. Jobidon, where they had intended to continue with the fight until one of them had retreated or had given up.

Mr. Jobidon had stated that undoubtedly thought that Mr. Haggart would get up and continue fighting, he had stated that he was unaware that Mr. Haggart was unconscious during his 2 to 6 blows after landing on the car, in regards to that, as mentioned above, His Honor had ruled that he had not intentionally exceed the scope of the consent of Mr. Haggart, he had reasonably thought that the victim was still able to fight and was going to strike back any minute.

Judge Campbell had went through an exhaustive comparison of Canadian and English law, and had finally found himself bound by the judgment of R. V. Dix on the grounds that the crown was unable to prove lack of consent from the victim which results the innocence of Mr. Jobidon in regards to the crime of assault.

Mr. Jobidon was acquitted.