Shoplifter V. Stc Case Summary

QUESTION PRESENTED
Under Indiana law, whether Stranger Things Corporation is immune from liability for false imprisonment under Indiana's Shoplifting Detention Act § 35-33-6-2 when James Hopper acted with probable cause to mistakenly identify a customer with immediate medical needs, Will Byers, as a shoplifter, and detained him in a locked room for twenty minutes?

BRIEF ANSWER
No. STC will likely not have immunity because Hopper conducted the detention in an unreasonable manner by confining Byers to a locked room despite his requests for medical assistance. § 35-33-6-2 provides immunity from liability when the detention (1) has probable cause, (2) lasts for a reasonable amount of time not exceeding two hours, and (3) is conducted in a reasonable

manner. The first element requires the store agent to reasonably suspect that a person is committing theft, and is met because Hopper witnessed Byers walking speedily towards the exit with concealed merchandise. The second element requires the detention to be within the statutory limit of two hours, and is met because the incident took thirty minutes. The third element requires the detainment to not excessively restrict the detainee’s freedom of movement or cause serious harm. This is not met because Hopper confined Byers to a locked room for twenty minutes and ignored his repeated requests for medical assistance.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 27, James Hopper, Chief of Security at Stranger Things, noticed William Byers looking around nervously while pushing a shopping cart containing a PlayStation placed above store merchandise. When Byers failed to stop at the registers and started walking speedily towards the exit, Hopper suspected he may be shoplifting and requested that he stop. Byers ignored his call and increased his speed. Hopper ran to intercept Byers and asked him for a receipt for the merchandise. Byers looked flustered, did not provide a receipt, and attempted to break free.
Hopper escorted Byers to the security office for questioning. Byers, sweating profusely, explained that he had a heart condition and intended to leave the cart by the entrance to retrieve medicine from his car. He asked to leave to call his doctor. Hopper assumed Byers was faking an illness and told him he would not be free to go. He left Byers locked in the office to discuss the situation with a manager. After determining that Byers was innocent, Hopper bought him a bottle of water and told Byers he was free to leave. The situation took thirty minutes.

DISCUSSION
Stranger Things Corporation likely will not have immunity from liability for false imprisonment for William Byers’ detention because, although the detention had probable cause and lasted for a reasonable amount of time, it was not conducted in a reasonable manner through Hopper’s disregard for Byers’ medical needs and confinement in a locked room.

Indiana's Shoplifting Detention Act (ISDA) provides a store owner or agent with immunity from liability to detain a suspected shoplifter when the detention (1) has probable cause, (2) lasts for a reasonable amount of time, not extending beyond two hours (3) is conducted in a reasonable manner. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-6-2 (2016).
For the first element, Indiana courts look at whether the facts known to the store agent would lead a reasonable person to believe that the detainee may be committing theft. This is met because Hopper witnessed Byers walking speedily towards the store exit with concealed store merchandise. The second element is undisputed because the detention took thirty minutes. For the third element, detentions must not excessively restrict the detainee’s freedom of movement, or cause serious harm. This is not met because Hopper locked Byers in a room for twenty minutes and ignored his repeated requests for medical

assistance.
1. Hopper had probable cause to suspect Byers may have been shoplifting
Hopper had probable cause to detain Byers under the Indiana Shoplifting Detention Act (ISDA) because he witnessed Byers move concealed merchandise past the point of sale while walking speedily towards the store exit. The ISDA provides Indiana merchants and their agents with immunity from liability from false imprisonment suits for detaining suspected shoplifters. The immunity is triggered when a merchant has probable cause to believe a person is committing theft and detains them to verify their identity and determine whether they have unpurchased merchandise. § 35-33-6-2.
The probable cause requirement is fulfilled when the facts known at the time of the detainment would lead a reasonable person to believe that the arrestee may be committing theft.

Haltom v. Bruner & Meis, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). In Chestnet v. K-Mart Corp., a security officer observed a customer place a gas-cap into her purse and exit the store without purchasing merchandise, and detained her in-store for 30 minutes. 529 N.E.2d 131, 131-2 (Ind. Ct. App 1988). Although the customer was found innocent, the court held that the store was immune from liability because this "satisfied both the spirit and the letter" of the ISDA. 529 N.E.2d at

135.
Indiana courts hold that concealing and moving merchandise past the point of sale is sufficient probable cause to trigger ISDA immunity. Duvall v. Kroger Co., 549 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Indiana's statute § 35-43-4-4 (c) provides that concealing and moving store property past the point of sale constitutes intent for theft. Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-4-4 (c) (2016). The Indiana Federal District Court interpreted § 35-43-4-4 (c) in Pasquinelli v. Target Corp., where a customer intended to return a CD and walked out of the store holding it without going stopping at a register. The court held that this constituted concealment for the purposes of § 35-43-4-2 and was sufficient probable cause for detention. Pasquinelli, 75 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 530 (Ind. 2009).
The probable cause requirement is fulfilled when a customer exerts suspicious behavior like walking speedily towards an exit. In Bowman, a customer holding store merchandise failed to stop at two registers. The security officer saw the suspected shoplifter "walking so quickly [towards an exit]… that he had to jog to catch up.” Bowman v. State of Indiana, 468 N.E.2d at 1067. The court held that § 35-33-6-2 “encompasses all impediment … to suspected thievery" and that the customer's speedy walking was sufficient probable cause to stop the customers for investigation. Id.
Hopper had probable cause to detain Byers because the facts known to him indicated that Byers was concealing store merchandise underneath the PlayStation and moving the items past the point of sale towards the store exit. Like Chestnet, Pasquinelli, and Bowman, Byers walked past the registers and towards the store exit without payment. Byers did not conceal the item on his person like Chestnet, but in plain view like Pasquinelli. The cost of the store merchandise that Byers concealed greatly exceeds the gas-cap in Chestnet or the CD in Pasquinelli, reinforcing Hopper’s probable cause. Although Byers was found innocent upon detainment like the customers in both cases, the probable cause standard was fulfilled by Byers' failure to pay for concealed merchandise while walking past the registers.
The probable cause for Byers detainment is strengthened because Hopper had to run to catch up with Byers. Byers’ nervous glances and extremely fast pace of walking while carrying store merchandise directly towards the store exit is similar to the facts in Bowman. When Hopper requested that Byers stop for questioning, Byers ignored his call and increased his speed so that Hopper ran to catch up. The Court of Appeals in Bowman held that this "is sufficient probable cause to support the investigative stop." 468 N.E.2d at 1067.
Hopper likely had probable cause to stop Byers because the facts known to him indicated that Byers was concealing store merchandise, looking nervous, and speedily walking past the registers towards the exit. § 35-43-4-4 (c) provides that Byers’ actions can reasonably be interpreted as theft, and the Court of Appeals has held that fast pace of walking towards a store exit is sufficient probable cause for detainment. These holdings indicate that Hopper had probable cause to stop Byers.
2. Hopper's detention was unreasonable because he confined Byers in a locked room and ignored his medical needs
Hopper will likely not have immunity under the ISDA because he conducted Byers' detention in an unreasonable manner by confining him to a locked room and ignoring his urgent medical needs. The ISDA requires the detention to be reasonable in manner. § 35-33-6-2. Indiana courts hold that detentions may not (1) excessively restrict the detainee's freedom of movement and (2) cause the detainee serious harm.
When there is deprivation of the detainee's freedom of movement, Indiana courts look at whether there was a reasonable explanation, if the confinement was brief, and whether the detainee was intimidated into staying. In Dietz v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., the detainee was told to stay in the room and felt she would have faced "verbal intimidation" if she left. The court held that this did not "conclusively establish the reasonableness of the detention," and instructed a jury trial. 754 N.E.2d at 968. In Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's five-minute confinement in a locked room did not constitute false imprisonment because it was brief and had a reasonable explanation. 324 F.3d 935 (Ind. 2003). In Pasquinelli, the security officer told the detainee that he was not free to leave and handcuffed him to a chair in an unlocked room for an hour. The district court concluded this could be considered unreasonable. 75 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 530 (Ind. 2009).
The detention is unreasonable if it causes serious physical or psychological harm to the detainee. In Lazarus Dep't Store v. Sutherlin, a customer’s detention produced long-lasting physical and psychological trauma, which the Court of Appeals held entitled her to damages. 544 N.E.2d at 526-8. In a Louisiana case, a customer with a "complex … medical history" was physically hurt when the security officer closed the door on her hand while detained, leading the court to award her damages covering the cost of her medical treatments. Thomas v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarket, Inc., 561 So.2d 992, 994 (1990).
Hopper's detention of Byers is unreasonable because he restricted Byers' freedom of movement by leaving him in a locked room for twenty minutes. Although Hopper's did not use verbal intimidation like the officer in Dietz, he told Byers that he would not be free to leave like in Pasquinelli. Hopper's conduct can be distinguished from Adams because although Byers' detention had a reasonable explanation, it was four times as long. In both Dietz and Pasquinelli, the court could not conclusively establish the reasonableness of the detention and STC is likely to face the same level of scrutiny.