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Recommended: Functionalism theory
Introduction
The object of this essay is to depict as to whether or not artificial intelligence (A.I.) is possible from the use of arguments by Alan Turing, John Searle, and Jerry Fodor. To accomplish the task at hand; I shall firstly, describe the Turing Test and explain how it works, secondly, describe Functionalism and to detail on how it allows for future A.I. Thirdly, I will describe and explain Searle’s argument and example of the “Chinese room”, and finally I shall describe and explain a few replies to Searle’s “Chinese room” argument. However, due to the time constraint I will be unable to fully analyze Searle’s reply to all of his critiques, rather I will now state Searle’s counter to the objections with a simple point; they all are inadequate because they fail to come to
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grips with the actual Chinese Room argument. In the end, this essay will demonstrate as to why not only A.I. is possible, but also that it is on its way and will arrive in the near future. (i) The Turing Test was created by Alan Turing in an attempt to answer his proposed question as to if a machine could pass as a thinking machine. To begin with attempting to solve the question, Turing proposes a game which he addresses as the “Imitation Game”. As stated by Turing, the game is played with a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either gender. However, the one who is the interrogator must stay in a separate room apart from the other two. According to Turing, the objective of the game is for the interrogator to determine which one of the two players is the man and which is the woman. Furthermore, Turing points out that the interrogator knows the other players as X and Y, and that the interrogator must make a decision at the end of the game by stating that either “X is A and Y is B” or “X is B and Y is A”. Moreover, the interrogator in the game is allowed to ask questions (which should be responded to by either written or typewritten answers ensuring that the tone of the voices do not assist the interrogator) to the man and woman in order to help identify the gender. In addition, the objective of A is to try to cause C to make the wrong identification, while B’s objective is to help C. For instance, Turing asserts that the interrogator could impose the question of X’s hair, which X could reply to as, “My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long”. As depicted by the example, the interrogator poses a question to assist him/herself in identifying the gender, however, the man makes in attempt in leading the interrogator to make the wrong identification by supplying an answer based upon general female appearances. Since the task is of identifying the gender of the two players, it will be a difficult task for the interrogator, one that they may not succeed in. Therefore, Turing puts forward the question of “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?”. Additionally, Turing wonders if the interrogator will decide wrongly as often when the game is played with a machine than when the game is played with a man and woman. Turing also addresses the objection of whether a machine can be constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily, which he believes we should not be troubled by. In other words, Turing is stating that being able to fool the interrogator often enough is a sufficient condition for deciding that the computer can think, even though perhaps not a necessary condition: there might be computers that do not succeed in the game, but are still thinking in some other way. While the goal of the Turing Test is clearly defined and depended on Turing’s original question of whether machines can think, it should be noted that the game may have another goal in breaking gender inequality. As discussed in class, Turing was a homosexual that faced enormous amounts of discrimination, all after his vital contributions to computer science and his large part in breaking the German code in World War II. Furthermore, he was prosecuted in 1953 on the basis of his sexuality and given “medicine” from which he could have been cyanide poisoned which lead to his death. In class it was mentioned that since Turing faced this discrimination, he would understand the amount of pain and suffering those who are also discriminated against would face. Therefore, with the Turing Test there was a strong possibility in demonstrating that a man and woman are not different by depicting how one cannot even notice the difference between the genders if placed in a separate room where they cannot physically identify the gender. (ii) Functionalism has been a vital component to the idea of A.I., and as discussed later on, it was the key target of Searle’s objection to A.I. Thus, Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states, and how mental states are identified by what they do rather than what they are made up of. In other words, functionalism is the arrangement of the components involved that is essential to the overall structure (in this case the brain). In addition, according to functionalism mental states are functional states. In the case of computers they themselves are machines that implement functions. Thus, if functionalism is true, mental states can be similar to program states of computers, which would allow for a machine running the right computer program to have mental states. The machine could possess beliefs, memories, and pain, and could have a mind that can be seen as intelligent, and allowing for A.I. to exist. Moreover, it is important that we note that computationalism states that roles or activities of the mind are computational, for instance, the mind manipulates symbols like flipping images in the brain (which requires calculations in mathematics), and therefore, the mind is sort of a computer. The relevance of computationalism lies upon the basis that according to functionalism and computationalism “the program is to the hardware as the mind is to the brain”. Hence, if minds can perform calculations (which are considered as a mental activity) and what the mind is made up of not mattering, then it is possible for machines to think. (iii) In John Searle’s “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program”, he constructs his argument on the premise of functionalism to state that A.I.
is false. To accomplish this, Searle uses the example of “the Chinese Room” to challenge strong AI, and to object to Turing’s test. Searle begins by stating to imagine himself in a room with a box of Chinese characters which he could not understand, but in the room he had a book of instructions in English which he could understand. Searle then states that if there was a group Chinese speakers’ outside of the room passing him messages in Chinese, he would not understand, but could reply with the symbols in with the use of the instructions to form an appropriate response. Furthermore, Searle states that the Chinese speakers would think that the speakers were speaking to a Chinese speaker; however, realistically they were talking to a confused John Searle. Therefore, as Searle states, if a computer were to be placed in Searle’s position, the rule would become the “computer program”, and the basket of symbols the “data base”, it would prove that the machine would not understand Chinese, but only simulate that knowledge, which is not truly
intelligence. Furthermore, Searle’s Chinese Room argument is particularly directed functionalism’s concept of strong AI, and not weak AI since weak AI makes no claim that machines can think. The claim from Strong A.I. according to Searle is that it claims that thinking is merely the manipulation of formal symbols. Additionally, as stated by Searle, this view can be summarized to “the mind is to the brain as the program is to the hardware”. Searle demonstrates his argument against strong A.I. in the Chinese room, however, there is a much deeper argument that Searle makes and is derived from the Chinese room. Searle makes a point in demonstrating that programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor sufficient for the mind, and to demonstrate, Searle depicts the disparity between programs and the mind. Searle argues that programs implemented by computers are just syntactical, computer operations are formal in that they respond only to the physical form of the strings of symbols, not the meaning of the symbols, whereas, minds have states with meanings unlike programs. Therefore, Searle constructs a four premise argument; the first of which, states that computer programs are formal or syntactic (syntax). The second premise states that human minds have mental contents (semantics). However, syntax is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for semantic content (the third premise). Hence, the fourth premise asserts (and as stated previously) that programs by themselves are not constitutive of, nor sufficient for minds, or strong A.I is false. (iv) The Chinese room argument from Searle has seen its fair share of replies, two of which have rose to prominence over the others. The first is the Systems Reply and the reply points out that although Searle’s argument is logical against AI, it can be seen as sort of unfair due to the critique of one part of the Chinese Room system. In other words, Searle sets out three parts to the argument; the man, the box, and the rule book, however, Searle’s critique is concentrated on the fact that only the man does not understand, therefore, existing to be unfair since the man is one part of the whole. For instance, the functionalist would see it as illogical to state that the man does not comprehend the language for the reason that it would be painfully obvious that he would not understand for he is one part. Furthermore, the functionalist would reply by stating that while the man does not understand, the whole room does understand due to parts making the product according to functionalism. The second famous respond to Searle is known as the “Robot Reply” and it first attacks semantics for the reason it is not clear. For instance, the definition of semantics is that it is the meaning of a word, however, how does one give a word a meaning? For illustration, consider that I do not know what the word cat means and am completely unfamiliar with the word. However, one day as I walk I notice a cat and some person near me points at the cat and tells me that it is a cat. Therefore, with this in mind, I will associate the word “cat” with the physical image of the cat I have just seen to form a meaning of the word cat. As this illustration depicts, a meaning of the word cat was able to come from the association of the word with the physical image of the cat. Hence, given how this may be one way one becomes to know what cats are, the Robot Reply proposes that if we were to put a computer into a robot’s body, attached with television cameras onto the robot head, and installed transducers connecting the TV messages to the computer; it could learn by seeing and doing likewise to a human. Furthermore, this type of computer in a robot body which is freed from the room could attach meanings to symbols and actually understand natural language, allowing for A.I. to exist. Thus, according to the Robot Reply if we were to give the symbols in the program a meaning, then Searle’s argument against A.I. would fail. Furthermore, Searle lists a few other common objections to his illustration of the Chinese Room, which also happen to amaze him due to the number and vehemence of the defenders. The first of which is stating that the man in the Chinese room does indeed understand, albeit Searle explicitly stating that the man does not indeed understand. The explanation for this is asserted to be that despite the fact the man in the room does not understand Chinese, if it is possible after all, to understand something without knowing that one understands it. Similarly, the second objection states that while Searle does not understand Chinese, however, the unconscious subsystem in Searle does, since it is possible to have unconscious mental states. Therefore, there is no reason that Searle understanding Chinese is not “wholly” unconscious. Thirdly, the objection puts forward that the semantics Searle alludes to, do not exist anyway; there is only syntax. For instance, the objection states that it is a kind of prescientific illusion to suppose that there exist in the brain some mysterious “mental contents”, hence, only some sort of synaptic symbol manipulation exists in the brain (similarly on computers). The fourth objection asserts that Searle is not truly running the computer program, but only thinks he is. Since once the conscious agent of his goes through the steps of the program, it ceases to be a case of implementing a program at all. The last objection to Searle’s argument states that if the program were to simulate the operation of the brain of a Chinese speaker, then it would understand Chinese due to all the neuron level being identical to the brain of a Chinese individual. Thus, this type of system would most likely understand Chinese as well as a Chinese speaker. Problem with Functionalism & Searle’s argument Due to functionalism’s concept of organization of parts being essential to itself, it can led to absurd logics when this concept is applied. For instance, we know that according to functionalism it does not matter what the brain is made of, if they are organized properly and if it does the job, hence why A.I. can exist in terms of functionalism. However, imagine if we were able to gather all of the citizens of China, and specifically assigned them to accomplish tasks as a brain would, and this would lead to the remembrance of; for say one’s “grandmother”. Since the parts are organized properly, functionalists would have to accept this, therefore, stating that China is a brain, thus depicting the absurdness of functionalism. Conclusion In conclusion, it is clear that while Searle’s argument seems logical in a sense, it proves false as exemplified by the Robot Reply, and likewise from the Systems Reply (a reply which even Searle himself has agreed with). Despite the fact that the concept of functionalism can be proven to be absurd, and the fact that there has been no machine which has come close to passing the Turing Test as of yet, nonetheless it still should be concluded with confidence that not only A.I. is possible, but also that it is on its way, and will arrive in the near future.
Andy Clark strongly argues for the theory that computers have the potential for being intelligent beings in his work “Mindware: Meat Machines.” The support Clark uses to defend his claims states the similar comparison of humans and machines using an array of symbols to perform functions. The main argument of his work can be interpreted as follows:
Both Searle and Lycan agree that individual objects within a system cannot be considered thinking. In other words, both Searle and Lycan believe that in the example of the Chinese room, the man does not understand the language by himself. It is very obvious to Lycan that an object as part of a system cannot understand or think on its own. He argues that it must be part of a greater system which as a whole system can understand the Chinese. It is this whole system that understands. Lycan criticizes Searle for looking to much at the individual parts of a system and not at the system as a whole. Lycan even pokes fun at Searle when he says, "Neither my stomach nor Searle's liver nor a thermostat nor a light switch has beliefs and desires." The man who responds in Chinese using the "data banks" of Chinese symbols is, according to Lycan, understanding as part of a system. Although as an individual, the man is unable to "understand" Chinese, he can, as a whole system understand it.
I agree with Strawson in saying that we are not truly morally responsible for what we do, in a mental respect at least. Though it suffers from many faults, there are also ways to even more clarify his argument, as I will hope to do so in the following. First off, Strawson states that for someone to be truly morally responsible, we have to understand the points that he has given. The first being that we do what we do because of the way we are. These just states that the things we do and decide are based upon how we are in that moment, in mental respects. For example, when it comes to choosing what to eat between options A or B, I will choose option A because of how I am. But if you were to choose, it would be dependent on the way that you are
Héctor L Carral, a multimedia engineer wrote an article titled Stop Saying Technology is causing Social Isolation for The Huffington Post. The author of the article has a biased option, therefore does not include any research that would refute his argument. Carral states “it’s only obvious to blame them [technology] for some of society’s problems. Carral also states I believe that accusing technology (and, again, especially smartphones) of ruining social interaction and even all kinds of experiences is, to say the least, quite wrong and misguided. There was an obvious division between the commenters who agree with Carral and those who disagree with his argument. The demographics of commentators. From observing the occupations that the commenters listed, it was apparent the people who were against Hector Carral’s article were parents and educators while the people who agreed with his
The purpose of this paper is to present John Searle’s Chinese room argument in which it challenges the notions of the computational paradigm, specifically the ability of intentionality. Then I will outline two of the commentaries following, the first by Bruce Bridgeman, which is in opposition to Searle and uses the super robot to exemplify his point. Then I will discuss John Eccles’ response, which entails a general agreement with Searle with a few objections to definitions and comparisons. My own argument will take a minimalist computational approach delineating understanding and its importance to the concepts of the computational paradigm.
On December 2,2015 I went to to the Lynnhaven building to receive some feedback on my agreement paper for English 111. It was a very rainy day after running through the rain when I reached the writing center room. There was a yellow note saying that the writing center was in the student center until December 4,2015. After reading the note I ran back in the rain to my car.It was to cold to walk it was raining. As I approached the student center I was told by a security guard that the tutoring lab was located on the third floor. I had walked up three flights of stairs. When I had finally reached the third floor,I walk into the tutoring lab. There were about eight tables, but only four staff members and one student. Amen had approached me asking what did I need help with today. I replied saying that I would like some feedback on my paper for English. He then pointed to the writing table and said “she can assist you with your paper”.
John Searle’s Chinese room argument from his work “Minds, Brains, and Programs” was a thought experiment against the premises of strong Artificial Intelligence (AI). The premises of conclude that something is of the strong AI nature if it can understand and it can explain how human understanding works. I will argue that the Chinese room argument successfully disproves the conclusion of strong AI, however, it does not provide an explanation of what understanding is which becomes problematic when creating a distinction between humans and machines.
Since antiquity the human mind has been intrigued by artificial intelligence hence, such rapid growth of computer science has raised many issues concerning the isolation of the human mind.
This world of artificial intelligence has the power to produce many questions and theories because we don’t understand something that isn’t possible. “How smart’s an AI, Case? Depends. Some aren’t much smarter than dogs. Pets. Cost a fortune anyway. The real smart ones are as smart as the Turing heat is willing to let ‘em get.” (Page 95) This shows that an artificial intelligence can be programmed to only do certain ...
Computers are machines that take syntactical information only and then function based on a program made from syntactical information. They cannot change the function of that program unless formally stated to through more information. That is inherently different from a human mind, in that a computer never takes semantic information into account when it comes to its programming. Searle’s formal argument thus amounts to that brains cause minds. Semantics cannot be derived from syntax alone. Computers are defined by a formal structure, in other words, a syntactical structure. Finally, minds have semantic content. The argument then concludes that the way the mind functions in the brain cannot be likened to running a program in a computer, and programs themselves are insufficient to give a system thought. (Searle, p.682) In conclusion, a computer cannot think and the view of strong AI is false. Further evidence for this argument is provided in Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment. The Chinese Room states that I, who does not know Chinese, am locked in a room that has several baskets filled with Chinese symbols. Also in that room is a rulebook that specifies the various manipulations of the symbols purely based on their syntax, not their semantics. For example, a rule might say move the squiggly
In this paper I will evaluate and present A.M. Turing’s test for machine intelligence and describe how the test works. I will explain how the Turing test is a good way to answer if machines can think. I will also discuss Objection (4) the argument from Consciousness and Objection (6) Lady Lovelace’s Objection and how Turing responded to both of the objections. And lastly, I will give my opinion on about the Turing test and if the test is a good way to answer if a machine can think.
The official foundations for "artificial intelligence" were set forth by A. M. Turing, in his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" wherein he also coined the term and made predictions about the field. He claimed that by 1960, a computer would be able to formulate and prove complex mathematical theorems, write music and poetry, become world chess champion, and pass his test of artificial intelligences. In his test, a computer is required to carry on a compelling conversation with humans, fooling them into believing they are speaking with another human. All of his predictions require a computer to think and reason in the same manner as a human. Despite 50 years of effort, only the chess championship has come true. By refocusing artificial intelligence research to a more humanlike, cognitive model, the field will create machines that are truly intelligent, capable of meet Turing's goals. Currently, the only "intelligent" programs and computers are not really intelligent at all, but rather they are clever applications of different algorithms lacking expandability and versatility. The human intellect has only been used in limited ways in the artificial intelligence field, however it is the ideal model upon which to base research. Concentrating research on a more cognitive model will allow the artificial intelligence (AI) field to create more intelligent entities and ultimately, once appropriate hardware exists, a true AI.
He believes that it is not possible for a machine to actually think like a human. They follow particular codes that make them function without having the actual intelligence. Searles gives an example about a guy who can learn a way to understand Chinese without knowing how to speak it, write it, nor read it. The person just follows sets of instructions that are made to manipulate the uninterpreted formal symbols. This would completely make it seem like he understands the language. By this theory, Searles trying to prove that even when a computer has any type of formal program, it would still not be capable of understanding it. The machine will simply simulate the instructions and it would have nothing to do with having intellectual abilities, just
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
Crevier, D. (1999). AI: The tumultuous history of the search for Artificial Intelligence. Basic Books: New York.