Robert M. Citino's latest work attempts to determine whether there is a uniquely German style of fighting wars. Although he really does not examine the Thirty Years' War so much as its aftermath and the focus until 1871 is, of course, on the Prussian military and not those of other Germanic states, Citino does identify what he considers a German way of war. Citino's thesis is that Prussia, largely due to its position amidst other powers, developed a tradition of fighting "'short and lively' wars" (p. xiii) which emphasized the rapid maneuver and an aggressive spirit of attacking the enemy whenever possible, preferably with a flanking movement of some sort. To achieve this latter objective, field commanders were given considerable leeway to …show more content…
judge for themselves when to attack and Citino believes Prussian-German commanders were not hesitant to exercise this independence. To support his contentions, Citino traces a series of illustrative German military operations from Great Elector Frederick William's victory at the Battle of Warsaw in 1656 to the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Citino's efforts plainly aim at modifying some generally accepted notions about Germany's military history. One of these ideas, prevalent in the U.S. Army today, is that Prussia and Germany's military success sprang largely from the efforts of staff officers who studied warfare intellectually and rationally and made it more a science than an art through the development of what is generally called Auftragstaktik. In this view, the general staff laid out the parameters of an operational plan under whose guidelines field officers operated with a maximum flexibility to achieve the larger goals. Citino finds repeated examples of German field commanders working at cross purposes with overall command objectives and sometimes each other. He concludes that it is much more accurate to assume that the German way of war was based on attacking the enemy at the first reasonable moment with scant regard to prior planning. For Citino, Germany's officer corps' operational behavior was governed more by an aggressive offensive ethos than any sort of intellectual and rational planning. Far from being characterized by a perfect balance of staff planning and control and operational flexibility, the German strategy often involved no real coordination of subordinate commanders which, Citino notes, was unthinkable in the days before modern communication technologies. Many of these field commanders violated orders from superiors in order to push more aggressively, as demonstrated by Heinz Guderian in France in 1940, Hermann von Francois in East Prussia in 1914 and Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz in the 1700s. Indeed, Citino states in his conclusion that the current understanding of Auftragstaktik simply was not a component of Germany's military history. Citino also challenges the idea that Germany developed the notion of a war of movement (Bewegungskrieg) or, as it is more popularly known, blitzkrieg, in the 1920s and 1930s in the wake of the defeat in World War One.
Citino cites ample evidence to show that Germany, and Prussia before it, had always sought to fight short wars because of its paucity of resources and central position in Europe. Short wars necessitated speed, audacity and nimble operational maneuvers. In turn, these priotities required commanders to be aggressive and seize the earliest possible moment to try to force a battlefield decision. Citino presents repeated examples of this pattern as a hallmark of Prussian/German operations from the seventeenth century to the early phase of World War II. For Citino, this is the German way of war: a war of movement intended to bring a sudden and decisive victory. Simply put, Citino sees that Germany (and Prussia before it) simply did not have the luxury of time in fighting, which necessitated the development of Bewegungskrieg early on in the Prussian military tradition. For Citino, blitzkrieg merely constitutes the effective adaptation of new technologies to this traditional Prussian/German style of …show more content…
fighting. Overall, Citino's re-interpretation is well supported by his evidence, most of which, given that this is a work of synthesis, is based on secondary or published primary sources rather than archival work. He presents multiple examples to support his case and effectively supports his assertions about trends in the German military over time. He offers a compelling alternative explanation to overly idealized views of the Prussian and German militaries that exist in some quarters of the English-speaking world today. Nevertheless, some weaknesses trouble Citino's otherwise sound work. First, he tends to present the German way of war in isolation from other developments, even in military affairs. For instance, it is common among military historians to credit Napoleon with the development of the operational, indeed strategic, goal of seeking to destroy one's enemy in a climactic battle. Yet Citino never mentions this historiographic position as one that needs reworking in light of a clearer understanding of earlier Prussian developments. Nor does he compare how the German offensive mentality leading up to World War I compared with that in France. Indeed, the book includes very little discussion of foreign influences on Germany's military development. Citino also claims his work is correcting the neglect of operational history endemic in the New Military History (which is no longer all that new).
Yet Citino tends to neglect the impact of broader social, economic and cultural factors on military affairs. For example, little attention is paid to the impact of the paucity of resources on Prussia's war-making capabilities, one of the main factors behind Prussia's need for quick victories. Citino writes nothing about the role of nationalism as a motivational factor for troops. This omission seems significant, given scholars' wide acceptance of the claim that the spread of nationalism greatly facilitated both the growth of military forces and the reliability of the average soldier to perform a wide array of duties without immediate supervision, particularly those involving speed and offensive actions. Indeed, the book makes no mention of how growth in education, literacy and technological skill encouraged this development as well. Certainly, these issues would not command extensive attention in a book of this sort, but incorporating the useful findings of the New Military History might have been better than simply setting it up as a straw
man. Lastly, there is the matter of style; Citino is, on the whole, a very good writer, but sometimes falls victim to overt glibness. For example, he refers to the Prussian commanders of 1806 as "a group of men long past their sell-by date" (p. 110), and elsewhere to "happenstance" (p. 100). Such examples can simply be written off as stylistic idiosyncrasies, but they occur frequently and consistently enough that when coupled with the aforementioned tendency to omit discussions of broader trends, they detract slightly from the overall quality of the work. The book also suffers from a shortage of maps, particularly to accompany the descriptions of battles, surprising for a work so proudly devoted to operational history. On the whole, Citino's significant book deserves attention from a wide range of historians and military thinkers. He successfully demonstrates that Germany's military history indeed follows a consistent path from its origins in the Prussia of the Great Elector through the National Socialist era and the first part of World War II, though that path is not necessarily the one commonly accepted by students of the German military; that is, that Bewegungskrieg is older than often accepted and Auftragstatik did not exist as commonly defined by experts today. Whether this characterization constitutes a completely distinct German path or not, Citino does not conclusively demonstrate, because of the lack of a comparative element. Yet, Citino's argument is sufficiently compelling in showing a consistency within Germany's military history to merit the reassessment of some significant assumptions about this nation's military heritage and legacy.
I learned many things about Philip Caputo and his tour of duty. He described how he felt in the beginning about the Vietnamese people, which was not as much hate since him and the other soldiers were not as knowledgeable about all the conflict that was taking place in Vietnam. Caputo was very opinionated towards his views of the Vietnamese people. He actually felt sorry for all the villagers who had to see and deal with the negative environment that was brought upon them, and bear the Marines who probed their homes for prohibited Viet Cong relations. Caputo did not find it fair how the American troops mistreated the villagers and protected the concept of apprehending the Viet Cong. However, throughout the end of his tour, he and his men disliked the VC very strongly, learned how to hate and wanted to kill them.
The mannerisms, attitudes, and background of the American and British soldiers contrasted greatly. The values held by the individual soldiers of the two armies differed. American soldiers had a tendency to think on their own accord and often with liberty in mind (143). In contrast, the British soldiers held the values that their army held (144). American soldiers often fought with the same men from their town or village (142). The British soldiers, however, were pulled from society and isolated from it (144). During the time of the British soldiers’ isolation, they were tightly disciplined and rigorously trained (144). This too shows a contrast between the British and American soldiers. British soldiers underwent a stricter regimen of training while the training Americans had was more informal. The commanding men of the armies, the officers, were different as well. The British officers held themselves aloof from war and quite distant from their men (145). British officers were also much harsher on their men and trained them more effectively (136). The American officer sought to achieve the refinement of the British officers but often failed in achieving it. (145). The training American officers gave to their men was also not as cohesive like the
Overall McPherson’s reasons for the soldiers motivations were clear and concise, easy to follow and understand allowing for easy interpretation of the book. McPherson also includes multiple quotes from various letters and diary entries to support his statements which gives his statements credibility. The reasons for motivation presented in the book were convincing and were supported by numerous quotes.
According to Duffy, “The famous “oblique” attack of Frederick was therefore, no innovation, but what Old Fritz succeeded in doing was to translate the hoary old idea into an instrument of war.” This was a continues process of evolution of applying tactics to the current battlefield. Notably a skilled tactician, Frederick understood the importance of a disciplined military. This style of discipline desired was nothing short of obedience. Duffy also mentioned, “the common soldier much fear his officer more than the enemy.” Officer was to lead from the front of the formations and ensure to instill fear in soldiers, so in the time of danger, soldiers would obey the officer in charge of the
World War I is marked by its extraordinary brutality and violence due to the technological advancement in the late 18th century and early 19th century that made killing easier, more methodical and inhumane. It was a war that saw a transition from traditional warfare to a “modern” warfare. Calvary charges were replaced with tanks; swords were replaced with machine guns; strategic and decisive battles were r...
Nationalism influenced people’s thoughts about war, twisting their minds to believe that their government and military was supreme and would win a war quickly. Because “most European countries, with the exception of France and Prussia, had not had any major wars within the 19th century, they stepped into the 20th century thinking that they were immune to defeat. This idea of immunity developed as countries forgot of their past wars and sufferings. The British were confident in their naval forces, the Germans in their arms and ships, and the Russians thought their land was protected by God. Citizens strongly believed that their country was the best and would do just about anything to help their country. It became a school boy’s duty to enlist in the army upon his graduation. As Erich Maria Remarque states in his book, All Quiet on the Western Front, the “young men of twenty... whom Kantorek calls the ‘Iron Youth,’” are the ones sent off to war in Germany. Their teachers drilled this message into their minds from a young age. The boys were told that it was their duty to their country to fight. Zara Steiner, British Historian, related that British teachers were told “to teach boys that success in w...
The whole of Paul Bäumer’s class joined the army voluntarily due to Kantorek’s rhetoric on nationalism. National pride is portrayed as outdated and only useful for national leaders seeking to control the populace. Yet it become rather crass when it drives men and countries blindly forward to death and ruin. It is this very same force that is drove Kantorek’s students to join the army, and for that they abhorred him. The other characters’ quickly learned how pointless pride was on the battlefield and in the trenches. Paul f...
However, when confronted with a strict policy of appeasement, by both the French and the English, the stage was set for a second World War. Taylor constructs a powerful and effective argument by expelling certain dogmas that painted Hitler as a madman, and by evaluating historical events as a body of actions and reactions, disagreeing with the common idea that the Axis had a specific program from the start. The book begins with the conclusion of the First World War, by exploring the idea that critical mistakes made then made a second war likely, yet not inevitable. Taylor points out that although Germany was defeated on the Western front, “Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage.”
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
The Prussian Army relied upon the service of mercenaries and by plan, minimized the use of townspeople from the Prussian sovereigns to fill any remaining requirements, and only required short service terms. This manning approach had two economic benefits; it maximized the number of people left in the w...
To carry on, prior to World War I, numerous wars such as the American Civil War, the Napoleonic Wars, or the Opium War of China had been fought, but mostly for the sole purposes of territorial expansion or acquiring resources. However, “World War I was greeted with incredible enthusiasm. Each of the major belligerents was convinced of the rightness of its cause, demonstrating the power of nationalism.” (William J. Duiker and Jackson J. Spielvogel, World History, vol. 2, 667). After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the views of war changed drastically, and a new romantic idea about the war was born. War was now perceived as a great opportunity to prove an individual’s or nation’s greatness. “Now, God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour,
Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, until now remains one of the most influential studies in understanding character, nature and conditions of warfare. In his book Clausewitz not only traced an interaction of intension and planning with the realities of combat, but by exploring the relationship of war to policy, politics and society gave a new philosophical justification to the art of war. (Heuser, 2002)
The Guns of August by Barbara W. Tuchman condensed the opening drama of The Great War into 440 pages. “Europe as a powder keg” is easily described and articulated through analysis of the belligerents’ pre-war operations and alliances. Barbara Tuchman is a Pulitzer Prize winning historian and journalist, her main focus centers around geopolitical affairs. Tuchman’s analysis of the first thirty days of the war demonstrates how inadequate each nation’s military was at the wars onset. The Guns of August present the reader with the primary factors of the disposition, political, and initial combat operations that shaped the First World War. However, the Author’s writing style was the forefront in conveying to the reader that Europe was foolishly
Because the leaders and commanders of WWI forever changed the nature of war, it influenced the later Nazi leaders decisions, and forced the next set of Allies to adapt to an entirely new concept of total war as i...