Revenge And Retributivism In Nozick's Theory Of Retribution

Revenge and retribution are often incorrectly grouped together and taken as synonymous terms describing the same thing. While at first glance this erroneous alignment may seem ostensibly fitting, but in actuality, this is indicative of a misunderstanding of what both terms really entail. Moreover, this confusion frequently transgresses the misuse of terminology and gets inaccurately applied to a theory of punishment known as retributivism. Since the latter half of the 20th century, retribution has become one of the most influential and persuasive theories of punishment, arguably displacing even its principle rivals—deterrence and rehabilitation theory. Despite its prevalence, there is a pervasive sentiment that manifests in this fallacious,

As one of the most influential retributivists of the 20th century, Herbert Morris offers a distributive justice characterization of retributive punishment. According to his view, laws act as constraints on behavior which society deems collectively advantageous. When individuals deviate from these laws for their own rational reasons, they are effectively subverting the system by deriving personal gain without paying the societal costs, essentially making them comparable to free riders. In order to restore the equilibrium that crime disrupts, punishment of a lawbreaker must remove the unfair advantage ascertained through committing the crime. As explained by Jean Hampton, “Punishment of these free riders is a way to “even up the score”: the legal system takes away, by means of pain, the benefit these individuals derived from their lawbreaking.” In essence, Morris’s justification of retributive punishment can be understood from

Her theory of retributive punishment diverges from other retributivists by expanding the debate beyond the conflict of intuitions. Ironically enough, Hampton herself once experienced the same confused perception about retribution, actually arguing that it was similar to revenge. After her change in perspective, she deviated from other retributivists about the moral foundation of retribution, by claiming, “retribution is not foundational.” Instead, Hampton distinguishes revenge from retribution by asserting that retributive punishment is justified in that it invalidates criminals’ false claims about the value of victims. Hampton separates her theory into two retributive ideas, the first being punishment as defeat. From this viewpoint, when a person commits a crime, the wrongdoer is claiming an elevated status over the victim in respect to personal value. The core aspect of this first retributive idea, as Hampton proposes, is that “retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at the hands of the victim…that symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim.” In essence, the motive for retributive punishment is intended to counter the wrongdoer’s alleged superiority and in dong so reaffirms the victim’s real personal value. The second retributive idea that Hampton presents