René Descartes' Meditations

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René Descartes' Meditations

René Descartes’ argument that he does not know his piece of wax through his senses is rather straightforward. First, his sensory perceptions of the wax are its color, scent, sound, texture, temperature and the like. However, these purported properties of the wax are not constant; if the wax is brought close to a flame, its color, sound, texture and all the rest will change. Nevertheless, Descartes claims, no one would deny that the object now by the fire is the same wax that was first away from the fire. Descartes implies that it is evident and obvious that the wax, though its appearance to the senses is wholly changed, is still the same wax. Let us grant this. Because the wax is still the same wax even after all of its sensory properties have changed, the essential properties of the wax—those primary properties which define what the wax really is—must not be found among it’s sensory properties, as these have changed, but the essential properties have not.

Descartes then considers whether it is through his imagination that he knows the wax, rather than through his senses, but finds this lacking as well. First, let us delineate what Descartes means by “imagination.” Earlier in the Meditations, Descartes describes imagination as a mental simulation—of a sensory nature—of a corporeal entity. That is to say, when we imagine something we contemplate a mental image of some object. This mental object, an individual instance of imagining, is therefore precise, in the sense that the object is imagined as possessing certain properties.

Now, because the wax’s essential properties are not to be found among its sensory characteristics, we discard them to see what is left. Descartes specifies that only ...

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...ng”) and there may not even be corporeal things about which we can gain accurate sensory perceptions. Were this the case, however, reason alone could also not know the wax, because there would be no wax to know, no substance with the properties of extension, flexibility, and mutability. That this is so is not counter to the spirit of the Meditations either, as Descartes’ entire discussion of the wax is couched in his indulgence of his deep-seated belief in the existence of external physical objects, of which the wax is archetypical. That “an inspection of the mind” will not suffice for true perception of the wax without the aid of sensory and perhaps imaginative perception should come as no surprise, however. After all, even if we are only thinking things—only minds—our capacity to sense, to imagine, and to reason and understand are all modes of that self-same mind.

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