Relationship Between Abbasid Caliphate

Most people have heard the timeless adage “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This sentiment applies perfectly when describing the relationship between Charles the Great’s Carolingian Dynasty and the Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth century CE. These two expanding empires faced mutual enemies in both the Ummayad Caliphate as well as the Byzantine Empire. The Ummayad Caliphate had been disrupting Charlemagne’s empire from Spain; this eventually led to the creation of the Spanish March, a buffer zone intended to control his Muslim enemies. This caliphate also was naturally against the Abbasid Caliphate, as the two different groups each sought to be the dominant Caliphate in the Muslim world. Additionally, the Byzantines under Empress Irene inhibited

the expansion of the Carolingians, and they also were the subject of military aggression from Harun al-Rashid, the Abbasid leader. Thus, Charlemagne and al-Rashid had clear mutual interests in terms of foreign policy. The Abbasid leader first “exchange[d] envoys and gifts” in roughly 798 CE, and these trades eventually led to the formulation of an alliance between the empires (Nourallah, 51). Ultimately, Charlemagne agreed to this alliance for strategic and military reasons, but both empires also received economic and cultural benefits from the alliance.
Charlemagne’s main motivation for the Carolingian-Abbasid alliance was the desire to establish an ally against two nearby enemies.

Charles the Great first led an invasion of the Ummayad Caliphate into Spain in 778 CE. This invasion ended unsuccessfully and forced a Carolingian retreat back to France (Royal Frankish Annals). More importantly, this defeat illustrated the power the weakened Ummayad Caliphate still possessed. Spain clearly was still a remaining stronghold for the Ummayads. Consequently, Charlemagne was wary of his enemies in Spain, and control of the Spanish March was a constant objective and priority during the rest of his reign. He foresaw the need for future assistance against his Ummayad enemies, so he turned to the Abbasid Caliphate as allies. The Abbasids were the first to successfully depose the Ummayads in the Middle East, as they were mostly responsible for labeling the Ummayads as infidels and sparking a revolution against them in 750 CE (Marin-Guzman, 227). Though they were the first faction to find success toppling the Ummayad regime, they were not the first to try. A notable historian offers that “The Abbasids succeeded where others failed because of their efficient, determined organizational skills and their clever exploitation of popular discontent and religious ideology” (Elton n.p.). Clearly, the Abbasid Caliphate had a history of fighting the Ummayads and had proven their ability to defeat them. For these reasons, Charlemagne agreed to an alliance with the Abbasids against his Muslim neighbors in Spain. Overall, their experience against the Ummayad Caliphate allowed them to perfectly complement Charlemagne’s military

aspirations.
In addition to the Ummayads, The Carolingian Empire and the Abbasid Caliphate shared another mutual enemy. The Byzantine Empire, also known as the Eastern Roman Empire at the time, was competing for power in Europe against the Carolingians as well as in Asia Minor against the Abbasids. In 800 CE, Charlemagne assisted Pope Leo in Rome and saved his life from his enemies, actions that earned him the title of Holy Roman Emperor (Einhard, Vita Karoli Magni 28). While this title may seem trivial, Pope Leo officially named him leader of the entire Roman Empire. After this, Charlemagne had to deal with the backlash and “jealousy which the Roman emperors showed upon his assuming these titles” (Einhard, Vita Karoli Magni 28). The Eastern Roman Emperor clearly did not support Charlemagne’s new position of authority over her position. Therefore, conflict arose between the two empires. However, this was not the only conflict for the Byzantines at the time. They were also constantly being harassed by their Southern neighbors, as they fought many battles against Harun al-Rashid and the Abbasid Caliphate (Buckler, 17). As a newly formed and now spreading Caliphate, the Abbasids saw the Byzantines as little more than an obstacle impeding their expansion. Al-Rashid’s forces eventually coerced the Byzantines into paying a tribute every year in order to avoid further attack. The Eastern Roman empire was undoubtedly a foe to both the Carolingians and the Abbasid Caliphate. This mutual foe certainly encouraged Charlemagne to accept the alliance proposed by Harun al-Rashid and the Abbasids. A historical critic best summarizes the reasons for this alliance between the two nations: “It is likely that the Carolingians tried to seek an alliance with the Abbasids in order to weaken the power of their enemies at the time: the Byzantine empire and the Ummayads of Spain” (Shalem, 95). The two leaders recognized there mutual enemies and decided to put aside cultural differences in order to enhance the power of their respective empires.
Although this alliance between the Carolingian Empire and the Abbasid Caliphate was founded for almost purely military purposes, little to no joint military action was taken between the two empires because of the sizable distance that separated them geographically. For this reason, questions have arisen on whether or not the alliance actually existed. No Abbasid or Carolingian primary sources mention any physical meeting between Charlemagne and Harun al-Rashid, but the Royal Frankish Annals does mention contact being made between their messengers, the first being in 798 CE. Charlemagne received all sorts of gifts from the emissaries of al-Rashid, including linens, clothes, scents, and other various trinkets (Royal Frankish Annals). This multitude of presents traded clearly shows that a relationship existed between Charlemagne and Harun al-Rashid. Their relationship was undeniably friendly, so much so that Rashid “preferred his favor to that of all the kings and potentates of the earth, and considered that to him alone marks of honor and munificence were due” (Einhard, Vita Karoli Magni 16). Thus, Carolingian sources examined indicate that this alliance definitely existed and was friendly in nature. The fact that no Islamic sources comment on the relationship can perhaps be linked to the Abbasid Revolution. There are fewer Islamic sources that exist in this time period due to the turmoil from the recent overthrow of the Ummayads. Also, Islamic sources may be more likely to report on internal affairs during a revolution. One certainty though is that these interactions were recorded in Carolingian documents, and they seem to have a distinguished importance.
While the relationship between their empires had very few military benefits for either Charlemagne or al-Rashid, this alliance was still unquestionably beneficial to both parties in a cultural and economic sense. It is noted in Vita Karoli Magni that Charlemagne once sent ambassadors to visit Jerusalem, a spot essential to the Christian Faith as the birthplace of Christ. These ambassadors bore gifts to Harun al-Rashid and made their purpose known to the Abbasid leader. He allowed them free travel, as well as sent his own representatives back to the Carolingian Empire, bearing varied “rich products of the Eastern lands” (Einhard 16). Many of these Abbasid gifts were previously unknown to the Carolingian people, and likewise for the gifts given by Charlemagne. This trade between the two empires thus resulted in a significant spread of culture for each. However, the greatest spread of culture between the leaders may be the Persian elephant that was supposedly sent to Charles. Charlemagne allegedly requested an elephant, and al-Rashid “sent the only one that he had” (Einhard, Vita Karoli Magni, 16). Some doubt the elephant’s existence, as the historian Shalem notes that it may have only been an elephant tusk, as this was sometimes used as a symbol of alliance (96). Nevertheless, the exchange of an elephant across thousands of miles to a foreign land illustrates the significance of the spread of culture between the two empires. Historical analyst Gene W. Heck believes that there was a substantial economic impact of this trade. He notes that Charlemagne was “particularly concerned with, and committed to his empire’s foreign commerce with the Islamic world”; thus, Charlemagne sent valuable gifts to the Abbasids in order to “develop new consumer tastes” and “promote commerce” (174). Clearly, the trade between the two empires had far more importance than mere peace offerings between members of an alliance. The goods each empire received from their exchanges caused a flow of culture that also held economic worth. In short, the intended military alliance between the two empires had proven to be far more productive in the commerce that resulted.
In conclusion, despite the fact that Charlemagne and Harun al-Rashid never fought beside one another on the battlefield, their empires’ alliance benefitted both the Carolingian and Abbasid culture and economy. This is because the gifts that each exchanged were foreign to the other’s empire and held significant value in the other’s cultures. Consequently, the Carolingian-Abbasid alliance was one that held far more importance than a simple military pact. Although the two dynasties did not have very many similarities, they found their most important one in the nations they each considered their foreign rivals. Harun al-Rashid and Charles the Great both opposed the Byzantine Empire and the Ummayad Caliphate. These mutual rivals were the spark that created the alliance. Had these common enemies not existed, one of the most powerful alliances in the eighth century world may not have ever come to fruition.