Rationality During The Renaissance

Rationality – Introducing rational choice

The Renaissance firstly broke the blind worship for the theology in the public from the 14th to 17th century, human thought gained the liberty (Stinger, 1977). This makes people turn to pay attention to the essence of ourselves from the worship of theology. Based on this, the Enlightenment further boosts the ideological emancipation in the public from the 17th to 18th century (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997). It thoroughly broke the construct of the church for theology and the thought of feudal hierarchies. People began to think about the essence of ourselves and the rationality at the same time of anti-feudalism under the influences by two intellectual movements.

People for the rational thinking concentrate

Olson (2009) raises doubts about the exist of group interests prompt that group members adopt actions in order to acquire common benefits. Olson argues that people who are rational and seeking for self-interests will not implement actions to achieve their common or group interests unless the fewer members are in a group and the coercive or other special measures make individuals follow their common interests to act. in other words, even though all individuals of a group are rational and seeking for self-interests. Also, they as a group can obtain benefits after they take actions to achieve their common interests. They still will not take actions to achieve common and group interests. For the reason of this situation, Olson think that group interests are equal or like a kind of public goods, while any public good contains the beneficial exclusiveness and non-competitive characteristics on the consumption. Regarding these two characteristics, on the one hand, some members have spent the cost of production and supplied public goods. But they cannot stop other members who do not consume any cost to share the equal benefit. Namely, it emerges a serious phenomenon of ‘free-ride’ (Marwell and Ames, 1981). On the other hand, the cuts will decrease when the size of groups and the number of members increase. Group

It supposes that two prisoners (A and B) are jailed in different interrogation rooms. It demonstrates that: each of them will be sentenced 8 years if both confess; each of them will be sentenced 1 years because of lack of evidence if both stay silent; the frank one will be free and silent one will be sentenced 10 years if one confesses and another stay silent. Each prisoner has two choices (confess or silent). Based on one hypothesis, people are rational and intelligent. Both A and B will choose self-interests maximization. A has 4 possible results of prison term (years): 0, 1, 8 and 10, similarly B is 0, 1, 8 and 10. No matter which strategy the opposite side will choose, the best strategy for both is to confess. Therefore, the uncooperative strategy is the best choice for them. The result is Nash Equilibrium Game (each for 1 year prison) (Vives, 1990). Unfortunately, the only equilibrium result of prisoners’ dilemma is not Pareto Optimality (Kacem et al., 2002). Moving to any choice will enable the situation of the other to improve. However, even though A and B build an alliance before they are arrested, Pareto Optimality cannot do it. Because it does not satisfy the requirement of the individual rationality, the dominant position of uncooperative strategies render (silent and silent) impossible to constitute Nash Equilibrium. Nobody has the positivity to conform the agreement. This model