Text: G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Texts (1998), trans. & ed. R.S. Woolhouse & Richard Francks, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 262.
Upon inspection of Leibniz’s short essay titled, Principles of Nature and Grace, it becomes apparent the aim of investigation will be taking reason paramount to understand the role of nature in grace. The opening six paragraphs focus primarily on a physical level, however §7 onward marks the bifurcation towards a metaphysical inquiry. The step that leads the reader towards higher investigation is what Leibniz calls the great principle, namely the principle “that nothing comes about without a sufficient reason.” What follows is the The Leibnizian cosmological argument, and despite mirroring that of which purported
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For example “all bachelors are unmarried” shows the truth of this proposition is inherent in the concepts involved. However, when a fact is contingent, it could be otherwise. Contingency is the status of propositions that are neither true nor false under all possible valuations, making it neither necessarily true nor necessarily false; for example, Aristotle was educated in the Platonic Academy, but if he had never studied among the Platonists, he would still be Aristotle. We speak of things being necessary or contingent according to whether their existence is a necessary or contingent …show more content…
Existence of the universe cannot be found in a series of contingent things, otherwise it would go on ad infinitum. Sufficient reason cannot be in contingent things because contingent things do not provide an explanation for themselves; matter is unaffected by the ways in which it moves. If matter is moved, it cannot be said that it has the inertia to change its sate of motion. Therefore, it is not possible to find in matter a reason for motion because contingent things are indifferent to motion. An atheist opponent could attack the argument here by denying the principle of sufficient reason, although the confidence of many in scientific explanations might not sit comfortably with a denial that there are necessarily explanations to be
Within William Rowe’s Chapter two of “The Cosmological Argument”, Rowe reconstructs Samuel Clark's Cosmological Argument by making explicit the way in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or PSR, operates in the argument as well as providing contradictions of two important criticisms from Rowe’s argument.
First we will consider the assigned baseball scenario under Leibniz’s system of metaphysics. In the baseball scenario, the aggregate of the player, bat, pitch, swing and all the other substances in the universe are one and all contingent. There are other possible things, to be sure; but there are also other possible universes that could have existed but did not. The totality of contingent things, the bat, the player, etc., themselves do not explain themselves. Here Leibniz involves the principle of reason; “there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise.” There must be, Leibniz insists, something outside the totality of contingent things (baseball games) which explains them, something which is itself necessary and therefore requires no explanation other than itself.
SALAMUCHA, AGNIESZKA. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy, Spring2009, Vol. 14 Issue 1, p166-168, 3p
...Contingency Argument that whether a contingent series of causes is infinite or not, that fact is now irrelevant because as long as the series as a whole is thought to be contingent the existence of God can still be proven. So the Contingency Argument looks something like this.
American Philosophical Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1984): 227-36.
The agnostic’s assertion may be expressed by the sentence, “We cannot know whether there is a God or not, and we cannot know whether the universe has been in existence since eternity or not.” He believes that nothing is or can be known. If the hypothesis “Matter had a beginning” is confirmed, the assertion that “Matter had no beginning” would be refuted and the contention “We cannot know whether it had a beginning or not” will be proved wrong. Thus, demonstration of the fact that matter had a beginning is a blow not only to atheism but also to agnosticism and skepticism. Once the hypothesis of the beginning and creation of matter has been confirmed, the atheists should abandon their disbelief and the agnostics their skepticism. If you remember the words in the sura The Prophets, verse 30, “Will they not believe even then?” this statement in the verse that described the Big Bang is a sign according to which the unbelievers will stick to their own convictions, or lack of conviction. It has become clear that an agnostic is no different than a man who worships the cow and the denial of the atheist is tantamount to the adoration of fire; these people base their philosophies on absolute lack of evidence, sheer delusion, total lack of logic and scientific reasoning.
ABSTRACT: I maintain that Leibniz's distinction between 'organic machines of nature' and the artificial machine that we produce cannot be adequately understood simply in terms of differing orders of structural complexity. It is not simply that natural machines, having been made by God, are infinitely more complex than the products of our own artifice. Instead, Leibniz's distinction is a thoroughly metaphysical one, having its root in his belief that every natural machine is a corporeal substance, the unity and identity conditions of which derive ultimately from its substantial form. Natural machines are thus true unities, while artificial machines are mere aggregates of substances and are therefore only accidental unities. I briefly explore this connection between Leibniz's distinction between natural and artificial machines and his views about individuality. I conclude on a polemical note, in which it is suggested that these results undermine the currently popular view that Leibniz renounced corporeal substances toward the end of his life.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
In addition, the nature of the universe can be also explained when Aquinas mentions that “the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification.”
"Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Beauvoir, Simone de []. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. .
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm., and J. M. Child. The Early Mathematical Manuscripts of Leibniz. Mineola, NY: Dover Publ., 2005.
In William Paley’s paradigm, the world is perfectly designed by a benevolent God who purposefully created everything and “superadded pleasure to animal sensations” (RP 47 ). Paley strongly believes the existence of a God who is wise and benevolent enough to create everything on earth with happiness and a purpose. For Paley, science is a tool to complement the greatness of religion and prove the importance of Design (RP 46). In order to support his paradigm, Paley illustrates the contrivance and work of God in nature with the methodological assumption of First Cause (the belief in the existence of God) and Final Cause (the belief that a God creates an object with a purpose). Additionally, the metaphysical assumption of a close, active God underlies the paradigm as a premise that influences e...
He was also the one who compiled the book of evidence that the “society” was
Leibniz was a German theorist who developed the philosophical system of optimism. According to the introduction, 18th-century France had a very narrow understanding of optimism, “the opinion of those philosophers who assert that this world is the best that God could create, the best of all possible worlds” (Voltaire xii). Liebniz argued that if God was perfect then He must have created a perfect world. Voltaire and many other philosophers were concerned about this interpretation because it provided “divine justification for suffering and injustice” (xii). Leibniz argued that it is the suffering and injustice that are part of the “harmonious universe, in which the human perspective was simply too limited to grasp the role of the individual pieces in the greater design” (xii). In other words, he thought that God works in mysterious ways, an explanation that many people still use today, and that people need to just accept the world as is.
Although it turned out secular modern science, the aim of natural philosophy was to understand God’s power and purposes in the creation of nature. This relationship between natural philosophy and religious studies was strengthened by the clergy, especially in Protestant churches. They aimed to create a ‘reasonable Christianity’ by supporting the irrational sources of it, such as ...