Police Detention: A Case Study

Issue #1

Mr. Caulfield was stopped for driving a mere two miles an hour over the speed limit, and slightly veering over the centerline of the road. The question that arises on this issue is whether officer Campbell was justified in making the stop in the first place. The reasonableness of the stop comes into question. The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants are considered a seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F. 2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1993).

In U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F. 3d 232, 244 (5th Cir. 2007) the court stated that “the reasonableness of traffic stops and investigative detentions of motorists who are suspected of criminal activity is analyzed under the framework established in Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).” There are two elements established under Terry to determine the reasonableness of an investigative traffic stop. The first element is “whether the officer’s action of stopping the vehicle was justified at its inception”, and the second element is “whether the officer’s actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 244. For the purposes of Issue #1, I will be addressing only the first element of a Terry stop. The second element of a Terry stop will be addressed in Issue #2.

Stevens states that as long as a traffic infraction that would have objectively justified the stop has occurred, it is irrelevant that the officer may have made the stop for another reason. “Giving a pretextural traffic violation as the reason for a stop does not invalidate an otherwise justified stop.” Id.

The deposition of Officer Campbell focuses a great deal on whether it is the customary practice of the Beaumont Police Department to stop motorist who exceed the speed limit by less than five miles per hour. It would appear from Campbell’s testimony that it is not their usual practice to stop motorist for such a minor infraction. However, Whren v. U.S., 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), helps clarify the court’s stance on this issue. In that case, the lower court ruled “a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.” Id. at 1772. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, and expanded on the issue stating that a traffic stop is reasonable if the police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has been committed. Id.

In light of these earlier rulings, it is unlikely the court would disallow the evidence seized from Mr. Caulfield’s car based on this issue. Mr. Caulfield did commit traffic violations, and regardless of how slight in nature they were, Officer Campbell was justified in the stop under current law.

Issue #2
Issue #2 pertains to the second element of a Terry stop.

The officer’s actions must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place Stevens, 487 F.3d at 244. In U.S. v. Massi, 761 F. 3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014) the court recognizes that there are three tiers of citizen-police contact for the purposes of the fourth amendment. First, there must be no coercion or detention. Second, an investigatory stop is a brief seizure that must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Third is a full-scale arrest that must be supported by probable cause. Id. at 520. Massi goes on to say “police may detain an individual if the officer has reasonable suspicion based on specific and particularized facts that the person is involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 521. Officer Campbell had no specific facts that Caulfield was involved in criminal activity. His justification for prolonging the stop, and the continued questioning, was that Holden seemed nervous. When asked why he seemed nervous, Officer Campbell said it was because he was sweating a lot. The fact that he was sweating is not either specific, nor particularized. The weather that day was clear, hot, and 92 degrees, therefore, it is not unlikely that he would be

sweating.

Massi also states that reasonable suspicion does not have to be based solely on a law officer’s personal observation, but can also arise from the collective knowledge of law enforcement entities.

Id. Officer Campbell ran a NCIC on Holden at the beginning of the stop. Within three minutes the check came back showing he had no criminal record, and the car had not been reported stolen. Consequently, Campbell had no basis for reasonable suspicion after that

point.

Massi goes on to say, “a detention initially authorized by Terry can, due to its duration, transform into the equivalent of an arrest.” An arrest occurs when, in light of all the circumstances surrounding a situation, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Id. at 522. The officer’s actions after receiving the NCIC clearly showed Caulfield was not free to leave the scene of the stop. He did not immediately return license and registration, and he positioned himself between Caulfield and the driver side door, barring any attempt to leave.

The U.S. Supreme Court also weighed in on this issue in Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). In that decision the court stated “like a Terry stop the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission−to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” Id. at 1614. Addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, and the stop may not be prolonged any longer that the time it takes to achieve that goal. Id. An officer may conduct ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop, such as checking the driver’s license, vehicle registration, insurance, and checking for outstanding warrants on the driver of the vehicle. In addition, the officer may conduct certain unrelated checks, but not in a way that will prolong the stop. He cannot prolong the stop in an effort to uncover “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id at 1615.

Officer Campbell clearly prolonged the stop in an attempt to catch Caulfield in some sort of criminal activity. Prior to even making the stop he had determined Holden to be a drug trafficker, and the traffic violation was merely a pretext. Had the stop actually been for the violations, Campbell would have cited him once the NCIC report came back clean, then sent him on his way as is customary. Caulfield was never cited for the traffic violations. Based on the details of the traffic stop, and case law concerning this issue, the court should consider excluding any evidence obtained during the traffic stop.