Petraeus Mission Command

Petraeus’ Mosul
The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders is the Army’s book definition of mission command (ADRP 6-0, 2012). This theory empowers subordinate leaders with the ability to exercise disciplined initiative to execute unified land operations. The philosophy of the term fosters an environment of mutual trust and encourages a staff and subordinates to accept prudent risk, so that delays in communication do not hinder the ability to seize opportunities. The warfighting functional aspect of mission command deals specifically with systems and tasks that enable a commander to balance command and control of other warfighting capabilities. This is important because commanders and their staff seek to

incorporate all warfighting functions to maximize the total effects of its combat power (ADRP 6-0, 2012). The actions and approach of Major General Petraeus during the occupation of Mosul, Iraq in 2003, personified the understanding of the Army’s philosophy of mission command by establishing a functioning municipal government.
Officers afforded the privilege to serve as commanders bear tremendous responsibility and scrutiny in a garrison environment.

Commanders that serve in a forward deployed environment inherit a greater duty to perform under more pressure, while adhering to six additional principles. The principles of mission command are Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust, Create Shared Understanding, Provide Clear Commander’s Intent, Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk (ADRP 6-0, 2012). Major General David Petraeus took command of the 101st Airborne Division in 2002. In March 2003, he was leading the division into Iraq. He built his team on mutual trust, having two of three maneuver brigade commanders previously serve together in Bosnia, Kosovo, and stateside (Atkinson, 2007). The 18,000-Soldier force shared an understanding based on Petraeus’ intent and their mission orders. The remaining principles would come to the forefront, following the

invasion.
Three weeks after the invasion, the Pentagon tasked the 101st Airborne Division to seize control of Nineveh province and its capital, Mosul (Amos, 2003). A unit already familiar with adapting to the ever-changing battle conducted the longest air assault on record. Major General Petraeus was now responsible for 75,000 kilometers of northern Iraq, with the city of Mosul as its center of gravity (Lundberg, 2006). A man, who considered by many as this conflict’s ‘General Grant’ or ‘General Sherman,’ accepted prudent risk by sending one of his brigade commanders to reconnoiter Mosul prior to the entire division moving north (Badkhen, 2007). Petraeus clearly exhibited disciplined initiative, saying, “It literally was my decision. Nobody above us knew more than we did…There was nobody we could turn to that could tell us anything about northern Iraq” (Lundberg, 2006).
Petraeus’ subordinate commanders also exercised both, disciplined initiative and accepted prudent, while staying within the parameters of commander’s intent. Colonel Joseph Anderson, Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, said when asked how to occupy Mosul, “Go right into the heart of it” (Lundberg, 2006). Colonel Anderson moved his entire brigade, consisting of more than 6,000 Soldiers, in less than 24 hours. After the arrival of the brigade, Colonel Anderson issued one standing order. One “rule of engagement: shoot only when fired upon” (Lundberg, 2006). Knowing the inherent risk, Colonel Anderson was not interested in entertaining any additional challenges, stating, “This is risk taking: doing things without being told, say I’m going to do it and ask permission later” (Lundberg, 2006).
The three combat brigade commanders strategically placed their units in northern Iraq when Major General Petraeus arrived in Mosul, two days after Colonel Anderson’s feat.

Petraeus began to conduct another reconnaissance. One that included rebuilding the province from the ground up. He was well aware of the public opinion of the United States, but Major General Petraeus saw no reason how he could avoid committing to conducting stability operations, having taken on the task just a year earlier in Kosovo (Dickey, 2004). Ideally, a civilian entity, known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), would manage post-conflict rebuilding, but no one anticipated the swiftness of the invasion. Major General Petraeus and his staff devised a strategy with “three goals: provide a secure environment, restore basic life services, and facilitate a return to normalcy” (Lundberg, 2006). Along with the aforementioned goals, Petraeus established several priorities of work, including restoring public safety forces, food distribution, water and electricity, and the reopening of schools. He was most interested in providing Mosul with a stable and functioning government (PBS,

2004).
Petraeus recognized the need to build a cohesive team through mutual trust with the local populace as well. Before the end of April 2003, Major General Petraeus saw the fastest way for the Iraqis of Mosul to feel like solution makers, rather than dependents of the United States Army, was to hold an election (Gordon, 2003). To him, that would further solidify his strategy and further stabilize the region. Petraeus recognized that an election had not taken place in the country in more than 60 years, but wanted maximum representation for province’s interim government. After a week of meeting with tribal leaders, Iraqi military leadership, politicians an Election Day was established. More than 250 delegates, of nine different ethnicities gathered in a residential neighborhood on 5 May 2003. There were 24 council members were elected and of those, they selected a governor and deputy governor. In less than a week, the 101st Airborne Division relinquished the reins of government to the newly appointed council. As anticipated, much criticism followed, but Major General Petraeus was accomplishing his mission without any guidance from his superiors. Once again, he emulated the principles of the Army’s doctrinal term, Mission Command.
In less than 60 days, Major General David Petraeus completely revitalized an entire province in northern Iraq. After the swift and direct invasion of the country, his division diverted from just south of Iraq’s capital, to its northern-most province, his command quickly and professionally occupied the area. Without any guidance or direction, Major General Petraeus developed a strategy and established priorities of work in keeping with the principles of understanding mission command. The 101st Airborne Division transformed Mosul from a desolate capital without order, into a functioning government with elected officials and public services and schools. Major General Petraeus developed a clear commander’s intent and cultivated a shared understanding amongst his subordinate leaders. He accepted prudent risk and expected his men to exercise disciplined initiative based on the mission orders. Lastly and more importantly, Major General Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division developed a mutual trust with the leaders of the region.