Philosophers are divided on the ontological question of the reality of the past, present and future. While nearly all contemporary philosophers agree that the present time exists, there has been substantial disagreement over the existence of the past and future. In this essay I will argue that it is not that case that only the present time exists. I will argue that conclusion by discussing the ideas put forward by Presentists. This will then be contrasted with the ideas given by Eternalists, with a brief look at the Growing Block Theory.
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist . According to this view; events and entities that are wholly past or wholly future, do not exist.
The ‘present’ in this sense is being used to
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However, Eternalists argue that there is no objective ontological difference between the three, there are only subjective differences similar to ‘here, there and far’ . This means that while all exist the same way, they are subjective to our point of …show more content…
This also seems to show that we have no free will in what we do, which many philosophers have a problem with. In spite of this I believe the Eternalist argument as while the future may be fixed, any future fixed facts are only fixed by our actions now – there is a causal relationship. For example, if it is fixed that in the future there is a nuclear war with sentient robots, surely our actions now would make that so. If we did not build the robots now and did not make any subsequent choices that would lead to a war, it does not follow that there would be a war with the robots. Therefore, in my opinion, the free will/determinism argument doesn’t hold water to the Eternalist argument.
The Growing Block Theory is a view comprised of ideas from both of the contrasting arguments above. Like the previous arguments, Growing Block Theorists argue that the present time exists, however in agreement with Eternalists they argue that the past also exists, and just like Presentists they argue that the future does not exist. Due to the fact that this argument is half-way between Presentism and Eternalism, it doesn’t attract as much discussion and is not currently a popular
...nd the future. I, myself, believe that things do not cease to exist completely in death, but do not have the same type of existence, as they do not. There are different properties of existence between a living and dead person, as one can interact and grow, whereas the other decomposes into the earth. Things can exist in the present and past, and in the future to a degree. The reason why I do not believe that some things exist in the future and so I disagree with eternalism is because of the fact that they could have so easily have not existed. Once they do exist though in the present they must in the past. For example, a baby may have not been conceived at all, but when it is and it is born it exists in the present and past. I agree with presentism more so though, due to the fact that the main point of something’s existence in within the present time of their being.
The notion of Persistence gives way to several predominant theories; of which, attempt to account for many possible questions that arise from it. As in most cases of debate, when more than one account of such is held to be true, there will clearly be much disagreement. Two views that claim to account accurately for persistence that remain widely known are , that of an endurantist (Threeist) and that of a perdurantist (Twoist). The endurantist will hold that objects are wholly present at all times, a persistent object ‘endures’ over time. The conflicting view of a perdurantist claims that objects are actually composed of temporal parts, more precisely, proper temporal parts. Further, a Twoist (vs. Oneist), will say that a name most often refers to the sum of one’s temporal parts, whereas a Threeist believes a name to refer to one who is wholly present during all times of its existence. The two opposing theories stated very simply, as above, give insight as to the nature of their arguments against one another. It does seem, however, that the Twoist’s account of persistence gives an exceedingly useful notion in regards towards many more subjects of philosophy, as well as an explanation that accounts for much more in terms of the problems associated strictly with persistence itself.
Opposed to this view of the persistence of objects through time is three dimensionalism. Three dimensionalism appears to be more in line with our common everyday sense of how objects persist through time; one in which we believe in, as Chisholm puts it, “the concept of one and the same individual existing at different times” (143). In contrast to the four dimensionalist, then, the three dimensionalist maintains that objects persist by being “wholly present” at each point at which they exist. Ultimately, Chisholm uses his arguments against temporal parts in order to support his general theses concerning personal identity over time. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to explore the underlying reasons Chisholm might have had for arguing against the four dimensionalist: that topic is best left to a more extensive project on the subject of the persistence of objects through time. For now, we will just take a look at three criticisms that Chisholm proposes for the temporal parts theorist: (1) that the so-called spatial analogy is not accurate, (2) that the doctrine of temporal parts does not solve the Phillip drunk/ Phillip sober puzzle, and (3) that the doctrine is of no use in solving various other metaphysical puzzles.
...time, reality becomes unclear, and when unclear, one might look upon the past for answers.
This is inconsistent with the fact that each of those differences reject the statement about time. He admits to this contradiction defending that any attempt to explain why there are difference in time is strictly due to the fact that we need to detail the order in which those events occurred (past, present, or future). The description of the “different times” raises the purpose of the past, present, or future and in turn will lead to a “vicious infinite regress” (Christensen, 1974). The vicious infinite regress is invoked because in order to explain why the alternative appeal to the differences in time, doesn’t go through that effort again, we must first be able to explain why each apply consecutively and then explain why that sequence appeals to the differences in time, which has no end to clarification. In McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence he explains how he no longer goes against the circulatory doubts, which is arguable in itself because he has come begin to treat the differences in tenses as unpretentious and inexpressible concepts, arguing that the tenses don’t need to be explained at all. McTaggart now claims that despite his inability to describe what the time differences mean, we can now apply them without additional scrutiny. This still leads to
John McTaggart in his essay “Time” presents a radical argument that claims time is unreal. While the argument is interesting and has attracted much attention for his arguments, I remain unconvinced of the argument he makes. This paper will lay out McTaggart’s argument that time in unreal, critically analyze why I believe McTaggart’s argument fails and present an alternative idea about time, utilizing aspects of McTaggart’s argument.
In this essay we will consider a much more recent approach to time that came to the fore in the twentieth century. In 1908 James McTaggart published an article in Mind entitled 'The Unreality of Time', in which, as the title implies, he argued that there is in reality no such thing as time. Now although this claim was in itself startling, probably what was even more significant than McTaggart's arguments was his way of stating them. It was in this paper that McTaggart first drew his now standard distinction between two ways of saying when things happen. In this essay we shall outline these ways of describing events and then discuss the merits and demerits of each, and examine what has become known as the 'tensed versus tenseless' debate on temporal becoming.
1) Barnes, Wesley. "Is Existentialism Definable?" The Philosophy and Literature of Existentialism. Woodbury: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1968
the novel is in fact based upon the idea that the past and the present
In The Eternal Now, Paul Tillich intent is to answer a variety of questions that are concomitant with Ontology and Theology. It is written in a direct style that is free from the characteristic rhetorical frills of many religious works. Make no mistake Tillich is a sincerely religious man who frames his philosophical thinking in the weltanschauung of Christianity. Nonetheless, in Tillich’s mode of existentialist manifestation, ideation of "being" saturates the mundane milieu of religion.
Although, Prior does not seem to account for the present tense in his argument. If one were to instead claim ‘Thank goodness I’m here!’ there is only a sense of being thankful for the present moment. So, if one were to claim ‘Thank goodness I’m here, on February 10, 2014’, the tense in which the event is being thanked, appears rather vague. It seems to insinuate that there has been a past event worth ending, and yet the sentence does not say specifically state anything of a past event. It seems then, we actually tend to think in the past, even when we are claiming the present in our statements. Prior therefore may need to explain why our reactions or attitudes towards time can remain in this fixed state.
THE POWER OF THE MOMENT: The ability to stay in the present is a virtue. Most people are always living either in the past or in the future. So they are either worrying about the past, worrying about the past pains, the past results, the past failures, past relationships, past struggles, or they are ruminating about the future fears, the future impossibilities, the future achievements, future possibilities. Worrying about the past or future would not benefit you as you are putting yourself in a position of disadvantage.
History and time are considered to be cultural formations since a History cannot be detached from the culture in which it is produced and received. It is through culture that a historical sense is achieved and in fact, each culture experiences History in a different way leading us to the current perception of History as not being one, but many histories depending on the cultural groups involved. Historians have fought throughout the centuries on whether such thing as “objective History” can exist but in the end, even materialist historians will admit that the reality of History is so complicated and contradictory that no single version could possibly represent the truth; consequently different interpretations are inevitable.
This paper is supposed to be a reflection of my past and a glimpse into my future. I have a really hard time talking about my past because I don’t recall much of my child hood. I have managed to block out a lot of the memories the bad along with the good. I am not sure why but when I started blocking memories it also took the good along with the bad. So I will tell you what I can remember and what I have been told about my childhood. I will also tell you what my future holds for me and how I plan to reach that goal.
Now that we have explored my past, present, and future experiences with diversity, it is time to see how they are present within and effect each other. Firstly, let’s look into how my future is present in my past. The most obvious portion of my future that is in my past is my willingness and efforts to love and include everyone and to spread this world view. It took a fellow classmate of mine to demonstrate to my third grade self that we are all human beings and we all deserve to be treated as such. In my future, I aspire to demonstrate this world view to my students and inspire them to treat each other accordingly. This aspiration directly reflects my world view struggles I went through in third grade, for I want to help my students come to