Parliamentary Sovereignty

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Dicey defined parliamentary sovereignty as Parliament having “under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further… no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.” Despite however true this may have been when Dicey was writing, a lot has changed since late 19th century. The passing of the European Communities Act 1972 allowed EU laws to come into effect in the UK sparking clashes between EU and UK legislation, as well as the relevancy of parliamentary sovereignty. Added to this the Human Rights Act 1998 allows domestic courts to whistle-blow on contrariety between UK legislation and convention rights. The legal doctrine that …show more content…

When Parliament passed the European Communities Act 1972, it voluntarily subjected itself to any legislation passed by the EU, highlighted particularly in s.2(4) where it declares the about UK being subject to EU law whether “passed or to be passed”. Surely then, this poses a serious threat to the long-standing notion of parliamentary sovereignty? No longer would UK parliament be supreme in it’s law making abilities as it’s legislation could not legally contradict that of the EU – it’s legislation would now be disputed by a governing body. The case(s) of Factortame are an example of this dispute, where the House of Lords were forced to dissapply the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 under ruling of the European Court of Justice. However the House of Lords had first held that to do so would be a contradiction to English law. This is an example of the supremacy of EU law, and a real blow to the doctrine of …show more content…

It gave domestic courts the legal obligation to interpret and apply legislation so far as they could in accordance to the convention rights . S.4 of the Human Rights Act allows courts to make a declaration of incompatibility if they are satisfied the provision is “incompatible with a Convention right,” and “the primary legislation concerned prevents removal of the compatibility.” The passing of this act was said by some to be a transfer of power to the judiciary and therefore a breach upon parliamentary sovereignty. A view mirrored by Ewing who said “as a matter of constitutional practice it has transferred significant power to the judiciary.” But how far can this idea be true when there is no further legislation binding Parliament to act upon such a declaration? Whether Parliament does or does not use a procedure to fast track new legislation which would then converge convention rights with UK legislation, is entirely up to them – and in this remains Parliament’s supremacy in the

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