Oslo Accords

In September 2015, Palestinian President Muhammad Abbas proclaimed that the state of Palestine was no longer under any obligation to follow the Oslo Accords crafted over two decades prior. Citing Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Abbas argued that Palestine had been the only side upholding the terms of the once-heralded agreement, and that they were tired of being exploited as a “state under occupation.” How could the state have gotten here from the wide-spread optimism following the Oslo Accords ? The answer lays in both what the accords did and didn’t state, as well as the general opposition amongst Israelis towards the agreement. Overall, the Oslo Accords were, in a sense, doomed from the start, and created more in hope of an easy fix

The revolution was similar thematically to the Yom Kippur War in that Israel was surprised and slow to respond to the attacks. However, this time the attacks came from a grassroots group of Palestinians, rather than the Egyptian army. It’s easy to romanticize the intifada in the same way Americans view the Summer of Love. The songs and poems of protest were prevalent, and the original attackers were mainly women and children. This fact made it hard for the Israelis to strike back whilst maintaining a good moral conscience. The attitude of the Israelis became one of guilt, and the intifada “damaged the sense of superiority many Israelis had harbored toward the Palestinians” (282). The Israeli side characterizes the intifada as directly causal of the Oslo Accords, citing a newly level playing field and a need for resolution. In the Palestinian side, the Oslo Accords seem as though they will only hold back the fighters briefly, and that they do not represent a long term

The public opposition to the agreement was clear, and it only became clearer when represented by the government. The Oslo II agreement was only voted in favor by the Knesset by a “tiny margin: sixty-one voted in favor, fifty-nine against” (312). The negligible difference between those who support the Oslo Accords and those who firmly disagreed is only made more significant by the large, recently-disgruntled group of Israelis who feel their government does not represent them. These tensions came to a head when in 1995, Yigal Amir, an Israeli college student, shot and killed Rabin. Though this event was nominally an individual action, the assassination reflected the greater Israeli sentiment. Symbolically, by killing the biggest proponent of the agreement, Israel rejected the Oslo Accords. To add insult to injury, the Israeli public went on to elect Benjamin Netanyahu Prime Minister, whose “stance against the Oslo Accords was well known” (320). Netanyahu went on to begin construction again within the Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, as if to show just how against the Oslo Accords he really was. Overall, the Israeli people had disobeyed the agreement just three years after its signing, and did not seem to have any plans to change their