Objections to Descartes’ Interactionism

In the following essay I will be offering some objections to Descartes’ interactionism as is

primarily represented in his works The Passions of the Soul, Part I and Correspondence with

Princess Elisabeth, Concerning the Union of Mind and Body. I will start by describing the basic

features of how Descartes’ notion of interactionism works. Namely, that the pineal gland is the

“principle seat” of the mind because it is the only singular part of the brain. The pineal gland also has a

range of movements, which correspond to the body and to the soul to the capacity that it can be

‘thrusted’ by either the soul or the animal spirits. After describing Descartes’ interactionism, I will offer

three objections that I view to provide legitimate problems for Descartes and either an actual or possible

reply from Descartes. My first objection is that it seems unlikely that there are such varied physical

motions that affect the pineal gland. Much less that these would occur without our ability to hear, feel, or

otherwise detect them. I believe that Descartes might respond to this by saying the movements are too

small to be detected. My second objection asks how an immaterial soul can causally interact with a

material brain within the constraints of our modern conservation of energy laws in physics. Descartes

might reply to this by saying that the soul is so closely united to the body that it can derive the energy

necessary from the body itself. Finally, the third objection I offer comes from the correspondence with

Elisabeth in which she says that a causal interaction must take place by contact and thus the interaction

between a physical and immaterial object seems unlikely. We do have Descartes’ actual response to

this objectio...

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...in that she says a causal interaction necessitates contact to which I

proposed in addition to the actual responses he gave her, that he might simply repeat the close

unification of the mind and body and thereby give reason to say there is no intermediary step at all.

Bibliography

Descartes, René. "Correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, Concerning the Union of Mind and Body."

The Essential Descartes. Ed. Margaret Dauler Wilson. New York: New American Library,

1969. 37380.

Print.

Descartes, René. "Sixth Meditation: The Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction between

Mind and Body." Meditations on First Philosophy. Ed. John Cottingham. New York:

Cambridge UP, 1996. 5062.

Print.

Descartes, René. "The Passions of the Soul, Part I." The Essential Descartes. Ed. Margaret Dauler

Wilson. New York: New American Library, 1969. 35368.

Print.