Napoleon Essay Outline

Outline

I. Introduction

A. Thesis Statement

1. The French Imperial campaign to defeat the Russian Empire failed due to apathetic leadership on part of Napoleon, terrible logistical planning, failure of the main effort in the opening stage of the campaign, and lastly, a disciplined rear-guard defense by Russian forces.

2. Supporting topics will describe the conditions that set the stage for Napoleon’s decision to conduct the Russia campaign, including, but not limited to, the war with Britain; imposition of the Continental System; existing French logistical system; and Napoleon’s laissez-faire leadership style.

II. The Campaign

A. Background

1. Conflict with Britain

2. Imposition of the Continental System

3. Effect on the European economy

and Russia’s refusal to abide by the System
B. Setting the Stage
1. Napoleon’s strategic objectives
2. Plan of action
3. Logistical preparations
C. The Campaign
1. Advance to Smolensk
2. Borodino
3. Moscow
4. Retreat
III. Conclusion
A. End of the Empire

The French Imperial campaign to defeat the Russian Empire in 1812 failed due to apathetic leadership on part of Napoleon, terrible logistical planning, failure of the main effort in the opening stage of the campaign, and lastly, a disciplined rear-guard defense by Russian forces. This campaign shook the credibility of the Grande Armee to its core, (and by extension, Napoleon’s), and led to its eventual decline as a military fighting force.
To understand the Russia campaign in its entirety, we must first shed light on the situation leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision.

Beginning in 1802, Napoleon fought a series of campaigns across Europe, and by 1812 controlled a swath of terrain that stretched from France as far east as modern-day Poland and Lithuania. As a result, in 1806, the British government imposed a blockade on all French ports, effectively limiting the French to commerce within continental Europe. In response, Napoleon passed the Berlin Decree of 1806, instituting the Continental System which forbid any French allies or conquests from trading with Britain. In practice, no British ships were permitted to land on the Continent, and all ships were required to land in France first to be searched. Like the National Prohibition Act of 1919, Napoleon’s edict created a massive black market in smuggling British Colonial good to Europe, and Napoleon was forced to stage troops across European ports to prevent this illicit trade. Czar Alexander I of Russia, an erstwhile ally of France, tolerated abiding by the Continental System until 1810, when internal dissent within his own domestic power base forced him to relent and allow British merchant ships to dock in Russia. In this fashion, British merchants used Russian ports as a way of circumnavigating the Continental System and accessing the lucrative European market (Smith, 2014).

In 1807, Napoleon attempted to seize Portugal by way of Spain, and started what

would be known as the Peninsular War. (Connelly, 2006). Napoleon faced a dilemma: defeat the Spanish guerillas and British in the Peninsular War to protect his western flank; but to defend the credibility of the French Empire, he desired to conduct a punitive campaign against Russia for violating the Continental System.
With the war in Spain still in full swing, Napoleon decided to invade Russia, with the following over-arching goal: conduct a punitive campaign against Russia, force Alexander I to sue for peace and bring Russia into compliance with Continental System. To achieve this aim, Napoleon would have to cross into Russia, and defeat two separate Russian armies before they could link up into a larger, more formidable force. Napoleon’s desired end-state was to deny Britain the profits gained through access to European markets and send a message to all French allies and conquests that violation of the Berlin Decree would not be tolerated.
Preparations began for the invasion of Russia in 1810 by calling up approximately 80,000 French conscripts (Smith, 2014).

By June of 1812, Napoleon’s Grande Armee had an invasion force of approximately 611,000 men, that consisted of troops from France (200,000); Dutch, Belgian, German, Swiss, Italian (100,000); with the remainder of the troops, (311,000), consisting of Polish, Lithuanian, Neapolitan, Illyrian, Rheinbund German, Swiss, Austrian, Prussian, Spanish and Portuguese (Connelly, 2006). This fighting force was staged at bases near Danzig in the Duchy of Warsaw. For the impending invasion, the French set up storage depots or magazines in the key cities of Danzig, Koenigsberg and Thorn; these supply depots in turn would use a combination of ships and wagons to move supplies to Vilna, Lithuania. However, only troops of the Imperial Guard were permitted to access these supply depots; all other troops in the Grande Armee had to forage for supplies (Smith, 2014). This caused the rest of the army to begin to search the surrounding countryside of the Duchy of Warsaw for food, a place that had already suffered a poor harvest in 1811. Troops were forced to take livestock, grain and other items from the local populace by force. All of this occurred prior to the actual invasion, so Napoleon’s forces were already suffering a distinct supply shortage. Another fact began to emerge, something that would continue to hobble French forces throughout the campaign- due to the chronic

shortage of adequate Horse fodder, troops were forced to feed their animals on green grain and at times thatching straw, causing deadly cases of Colic to erupt (Smith, 2014). Napoleon expected the campaign to be of short duration, and so planned to have a two weeks’ rations on the march, with the Grande Armee finding supplies by foraging the local countryside. It was essential that Napoleon’s forces catch the two Russian armies and defeat them separately before they could link up.
On the Russian side, Czar Alexander I had a total force of approximately 450,000 men; however, it was estimated only 130,000 men were ever massed for battle at any one time (Connelly, 2006). Prince Mikhail Barclay de Tolly was initially in charge of the Czar’s 1st Army of the West (and overall commander), while Prince Piotr Ivanovich Bagration commanded the 2nd Army of the West. Barclay, calculating the logistical needs of the Grande Armee, advocated fighting a series of rear-guard actions, leading the Grande Armee deeper into the Russia’s steppes, stretching their supply lines and making them vulnerable to attack (Smith, 2014).
The Grande Armee began the invasion of Russia on 23 June 1812, crossing the Nieman river and advancing and taking Vilna after sporadic resistance. Up until this date, the weather was hot and dry, and adequate potable water was becoming increasingly difficult to find. Wells and streams ran dry, and there were cases of men drinking their own urine to survive (Smith, 2014). An additional problem arose during this time: the roads in the local area were un-metalled, having no gravel on them. Furthermore, the French supply wagons were designed for western European metalled roads and when rain storms came on 29 June, the roads tuned to mud