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Challenger space shuttle
Challenger space shuttle
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Despite strict safety regulations and careful consideration of risks and risk mitigation within engineering, tragic disasters still occur, unfortunately. One such disaster was the explosion of the NASA space shuttle, Challenger. On January 28, 1986, the Challenger disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven astronauts on board. This catastrophe was caused by the failure of an O-ring seal in the right solid rocket booster at launch. The O-ring failed because it was not designed to withstand unusually cold conditions which occurred on the launch day. Since the solid rocket booster joint was no longer properly sealed after the failure of the O-ring, pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor leaked out to surrounding components where it caused the separation of the right solid rocket booster at the joint attachment and also led to the structural failure of the external tank. The orbiter was broken up by aerodynamic forces. Crew members are believed to have survived the initial breakup of the space shuttle. However, the shuttle did not have an escape system, leaving the crew trapped inside. The violent impact of the crew compartment with the ocean was too forceful to allow any of the crew to survive. …show more content…
The commission found that NASA staff were aware that the contractor’s design of the O-rings contained a potentially catastrophic flaw but failed to address the problem. NASA violated several of its own safety rules and their organizational culture and decision- making processes were key contributors to the accident. The decision- makers also ignored warnings from engineers that they should delay the launch until weather conditions were more
This would be McAuliffe’s first and only mission. It would last for seven days. During the mission, she planned on teaching two lessons. The first would include a tour of the Challenger itself. The second would be about the future of space travel. During the Challenger Mission, Christa McAuliffe and six others would use the Challenger. This accommodation had up to two thousand displays and instruments, and carried about five computers. It had been cold that morning of the lift off in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The shuttle exploded less than two minutes after take-off. What caused the explosion? The cold temperatures caused the o-rings to be affected and a leak from the o-rings on the Challenger caused fuel to ignite. Millions of people and school students stared in shock at what had occurred just before their
While seated in the Oval Office of the White House, January 28, 1986 President Ronald Reagan delivers his speech The Challenger Disaster hours after the space shuttle The Challenger explodes while in take off. Thousands witnessed this horrifying event live, in person and on television. This mission was very unique, allowing the first civilian to ever be allowed in space during a mission. She was aboard The Challenger as an observer in the NASA Teacher in Space Program. Ironically, nineteen years before this disaster, three astronauts were tragically lost in an accident on the ground.
To correctly assess the ethical violations, one needs only to consider the safety of the astronauts as the top priority during the launch. With this perspective, it is easy to see the ethical violations that occurred during this launch test. Inside of the Apollo 1 Command Module, there were many flammable materials present(Moskowitz, 2012). In a closed space, an abundance of flammable material is incredibly dangerous. Even if NASA had considered and fixed this issue, there are numerous other reasons the fire was able to be as dangerous as it was. The atmosphere of the spacecraft was one hundred percent oxygen (Moskowitz, 2012). Oxygen is a highly flammable gas, so once the fire started, the oxygen helped it quickly spread. Having a pure oxygen atmosphere in any situation where there both humans present and any chance of a fire starting is a severe ethical violation. The combinations of both the flammable materials present and the oxygen atmosphere meant that as soon as a fire occurred, the astronauts’ only chance of survival was to escape the module. Unfortunately for the astronauts, the hatch that they needed to use to escape was inward-opening (Moskowitz, 2012). The fire had been raging for long enough to cause the pressure inside of the cabin to be significantly increased (Moskowitz, 2012). The high pressure caused by this fire
Engineers and scientists began trying to find what went wrong almost right away. They studied the film of the take-off. When they studied the film, they noticed a small jet of flame coming from inside the casing for one of the rocket boosters. The flame got bigger and bigger. It started to touch a strut that connected the booster to the big fuel tank attached to the space shuttle. About two or three seconds later, hydrogen began leaking from the gigantic fuel tank. About seventy-two seconds after take-off, the hydrogen caught on fire and the booster swung around. That punctured the fuel tank, which caused a big explosion.
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board has made recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Although the design flaws that contributed to the Challenger and Columbia accidents were different, the accidents themselves were similar. The CAIB during the investigation of the root causes of the accidents, identified contributing organizational problems that played a factored in both cases. NASA had received early warnings of safety issues, however, they failed to take them seriously and resolve them. “What we find out from [a] comparison between Columbia and Challenger is that NASA as an organization did not learn from its previous mistakes and it did not properly address all of the factors that the presidential commission identified.” - Dr. Diane Vaughan.
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
On January 26, 1986, one of the greatest disasters of our time occurred. The shuttle, Challenger, blew up in front of a live audience. The space launch was being broadcasted across the United States live from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. This launch was one of the most publicized launches due to the first civilian going into space and also that the launch had been delayed six times before.
On the morning of January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated in midair as the nation watched in disbelief and sadness. The cause of the Challenger accident was determined to be a system design failure on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters. Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are a pair of large solid strap-on rockets that were utilized by NASA during the first two minutes of the Challenger’s Space Shuttle launch. The pair of SRBs was applied to provide an extra liftoff boost for the Space Shuttle during takeoff. Each SRB were located on each side of the external propellant tank of the spacecraft. Once they began to operate, “the boosters separate from the orbiter/external tank, descend on parachutes, and land in the Atlantic Ocean” (Wilson, 2006). NASA would then send ships into the Atlantic Ocean to retrieve the boosters. The boosters were refurbished so they can be used again. According to NASA officials, “the SRBs were the largest solid-fuel rocket motors ever flown, and the first to be used for primary propulsion on human spaceflight missions” (Wilson, 2006).
NASA failed to listen to them and went ahead with the launch witch ultimately led to the death of 7 innocent people. After the accident President Ronald Reagan made the Rogers Commission which is a group made for the investigation of the Challenger accident they found out that NASA “disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching on such a cold day and had failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors.” Showing that after all the people that were not listened to were right and NASA allowed this to happen.
It’s very hard to say what steps, if any, could have been taken to prevent the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster from occurring. When mankind continues to “push the envelope” in the interest of bettering humanity, there will always be risks. In the manned spaceflight business, we have always had to live with trade-offs. All programs do not carry equal risk nor do they offer the same benefits. The acceptable risk for a given program or operation should be worth the potential benefits to be gained. The goal should be a management system that puts safety first, but not safety at any price. As of Sept 7th, 2003, NASA has ordered extensive factory inspections of wing panels between flights that could add as much as three months to the time it takes to prepare a space shuttle orbiter for launch. NASA does all it can to safely bring its astronauts back to earth, but as stated earlier, risks are expected.
In 1986, the Challenger crew met at NASA's Kennedy Space Center for countdown training. The crew of this shuttle included two civilians and five astronaut members: “Teacher-in-Space” payload specialist Christa McAuliffe; payload specialist Gregory Jarvis; and astronauts Judith A. Resnik, mission specialist; Dick Scobee, mission commander; Ronald E. McNair, mi...
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment.
Moreover, after the investigation was conducted, the NTSB had issued safety recommendations for the FAA to consider. The FAA had considered some of NTSB safety recommendations, for example, improving the mechanical procedure of locking and stronger latches for oversized cargo doors. One can agree that survivals of Flight 811 would remember that day.
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...