My Lai Massacre Social Psychology

On March 16th of 1968 American Lieutenant Colonel Barker ordered his troops to storm the small Vietnamese village of My Lai and shoot at any threatening individuals who may put the American soldiers at risk of being under hostile fire. However, upon arrival, the village was abundant with peaceful civilians going about their daily business—not armed enemies. Nevertheless, the orders of Lieutenant Barker were fulfilled, resulting in the brutal massacre of over 500 unarmed Vietnamese citizens. Using various concepts of social psychology, we can retrospectively examine the events and circumstances that led up to the tragedy of the My Lai massacre.

While ambiguous interpretations of the commands given to the soldiers played a large role in their

unwavering obedience, this same ambiguity can also contribute to obedience on a general level. When one is given vague direction from a superior, the subordinate individual will begin to show signs of doubt, which will prompt them to look for individuals of authority for “interpretation of [the] situation” (Nelson, Class Lecture, 2018). If others around the individual are not perceived to be of greater superiority, then they will simply do what others are doing. As one may imagine, this issue may lead to incorrect action to fulfill an order, much like it did in the context of My Lai. Lieutenant Colonel Barker simply instructed his soldiers to fire at threatening individuals, which leaves the definition of “threatening” up for interpretation. Additionally, the article reports that those who were there to hear Barker’s instructions in person ended up interpreting “conflicting accounts of Barker’s exact orders” (3, Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Even if they expected to raid the village at a time when the peaceful civilians were at the market, Barker still “conveyed at least a strong suggestion that the area was to be obliterated,” (3, Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) meaning that, from the beginning, there was no clear direction to avoid the market area. Furthermore, the scene from Remember My Lai of Varnado Simpson recalling his choice to shoot a woman in holding a baby is a perfect example of how the confused soldiers perceived everybody as threatening, simply because the soldier thought she may have been holding a weapon (1989). In summation, the presence of conflicting orders, unclear ideas of who was to be seen as a threat, and the supposed expectation for complete destruction of the area caused these unexperienced soldiers to perceive each Vietnamese individual as a threat. If it had not been for the uncertainty of these orders, the number of casualties surely would not have been as staggering.
Secondly, time constraints can cause pressure that force obedience, regardless of what the obedience requires of an individual.

When feeling rushed, one would feel inclined to take a peripheral processing route in order to save time, but this also means that the resulting action is most likely not indicative of their typical behavior. Moreover, when one uses automatic processing, they would be less likely to defy instruction since disobedience typically requires effortful cognitive energy. The culmination of pressure from authority and time constraints directly caused many issues at My Lai, resulting in a nearly thoughtless obedience to the harsh demands of Lieutenant Calley. It is shown in the video that many of the American troops were under the impression that there would be enemy soldiers present at My Lai, therefore invoking an instinct of needing to “kill or be killed” (Remember My Lai, 1989). Despite the lack of enemy fire, Calley’s direct orders of “want[ing] them dead” (6, Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) combined with the perceived potential of a counterattack was enough reason for the soldiers to continue killing. On the contrary, Hugh Thompson’s distanced view of the massacre from a helicopter allowed him enough time to process the horrific reality and begin to take action against orders. Upon spotting wounded civilians, he attempted to notify American troops on the ground so they could help them—to his abhorrence, he watched as they “killed them instead” (7, Kelman &

Hamilton, 1989). Thompson’s efforts exemplify the effect of time constraints on one’s actions, especially considering that Thompson had received all of the same training as the soldiers doing the killing, the only difference being that he was able to extract himself from the situation and realize that Calley’s orders to murder unarmed citizens was barbaric.
Lastly, the extent to which the citizens of My Lai were dehumanized enabled the soldiers to kill with greater ease.

Dehumanization works in less extreme, more general situations as well: if an individual cannot view a physical person, it becomes much easier for the individual to inflict harm or act negatively towards them, especially when there is a force encouraging harm. This can be seen in the form of cyberbullying, when one is more likely to be harsh because they cannot envision the person being bullied as being anything more than a computer. This is similar to the way that people become uncharacteristically aggressive when driving, as one would probably not direct obscene hand gestures to a person who cuts them off while walking. The American soldiers who murdered during the My Lai massacre, however, had no physical barrier to elicit dehumanization—instead, all of their dehumanization happened mentally. This occurred through Calley and other members of authority repeatedly referring to Vietnamese citizens as ‘communists’ and ‘gooks,’ which, through minimizing their humanity to nothing more than a political affiliation or slang term, inherently “deprive[d] the victims of identity and community” (19, Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). The effects of dehumanization are seen throughout the video, especially through the accounts of numerous soldiers, all recalling that they felt as if any inhibition to kill had left them as they mercilessly took life after life (Remember My Lai,

1989). However, also shown in the video is the immense regret felt by the soldiers afterwards. This is especially exemplified by both Varnado Simpson and Fred Widmer, as Simpson was diagnosed with severe PTSD and Widmer was unable to overcome the regret of killing the boy with an injured arm, even if he felt he was putting the boy out of his misery (Remember My Lai, 1989). This regret only surfaced after they were out of the pressure of obeying orders, and subsequently, unable to dehumanize the innocent people who were killed at their mercy. From the beginning of training up until the time of the massacre, the constant dehumanization of the Vietnamese people had huge impacts on how obediently the soldiers took orders.
To conclude, there are several aspects of social psychology that can be used to merely explain the reasoning behind the brutal massacre at My Lai. However, none of these explanations can provide an excuse for the actions of American soldiers. What happened on March 16th of 1968 is not an event that can be minimized into nothing more than a big understanding caused by a few powerful individuals. There are numerous external factors concerning the dark side of humanity that cannot be omitted from the narrative, factors that cannot be explained with a theory or phenomenon. Even though no amount of analyzing will ever give reason to the tragic events of My Lai, it is important to understand the influence of these factors on obedience so that we, as a society that can advance and learn, never make this mistake again.