This case is based on Mrs. Jennifer Sharkey, who sued J.P. Morgan & Co. (JCMC), Mr. Kenny, Mr. Green, and Mrs. Lassiter, alleging breach of contract and violations of the SOX anti-retaliation statute. The facts started when Mrs. Sharkey was assigned to a Suspect Client 's account where members of JPMC expressed to her their concern regarding to this account because they suspected that the Suspect Client was involved in illegal activities. After Mrs. Sharkey’s investigation, she claimed that she informed her conclusions to superiors Mr. Kenny, Mr. Green, and Mrs. Lassiter, of the Suspect Client 's potential unlawful activities, such as: money laundering, mail fraud, bank engaged in fraud, and violations of federal securities laws. After …show more content…
Sharkey can make a prima facie showing that her complaints about the Suspect Client were protected activity and that was a contributing factor to her termination and whether JPMC can prove by convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that protected behavior. As is reported in the case Sharkey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, "the defendants motion to dismiss is denied, and is stated that Mrs. Sharkey adequately alleges conduct she reported to Defendants and that Defendants had knowledge of Mrs. Sharkey 's protected activity." (p.650) 2. The allegations of fraud in this case involved a client, rather than the plaintiff’s employer. Why is she still able to sue her employer under the SOX …show more content…
On the other hand, we can infer that the reason was because they genuinely did not find sufficient evidence in order to terminate any relationship with the Suspect Client, and that they took the "wrong decision" to fire Mrs. Sharkey in order to stop the investigation. Moreover, we could say that the defendants wanted to prevent a possible lawsuit by the Suspect Client as a result of an unjustifiably business
Procedural History: Miller filled for an appeal claiming that he was entrapped, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct.
...d to the appellant , yet the defendant company itself had no appropriate measures or policy for dealing with the sexual harassment.
In the case of McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418 (2005), there was an internal investigation of the police department of “improper use of police scanners to eavesdrop on cordless phones and cellphones” (Diagle, 2012 para.10), which involved many officers. Police officer McKinley was interviewed two times. The first time McKinley was interviewed it was about the investigation, and the second time was about allegations that he was untruthful during the first interview, both times he was questioned he was under the Garrity Warnings. By the time of the second interview, McKinley was already “under criminal investigation for lying” (Diagle, 2012, para. 10), and during the second interview it was made clear to McKinley that it was about
“I agree with Ms. Krejci that the entire file should have been disclosed with the publics record request, but that does not make it discoverable.” Feeney said. “I understand her frustration that she wasn 't given the same information that another defense attorney was. When I discovered what had happened, which was in august, I immediately requested the entire file from the Phoenix Police Department so that I could disclose it to the defense council. I didn’t do that because I believed that the information was discoverable or relevant. I did it as a professional courtesy. So that we were on the same field, and so that she felt that she had everything tha...
It took for the losing in the case with two Bear Stearns hedge fund managers for the government to realize that there was a problem within their justice system. If they couldn’t take down two people accused of deceiving investors, how did they assume that they would be able to take down numerous high-end executives within Wall Street? So in fall 2009, over a year after the initial hit of the financial crisis, Obama introduced the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task to oversee prosecution for fraud and financial crime a week before the hearing to discuss ’08 financial crisis prosecution. With such a department now put in place, the government believed they could go back and review the “fraud” that took place within Wall Street years before and place a blame somewhere, revealing another flaw of the US government and justice system. The government wasn’t taking the cases as serious as they should have. They weren’t finding ways to filter through Due Diligence underwriters and they weren’t calling forth whistleblowers. They were losing the case before it could even
in doing so. They conceal the evidence to prevent Mrs.Wright 's possible conviction. Why do
Just like people, corporations have the capability of committing criminal acts. The Enron scandal in 2001; the Bernard Madoff ponzi-scheme of 2008-2009; both of these examples show that despite internal and external controls, regulations, and oversight, corporations still are a multi-faceted entity that have the propensity to partake in crime. That being true, that criminal entity must be punished and held responsible for their actions. One tool in the prosecutorial tool belt is the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. According to Lanny Breuer, the United States Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, “over the last decade, deferred prosecution agreements have become a mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement” (Warin, 2012).
The rise of Enron took ten years, and the fall only took twenty days. Enron’s fall cost its investors $35,948,344,993.501, and forced the government to intervene by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2 in 2002. SOX was put in place as a safeguard against fraud by making executives personally responsible for any fraudulent activity, as well as making audits and financial checks more frequent and rigorous. As a result, SOX allows investors to feel more at ease, knowing that it is highly unlikely something like the Enron scandal will occur again. SOX is a protective act that is greatly beneficial to corporate America and to its investors.
The following arguments will be used by Greene’s Jewelry against the defendant; violation of None Disclosure Agreement (NDA) in both Federal and State laws and the countersuit for wrongful termination. Greene’s has the original signed NDA by the defendant, which can be used as evidence. This signed NDA can illustrate the defendant has violated the legally binding agreement she had agreed to while employed under Greene’s jewelry. Howell Jewelry is Greene’s competitor; their intention for hiring the defendant was solely to use confidential documents she had from her previous employer when she was terminated. In addition to violating the NDA, the defendant violated both federal and state versions of the New Hampshire Trade Secret Law, that “safeguards
JPMorgan Chase seems to be in a legal bind this year and possibly needs to review their policies and procedures. Following in the wake of a discrimination lawsuit, JPMorgan is now being sued by their female working force. In mid-2012, JPMorgan failed to equally compensate 93 female workers that held such positions as application developers, project managers, and technology directors. The workers claim that men working in the same positions were being paid more for identical work being performed.
In this law brief, I will discuss two cases that all stem from one series of incidents. First, Greene Jewelry Company sued its former employee, Jennifer Lawson, for breach of confidentiality. Ms. Lawson is countersuing her former company for wrongful termination. In order to discuss all aspects of the cases against Greene Jewelry, I will address the aspects of the case individually.
In 1995 The Bayou Hedge Fund Group, referred to as the fund, was founded by Samuel Israel III in Stamford, Connecticut with the intention to produce high returns for investors. Good intentions were not enough when the fund began to experience losses almost immediately and Mr. Israel resorted to fraudulent activities to keep the appearance of success alive. The resulting life of the fund was filled will illegal, fraudulent, and unethical activities that finally brought the fund to bankruptcy and landed Mr. Israel and some of his key associates in prison. The objective of this paper is to overview the history of the case and to highlight some of the major issues that should have alerted investors and other outside parties to the wrongdoings being perpetrated.
• JPMorgan Chase relies on the effectiveness and integrity of its processes, operating systems and employees, and those of third parties, and certain failures of such processes or systems or misconduct by such employees could materially and adversely affect the Firm’s
...e to make a written application in advance before seeking to produce any evidence in the form of documents or witnesses. This prior disclosure however was not necessary for the Prosecution. There was also detrimental information that was obtained from the Accused without any legal protection prior to the trials. In essence the Defense team was seriously understrengthed and unprepared to face such a complete, powerful, and large prosecution team.
1. In this case, the legal issue to be debated is whether Vanessa’s conduct constitutes sexual assault? If her conduct is not sexual, does her conduct constitute common assault? According to s. 265 of the Criminal Code, a sexual assault occurs when there is a non-consensual application of force that violates the complainant’s sexual integrity (Chase, para. 1). This section, which is cited in the Chase case as s. 244, is now s. 265. According to R. v. Chase (1987), there is a flexible checklist of factors for determining whether the reasonable observer would view the assault to be sexual in nature. This checklist includes elements such as the part of the body touched, the nature of the contact, the situation in which the act occurred, the words