Modern warfare ranges from small to large campaigns with military fundamentals shaping the battlefield. However, none has a more significant value as the Napoleonic eras. Although France is no longer a dominant power, its military fundamentals influence the United States (U.S.) military.
The U.S. military employs three Napoleonic era fundamentals of Command and Control (C2), professional military, and nationalism. These fundamentals shape the U.S. military during peace and war.
Maintaining peace and winning wars are important. To do that, large capable militaries are required with C2 and Napoleon recognized this. Napoleon task organized the Army into Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Brigades, centralizing C2.
Napoleon’s Supreme Command controlled the Corps that had Divisions and Brigades. The Corps was Napoleon’s main fighting force. Napoleon’s Corps was a Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) unit that is self-sustaining and could fight on its own. The Corps was a headquarters, which units could be task-organized into with two to four Divisions of Infantry and their organic Artillery, a Cavalry Division, Corps Artillery, and support units.
Today’s the U.S. Army operates a similar formation. The Corps is the lowest tactical maneuver headquarters with a twofold purpose. They can remain Army pure or task-organized into contingency operational Joint Task Forces (JTF). However, JTFs are ad-hoc units pieced together at time of crises. Corps are only U.S. Army units, and do not encompass Air and Sea formations. To account for other military service formations, the U.S. military operates a Joint Unified Command with the same Napoleonic fundamentals.
Today the U.S. military operates a Joint C2 structure, divided into geographical areas as G...
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The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
Stewart R. W. (2005). American Military History (Vol. 1). The United States Army and the
Moreover, he concurs with Roberts principles that attain to a replacement of weapons, army sizes, tactics and the implication of warfare on society. However in Parker’s book, The Military Revolution he contributes three revised principles towards Roberts conclusion. First, Parker argues that the innovations of gunpowder weapons forced European states to innovate their fortifications, thereby changing warfare from being fought on land to sieges and being fought for decisive purposes. Second, he asserts that warfare in the early modern period prompted European states to monopolize on the supply effort to recruit soldiers and feed their new armies. Parker’s third principle indicated that naval power; size of fleets, design of ship's, gun weapons and tactics played a pivotal role in the military revolution that allowed Europeans to conquer “35” percent of the world during the early modern
The United States Army has been a leader in military prowess on the world stage since its inception in 1775, and with such a record, it is reasonably assumed that there must be solid foundation within the organization working to maintain the high level of performance. The Noncommissioned Officer Corps is one institution within the Army that serves as a large portion of this foundation that makes it the fighting force that it has always been, and the noncommissioned officers have been an integral piece since the very inception of the Army. The Prussian General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, organizer of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, encapsulated this idea when he coined the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the backbone of the Army. (Arms, 1991) In an Army that is continuously adjusting to world around it while maintaining its status as the military leader to all other nations, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps has always provided the platform for continuity through a growing rank system based on its original core, an evolving training program to develop effective leaders, and a creed that moves us forward while remembering the rich history of the corps that came before us.
The United States Army is an important subculture within our society. It has many uniquely defining attributes, which separate it from the general culture and from the subcultures of the other branches of the military. The Army’s subculture is critical to the effective operation and discipline of the Army. The Army is critical to the survival of our country, our society, and our way of life. Only certain individuals are willing to accept the demands of this subculture to be soldiers in order to preserve our freedoms for their own, and future, generations.
This book contains a powerful dramatization of current Marine Corps doctrine, but it also holds a hidden vision for many Generals. There are lessons in training methodology, leadership, and ethics as well. Because of this, it has made Card’s book, an often read title for many years; Ender’s Game has been a stalwart item on the Marine Corps Reading List since its inception. Then Captain John Schmitt, author of Warfighting (a foundational book on Marine maneuver warfare doctrine) used it to teach. Schmitt said, "Winning wars depends on the quality of the people you put into battle. Start with smart people, train them in imaginative and challenging ways, and ensure you force decisionmaking authority down to the person with a superior awareness of the tactical situation." Ender’s Game was published at the same time Marines started reading The Maneuver Warfare Handbook. We have since institutionalized maneuver warfare into the Marine Corps. The challenge to every generation of Marines is to continue to live up to what Maneuver Warfare philosophy demands of
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
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Napoleon Bonaparte, an unparalleled military commander who conquered most of Europe around the early 1800’s, invaded Russia in 1812, who was under the rule of Tsar Alexander at the time, lost three quarters of his Grande Armee which was composed of soldiers from all over Europe totaling 600,000 soldiers. This part of history is the most talked about and studied military campaign even today by scholars and military school alike. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 was a extraordinary expedition that shocked the French Empire to its foundation and led to its eventual collapse just a year later. This Historiographic comparative
This paper examines lessons learned that are timeless in their relevance for all types of warfare with respect to the lesson materials discussed in the Warfare Studies course. The first lesson learned that this paper examines is the United States’ adaptability in response to changing nature of warfare. The United States has experienced various types of warfare ranging from war of annihilation, war of attrition, or fourth-generation warfare; the United States has no identifiable American way of war. Second, this paper looks at the importance and enduring nature of fourth-generation warfare and counterinsurgency operations. These events are here to stay and will be significant in the future conflicts. The third lesson learned discusses America’s poor planning and preparation for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR) and demonstrated the need to avoid stovepiped, single agency planning. The apparent lack of planning for SSTR operations severely complicated and extended the United States mission in Iraq. Fourth, America must always strive to be on the cutting edge and maintain technological superiority over our adversaries in order to secure great advantages. However, the United States cannot solely rely on technological savvy military to achieve success. The last lesson learned discusses the growing relevance of information IOP as a powerful tool of war and the importance of it in shaping public opinion.
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
· By the use of theatrical and emotional language in his bulletins and Orders of the Day, Napoleon formed a special bond between himself and the army. He played on the ideas of military glory, of patriotism and of comradeship, while giving at the same time the impression that he had a deep paternal concern for his men. To this they responded with real devotion. ii) The Changing Nature of War · The majority of the eighteenth-century wars were fought with more or less evenly matched, mainly mercenary armies, very similar to each other in training, equipment, composition and strength.
In this article, an author under the name Warcat talks about how the army started out in war in the early 1900s and how their weapons evolved from then to now. As weapons evolved so did the method of using them. Until the 1900s, soldiers fought in big formations where Generals could mass their troops here they would do the most damage to the enemy. As guns became more common, troops were equipped with them and deployed in several ranks. When the atomic bomb was developed, large militaries again realized the danger of concentration their armies like they once did. Technology has changed the way war is fought. With more widespread and instantaneous media coverage, citizens are quickly informed of world events. With realistic views of what their
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
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