Misperception Theory Essay

2625 Words6 Pages

Apply ONE theory of the causes of political conflicts to ONE real-world case of conflict to help explain why/how the conflict occurred.
Introduction
While there are many theories one can draw upon to explain the background and outbreak of political conflict this paper will focus on the ‘Misperception Theory’. The prime objectives of this paper are to clearly document and explain the different facets of misperception theory, to effectively explore the various means by which decisions based on this theory can affect state policy and state welfare, and to reveal how exactly the misperception theory can aid scholars in understanding how and why conflict erupts. This paper will utilise the misperception theory to illustrate how, and why, the US and Great Britain overestimated the military pedigree and threat of the Saddam Hussein governed Iraq. Their misperception of the situation ultimately resulted in the two superpowers combining forces and invading the Gulf state in 2003.
Introduction to Misperception Theory
To comprehend, and clearly explain, how the 2003 US & Great Britain invasion of Iraq can be considered an example of the misperception theory, we must first understand precisely what the misperception theory entails and encompasses. It is integral we grasp how exactly misperception theory can lead to conflict and how an influential state leader can misperceive a situation/event.
A common definition of misperception theory describes it as “the gap between the world as it actually exists and the world as it exists in the mind of the perceiver” (Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). This definition is however, dependent on one crucial assumption, that there is both a single objective reality and multiple subjective realities. The key differe...

... middle of paper ...

...our is then considered evidence of this malign intent. The ‘enemy image’ becomes resistant to change and extremely difficult to discredit. Therefore, information received by state leaders that is consistent with this ‘enemy image’ has to cross a much lower perceptual threshold to get the attention of the leader (Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). The subsequent consequence is that the decision-maker, usually the state leader, may then make a decision based on this information. The ‘enemy image’ has become so ingrained, and the response so automatic, that the state leader may then inadvertently misperceive the situation and consider the enemy to be posing a far greater threat than he/she actually is. President Bush fell victim to this process in his evaluation of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and launched an invasion of Iraq on the basis of that misperception in 2003.

Open Document