Racial Prejudice and Constitutional Rights Violation

go temporarily out of an area where his presence might cause danger to himself or to his fellows. On the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States….I need hardly labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated. (Korematsu)

In saying this he finds the case to be based on racial prejudice, although he never uses these two words but the word “ancestry,” as there is no direct knowledge or experience that contradict Korematsu’s loyalty to the United States (Korematsu). He also draws the glaring

conclusion that Korematsu’s rights guaranteed by the constitution have been infringed upon.
In Justice Jackson’s dissent he makes a resolute statement that, “Korematsu, however, has been convicted of an act not commonly a crime. It consists merely of being present in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived” (Korematsu). Jackson asserts that the military necessity is not enough to violate the constitutional rights of American citizens. He continues to say that it is unreasonable to hold the military to the constitutional standards in times of war as the military maintains its power to arrest citizens. Acknowledging that, "military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal,” he understands that the courts should not be in the position of interfering with military orders, even if they are unconstitutional. However, he argues that:
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency…But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.

The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.

(Korematsu)
Here he declares that the precedent of Korematsu will last considerably past the war and expand to unforeseen purposes. He also believes that the majority opinion of the court “is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself” (Korematsu). He furthers exclaims that he would overturn the judgement and discharge Korematsu.
Justice Murphy conducts an extremely passionate dissent proclaiming that Americans of Japanese descent should not be forcibly removed from the West Coast with the defense of military necessity, as it “goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power, and falls into the ugly abyss of racism” (Korematsu).

He harshly criticizes the majority and disagrees with them that all Japanese-Americans should be sent to internment camps. Instead, he believes that it is possible to treat each Japanese-American as an individual, “holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal,” which he cites was done with people of German and Italian ancestry (Korematsu). With this he concludes that military necessity is not the only factor in this case but also the racial prejudice directed towards Japanese-Americans. He further acknowledges the racial discrimination aspect of the case exclaiming that there has been "disinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices.” Murphy also asserts that Executive Order #9066 “destroy[s] the dignity of the individual and encourage[s] and open[s] the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow” (Korematsu); foreseeing, like Jackson, that the precedent of this case will far exceed the war and stretch long into the

future.
Justice Black wrote the opinion of the court concluding that racial prejudice had nothing to do with removal of Japanese-Americans from areas deemed as restricted military zones and with the internment of Japanese Americans. The majority believed this because they were at war with the Japan and believed that they needed to protect the West Coast from invasions, especially those from the inside. He found that because of the urgency that there was no time to review each Japanese-American and determine if they were or were not loyal to the United States, but that a course of action had to be executed as quickly as possible. Basically the majority argued that the end justifies the means, if espionage and spies could be protected against than any means necessary to accomplish this should be done. However, what the majority failed to recognize is that these people are American citizens. Viewing them as a threat to national security for simply having Japanese heritage is discriminating against these people. They cannot say that they are not discriminating against the Japanese-Americans and then turn around and rip Japanese-Americnas from their homes to be sent away to internment camps, solely due to the fact that they are Japanese and American is at war with the Japan.
To forcibly remove over 120,000 Americans with Japanese ancestry in the name of military necessity and national security directly contradicts the United States Constitution, that should be upheld at all times—even during war. No where in the constitution does it cite that military necessity allows for Americans to be stripped of their Constitutional rights. The ruling of this case opposed the fifth amendment of the Constitution and deprived thousands upon thousands of Japanese-Americans their right to “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (V Amend). They were forced to leave behind their lives, homes, belongings, and friends, solely based on the fact that they looked liked the enemy. Also, these Americans were never given the necessary appropriate legal process to convict them in order to be evacuated to an internment camp.
Consequently, Fred Korematsu was sent to an internment camp, but still strongly believed that, “people should have a fair trial and a chance to defend their loyalty at court in a democratic way, because in this situation, people were placed in imprisonment without any fair trial” (Chin).
In the end of the war, not one Japanese-American was ever found guilty of aiding the enemy with espionage or sabotage. In fact, to prove their loyalty to their country, an all Japanese-American regiment—the 442nd—worked tirelessly for the allies and became the most decorated unit in the history of American warfare for its size and length of service. These Japanese-American men rose above what the Americans expected of them and blatantly contrasted the belief that ethnicity determines loyalty. In 1976, President Ford asserted that "We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the battlefield and at home the names of Japanese-Americans have been and continue to be written in history for the sacrifices and the contributions they have made to the well-being and to the security of this, our common Nation.” (President Ford). In 2004, Korematsu reflected that, “no one should ever be locked away simply because they share the same race, ethnicity, or religion as a spy or a terrorist” (Korematsu, Relearn). With this he explained the possible implications of the ruling of Korematsu v. United States—a case that was never overturned—and how, even today Americans can be betrayed by their own country.