Juvenile Delinquency In America

Read the article posted under the Course Materials tab, "The Supreme Court Rules Again that Juveniles are Different." Also, watch the video at this link:

https://youtu.be/WIXuUYXrt54

After reading the article and watching the video, analyze the social and legal issues that relate to how to deal with violent youthful offenders who commit serious crimes while they are juveniles. Be sure to incorporate references to the assigned materials in the content your create for your response. [minimum 250 words]

Juvenile delinquency within America’s society seems to have an ongoing fluctuation of opinions and areas of focus. As America continuously evolves, good or bad, the juvenile delinquency will continue to abide by the opinions that society

may present a rather quick fix solution. Historically, violent juvenile offending stands out as one of the most predominant issues in social problems that are associated with both youth and deviant behaviors (Bajaj, et al., 2016).
Ruling rather repetitive, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize the difference between an emotionally undeveloped adolescent committing crimes versus an adult (Bajaj, et. al., 2016). Recently the Courts accepted the fact that juveniles are less culpable than adults are (Bajaj, et. al, 2016). Moreover, juveniles possess a greater capability for rehabilitation, which means that extending parole edibility to juvenile offenders allows America to move closer toward possibly outlawing life sentences without eligibility for parole in most cases (Bajaj, et. al., 2016). Diversity is another aspect involved in the social impact as violent juvenile offenders elements involved within their social environment plays a factor on many levels regarding associated elements within their case and/or other social aspects of their environment. (Elrod & Ryder, 2014).
Legally these social dilemmas affect all persons associated with the presented case as well as the general society. Yes, the family of a victim should have the right for their loved one to seek justice. Furthermore, no matter what the imposition of the sentence imposed on the juvenile offender, the fact remains that the sentence will not bring the victim’s loved one back (Growing Up in Prison: Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole, 2011). Because violent juvenile offenders are not alike, strict and harsh standards should apply prior to granting violent juvenile offenders the right to parole. These standards would allow for an overall evaluation for recidivism, psychological aspects, and other factors deemed detrimental to maintaining the overall safety and sanctity within our society.

Kris, I agree with your discussion piece in that discretion should play a vital role when analyzing cases involving violent juvenile offenders. Because juveniles possess a greater capability for rehabilitation, I believe that all aspects involved in each court case should be reviewed independently. This would avoid the social condemning of a violent juvenile offender to the extent that he or she is denied the overall possibility of rehabilitating (Bajaj, et. al., 2016). While diversity places a role in most circumstances within the United States, social aspects that seem to influence the legal ones should not be the strongest underlining factor when determining if a juvenile offender has the overall capability of rehabilitation. Therefore, I absolutely agree that since there are two sides to every story, both side should be heard without bias.

Rebecca, a enjoyed reading your discussion piece and of your opinion of regarding the focus of criminal justice.

The overall focus seems to be centered on punishment and retribution based on the social condemning of violent juvenile offenders rather than on preventing recidivism (Bajaj, et. al., 2016). Moreover, with strict standards and the proper imposition of the sentence imposed on the juvenile, he or she would likely be receptive to different forms of rehabilitation. Although it remains a well-known fact that no two people are the same, giving a juvenile offender the capability to learn from his or her mistakes or to engage in some sort of rehabilitative means prior to ruling out a lifetime of freedom, seems to be a better approach in maintaining the overall safety and sanctity of our society.

Reference:
Bajaj, V., Bennet, J., Clines, F., Cohn, L., Downes, L., Giacomo, C., . . . . . . . . . J., Williamson, E. (2016, January 25). The Supreme Court Says Again: Juveniles Are Different [PDF]. The New York Times.
Elrod, P. PhD, & Ryder, R. S., JD. (2014). Juvenile Justice: A Social, Historical, and Legal Perspective (4th ed.). Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning
Growing Up in Prison: Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole. (2011, October 28). Retrieved April 17, 2017, from

https://youtu.be/Kf6paw8a5Zw

1-Case Summary
Use your text and the internet to research the case of Fare v. Michael C. In a narrative format of 500 or more words, outline the case. Give the facts, issue, and court holding.

In the United States Supreme Court case of Fare v. Michael C., the Court visits the issue of a juvenile’s Sixth Amendment rights as it pertains to his or her Miranda Rights (Fare v. Michael C., n.d.). The issue presented to the Court was whether a juvenile defendant requesting to speak with his or her probation officer acts as an invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to the right to remain silent and to protect themselves against self-incrimination (Fare v. Michael C., n.d.). Overall, the focus lies on how a probation officer is fundamentally viewed within a court setting and how that view compares with a prosecutor or attorney within the criminal justice system (Fare v. Michael C., n.d.).
Fare v. Michel (1979) began when respondent, Michael C. was implicated in the murder of Robert Yeager during the course of a robbery that took place inside Yeager’s home on January 19, 1976. After the respondent matched the description of the suspect responsible for the murder and reported the observation of a truck registered to the respondent’s mother was seen in the area at the time the murder took place, the respondent became the prime suspect (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Based on the aforementioned information the respondent police took the respondent into custody where police learned that the 16 ½-year-old juvenile respondent was currently on probation for the juvenile court (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). In addition, a further history reflected that the respondent had been on probation since the age of 12 and that approximately one year earlier, the respondent served a term at a youth corrections camp (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Overall, this juvenile respondent had a lengthy history of multiple previous criminal offenses that included burglary of guns, purse snatching, all of which stretched back over several years (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
At the Van Nuys police station, two police officers initiated the interrogation of the respondent (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). The interrogation was recorded and the two police officers were the only persons in the interrogation room with the respondent during the course of the interrogation (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). One of the officers initiated the interrogation and informed the respondent that he was brought to the station for questioning regarding a murder (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). After that officer fully advised the respondent of his Miranda rights, during which time the respondent requested to have his probationary officer present during questioning (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). After the respondent’s request was denied, the respondent expressed worry about the fact that police could bring a police officer into the room who posed as an attorney versus bringing a real attorney in (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
Once denied the request to have his probationary officer present, the respondent was again explained that he had the right to have an attorney present, not to talk with officers, and not to say anything (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Following these statements, the respondent agreed to speak with officers about the murder without the presence of an attorney (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Following this waiver of rights, the respondent answered questions and drew sketches, which incriminated him in the Yeager murder (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
Following these incriminating statements by the respondent, probation authorities filed a petition in juvenile court that alleged that the respondent had murdered Robert Yeager and therefore should be adjudged a ward of the juvenile court (Fare v.

Michael C., 1979). Then, the respondent moved to suppress the statements and sketches that he gave during the interrogation alleging that the statements and sketches were obtained in violation of Miranda due to his request for the presence of his probationary officer denied (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Claiming a violation of his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, the respondent claimed that requesting his the presence of his probationary officer was equivalent to having an attorney present during questioning (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Additional arguments based on the analogy in the decision of People v. Burton where the Supreme Court of California held that a minor’s request made during custodial interrogation to see his parents, constituted an invocation of the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights (Fare v. Michael C.,

1979).
Moreover, probationary officer, Charles P. Christiansen, was subsequently called as a witness (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Christiansen’s testimony resulted in the fact that he previously instructed the respondent to contact him immediately if police contact or concerns with the respondent’s family arose (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). In addition to those statements, history revealed the respondent was reprimanded my Christiansen when he failed to communicate effectively (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Therefore, the argument was based on the fact when the respondent requested the presence of Christiansen, he was, in fact, asserting his right to remain silent (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). The ruling from the bench resulted in denial of the respondent’s motion to suppress, holding that the facts, in this case, showed a “clear waiver” by the respondent to waive his rights (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
On appeal, this case was transferred to the California Supreme Court where the court held that the respondent’s request for the presence of his probationary officer at the commencement of the interrogation negated the willingness to speak with police resulting in the respondent’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). This conclusion was further based on its view of the juvenile court system’s emphasis on the relationship between a probation officer and the probationer, and because of that view the probationary officer was “a trusted guardian figure who exercises the authority of the state and parens patriate and whose duty it is to implement the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court (Fare v. Michael C., 1979, p. 3). Therefore, the minor’s request for his probationary officer was deemed equivalent to the minor requesting that his parents be present during interrogation, resulting in that under the rule of Barton it constituted an invocation of the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
Furthermore, the court held that in this case, a probationary officer would act to protect the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights in the same way that an attorney would (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Subsequently, the courts holding found that the request for a probationary officer was a per se invocation of Fifth Amendment rights, therefore, rejecting a totality of the circumstance inquire (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Finally, the court concluded that in this case, regardless of considerations of capacity, coercion, or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). The question then turns to the fact of whether the call for the presence of his probationary officer was the respondent exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). In final conclusion, the court said that the State had not met its burden of proving that the minor’s request was no an assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege and that the trial court should not have admitted the confessions obtained after the respondent requested his probation officer (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).
In Fare v. Michael C. the Supreme Court’s holding that a minor’s request for his probationary officer during custodial interrogation was not a per se invocation of his rights which required the termination of police questioning under Miranda (Asack, 1980). Further, the Court expressed the belief that it was not unreasonable to require that juveniles explicitly request a lawyer or expressly state a desire to remain silent (Asack, 1980). Also, that there can be no doubt that it would accept no less from an adult accused (Asack, 1908). In the overall importance of this case lies within the fact that its effect within the context of a single interrogation session would be to allow police questioning to continue where the questioned party’s statements or conduct falls short of an unambiguous announcement regarding the intention to remain silent (Asack, 1980). Therefore, the admissibility of resulting statements would not be judged on whether the accused’s statements or conduct were reasonably indicative of an intent to remain silent, but rather on the validity of the subsequent waiver, leaving Miranda unsettled (Asack, 1980).

References:
Asack, P. A. (1980). Invocation of Miranda Rights: A Question of Fact?: Fare v. Michael C. Boston College Law Review, 21(4), 4th ser., 1-27. Retrieved from http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol21/iss4/4
Fare v. Michael C. [PDF]. (1979). Retrieved from https://vcampbethel.blob.core.windows.net/public/SLS_CustomContentFileUploads/CourseMaterial/sql2_bethel_cps/Module_618/User_3615/201704021220202196_Fare_v_Michael_C_U3..pdf
Fare v. Michael C. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved April 21, 2017, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-334