Introduction
Technical intelligence collection technology since the end of World War II expanded to meet national policy makers’ needs in a growing, more diverse geopolitical environment.
Airborne Signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection is a growing means to close intelligence gaps that fulfill policymaker’s needs. Since the 1960s, the United States (US) and Britain were the primary governments with such capability (Streetly 2010). Today many nations in Asia maintain an airborne SIGINT collection capability. In broad terms, the following will discuss SIGINT airborne collection platforms in use by countries in Asia. Specifically, however, this writing will briefly discuss current and pre-World War II Japanese SIGINT organizations.
America and Asia
Many countries in Asia received American airborne SIGINT platforms. Countries include, for example, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore and Japan. One of America’s closest allies, South Korea, received four, according to Janes International Review, “… Hawker 800SIG COMINT and ELINT aircraft…,” and worked with Taiwan to develop a joint airborne system (Streetly 2010). In Japan, the primary airborne platforms in use are the EP-3 and YS-11EB. The popularity of airborne SIGINT capability by Asian countries lies in geography. Unlike Europe, in Asia many nations are island countries, or surrounded by large swaths of the Pacific Ocean. Thus, to maintain freedom of navigations that supports their collective, export driven economies, access by means of airborne platforms provide timely intelligence.
Japan and SIGINT
1940s
From an historical viewpoint and up to this point, the class largely focused on US and British SIGINT capabilities. However, prior to World War II the Japanese m...
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After a quick examination of the recurring theme of Japanese military arrogance, I will argue that the three most compelling strategies that the Japanese could have pursued in the spring of 1942 were, one – to consolidate the most important resource gains that were already made; two – commence immediate planning for a strong anti-submarine warfare campaign; and three – coordinate significant operations with Japan’s Axis partners, particularly in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia theaters of conflict.
?Espionage.? 2000-2004. The War to End All Wars. Michael Duffy. Original Material. Primary Documents Online.
For the American intelligence community, George Washington is considered the father of intelligence. The introduction of the intelligence concept and its application in some missions during the early days of America helped America’s Founding Fathers to succeed against t...
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In this paper, I will do a case study on the Bay of Pigs and why the United States tried to conduct this attack. I will find out what intelligence led to this invasion attempt as well as what intelligence failures were made which resulted in the failure of the invasion. I will discuss what impact the Bay of Pigs had on the United States Intelligence community and what changes was made. I will end this paper with any findings I have concluded to if the failure has any affect on how the U.S. conducts intelligence in today’s world.
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Over the year and a half between Pearl Harbor and Midway the United States made headway with various technological and military advantages. One of the most important of which was the code breaking efforts of Commander Joseph J. Rochefort Jr. “Most of the U.S’s information [on Japan] came from Rochefort. R...
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... army of the enemy and the capacities they had. Although US intelligence said they had improved their efficiency so another Pearl Harbor doesn’t happen again, the true is that there are still imperfections on the structure of the agencies, and the rival relationship between those, makes things worse.
the Pacific, the Japanese quickly learned America’s tactics and used a new form of strategy
Throughout the years most country's governments have established some sort of secret police. No matter what the government called it, whether it is the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or her Majesty's secret service (MI6), whatever name the government used, the international term of "secret police" could always be applied. Many agencies of secret police have had their success and failures, some more than others. The KGB, which in English means "the Committee of Public Safety," has had their share of both successes and failures. Most secret police agencies have been used primarily to obtain information from other countries. This was also a primary goal for the KGB, but one of their other goals, which was just as important, was to keep unwanted outside information from the Russian people. This was only one out of many the KGB's objectives. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to prove that the actions of the KGB were, all in all, a success.
of the National Security Research Division Toward a Theory of Intelligence, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 1-35. Retrieved Monday 22, 2010, from RAND Database.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) has access to many traditional and non-traditional dynamic elements that provide superior capabilities to collect and monitor visual, seismic, and acoustic signatures of motorized vehicles. SIGINT is the only system that can be operational and maintainable in any type of climate and terrain, which provides an advantage over the United States’ (U.S.) adversaries. The process of obtaining the intelligence starts with the collection of any type of signal, whether it be infrared, electro-optical, or electronic. After the signals are collected, analysts encounter the tasks of cryptanalysis, transcription, traffic analysis, and translations of the enemy information systems; analyst then determine size, location, distance, and terrain features. The data is usually processed in overlays and graphic displays within the United States. End products are then populated into National databases for the use of the Intelligence Community. The increasing utilization of computers, the internet, satellites, sophisticated encryption, and cellular telephones have streamlined effective and accurate Human Intelligence (HUMINT); implementation of Signals Intelligence has became an important role to maintain superiority over adversaries.