Wait a second!
More handpicked essays just for you.
More handpicked essays just for you.
Eassy War against terrorism
Eassy War against terrorism
Don’t take our word for it - see why 10 million students trust us with their essay needs.
Recommended: Eassy War against terrorism
In this week’s assignment we will be looking at a number of significant issues that are or have confronted the intelligence community in a post 9-11 environment. We will quickly touch on the role the Global War on Terrorism has had on changes to the intelligence community’s position, procedures, and policies along with assessing how the intelligence community has directed it efforts when it comes to dealing with traditional military threats from other countries. It is inarguable that for the large majority of times, change is instituted to make a situation better, or to prevent a bad situation from arising. So too can be said about the countless changes in policy and practices that have affected the intelligence community since 9-11. Retrospectively assessing a few of these polices it can become difficult to see in its totality if they have helped the intelligence community or in a way weakened it.
In the post 9-11 world the intelligence community was once again charged and reenergized to prevent another such attack and in a way take the war back to the enemies’ door step and off of our shores. A means to learn from the fall of those Twin Towers and the 3000 lives lost was of grave importance to the security of the nation and the preservation of the peace here in the United States. But we cannot talk about changes in the intelligence community without talking about what effect those changes might have on the basic principles that are key, to all of the diverse arms and branches of the intelligence community: The intelligence cycle. Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production, and lastly Dissemination (The Intelligence Cycle 2007) are all very important parts of the cycle- but even minor seemingly ins...
... middle of paper ...
...he Eighteenth Century . Washington DC : Collins , 2005.
"Director of National Intelligence ." Infomaition Sharing Strategy . Feb 22, 2008. http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf (accessed Aug 19, 2011).
Fleitz, Fred. America's Intelligence Denial on Iran. Jul 19, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303661904576453800512114910.html#articleTabs%3Darticle (accessed Aug 19, 2011).
Foust, Joshua. PBS- "What's Wrong with the U.S. Intelligence Community". Jul 22, 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/voices/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-the-u-s-intelligence-community/10612/ (accessed Aug 19, 2011).
Redd, Johnn Scott. Congressional Statement . Washington DC , Sep 10, 2007.
The Intelligence Cycle . Apr 15, 2007. https://www.cia.gov/kids-page/6-12th-grade/who-we-are-what-we-do/the-intelligence-cycle.html (accessed Aug 15, 2011).
Guilford, CT: Dushkin/ McGraw-Hill, 1997. Chiatkin, Anton. A. Treason in America. Washington DC: Executive Intelligence. Review, a review of the book, Divine, Breen, Frederickson, and Williams. America Past and Present.
What caused the intelligence failure of 9/11 and how can this be corrected in the Future?
Anonymous. "DIA Provides Strategic Warning for the Next Generation." Www.dia.mil. Defense Intelligence Agency, 11 May 2012. Web. 13 Nov. 2013
The Department of Homeland Security faces challenges of failure to coordinate and cooperate in the latest fight against computer crimes as well as more general intelligence-gathering operations. (...
Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Doubleday, 2007. Print.
...e community have had conflicting views and opposing agendas. Lack of cooperation and communication between intelligence agencies; such as the FBI and the CIA refusing to share information prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001, resulted in limited information and failure on the part of the intelligence community and policy decisions regarding US safeguards against terrorist.
The DIA started in 1958. The organizational structure of the DoD and U.S. foreign intelligence came to a new shape with the establishment of DIA. It was Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, who came up with the concept of DIA in 1961. DIA gathers human source intelligence, analyzes technical intelligence, distributes intelligence/reports to the intelligence agencies, provides advice and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with foreign military intelligence, and provides military intelligence to combatant commands as its operational functions. A DIA director is supposed to be a three-star military general and DIA is believed to have employed at least 7,500 staff worldwide today. The DIA is a defense intelligence agency that prevents strategic surprises and delivers a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, and to policymakers. This paper will try to evaluate DIA’s role in US national security in present condition of massive budget deficits and increased congressional oversight, plus the intelligence capabilities of the Regional Combatant Commanders and the individual services like CIA and NSA.
Seymour M. Hersh, “What Went Wrong: The C.I.A. and the Failure of American Intelligence,” New Yorker, October 1, 2001
Throughout history there are multiple intelligence failures such as 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. These failures are due to intelligence collected which was either delayed or misdirected to the rest of the intelligence community. Both events had catastrophic consequences and yet these tragic events has allowed the intelligence community to develop better security like warning signals and combat readiness to protect the United States. Pearl Harbor is still considered one of the worst intelligence failure in the history of the United States to date. During the upcoming months before the attack the U.S Naval Fleet intercepted and deciphered vast amounts of encrypted messages from Japan’s Imperial Navy. Due to manpower and at the time Japan being perceived as not a threat intercepted messages were disregarded or were delayed in being read. “The United States did not perceive the Japanese ability to attack the United States Naval Fleet at all and thus to bring the U.S into war- a step in which logically appeared to be a gross strategic miscalculation, as it indeed was” (Grabo, 2004). But ...
Intelligence tests have been developed by scientists as a tool to categorize army recruits or analyze school children. But still discussing what intelligence is, academics have a difficult time defining what intelligence tests should measure. According to the American researcher Thorndike, intelligence is only that what intelligence tests claim it is (Comer, Gould, & Furnham, 2013). Thus, depending on what is being researched in the test and depending on the scientist’s definition of intelligence the meaning of the word intelligence may vary a lot. This essay will discuss what intelligence is in order to be able to understand the intelligence theories and aims of intelligence tests.
... Sept. 11th, 2001, terrorist attack on theWorld Trade Center and the unreliability of U.S. intelligence onWeapons of mass Destruction in Iraq have been a focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. in 2004 particularly in the context of the 9/11 Commision , the continuing armed resistance against U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the widely perceived need for systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On July 9th, 2004 the Senate report of Pre-war Intelligenceon Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committe stated that the CIA described the danger presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq in an unreasonable way, largely unsupported by the available intelligence. In a briefing held Sept 15th, 2001 George Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a "top-secret" document describing covert CIA anti-terror operations in 80 countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway or being recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks". The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history".
Twenty- first century American intelligence is worlds away from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Not only is intelligence now a multi-agency effort, but the way in which intelligence is collected reflects the products of a technologically advanced society. Early espionage was reliant on human intelligence officers, and for the most part, that was the extent of the intelligence resources. Today, the intelligence collection toolbox is comprised of humans, plus drones, satellites, wiretaps, and other technological innovations. With the introduction of new ways of spying, some experts say that human intelligence (HUMINT) is outdated and is not an effective use of the intelligence community’s time or money due
Traditional theories of intelligence do not account for the ambiguity of classes such as philosophy or for the wide range of interests a child can have. For example, contemporary theories such as Sternberg’s Theory of Intelligence and Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences both account for more than the general intelligence accounted for in traditional intelligence theories. According to Robert Sternberg’s Successful (Triarchic) Theory of Intelligence, are Hector’s difficulties in philosophy indicative of future difficulties in the business world? According to Sternberg’s Theory of Intelligence, Hector’s difficulty in philosophy will not negatively affect his future. Sternberg would instead focus on elements of successful intelligence like Hector’s involvement and contribution as an individual, as opposed to relying on intelligence measured by tests.
... linguistic and physical differences between our personnel and theirs sources (i.e. Iran, North Korea, China, etc.). This is why I believe that overt HUMINT collection is where our focus should be: the legality and relative ease of acquiring open source intelligence can give us a vast array of indicators that can be converted into complete information with significant intelligence value. It is the result of overt collection that constitutes the context that should lead to consideration for clandestine operations. One of the IC’s biggest challenges is eliminating our government’s Cold War mentality: I worry that the U.S. still spends way too much on ineffective clandestine programs when it would be better served by investing those funds in more analysts and analysis instruments to improve the noesis of vast amounts information obtainable through overt collection.
... Taylor, S., ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’ in Collins, A., (ed) Contemporary Security Studies, US, Oxford University Press, 2007, p256. Dupont, 2003, p. 18. Dupont, 2003, p. 21. Dupont, 2003, p. 26.