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French revolution and its effect essays
Short note on impact of french revolution
French revolution and its effect essays
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How do military historians explain war? To answer a question like this, one must look to the scholarship. However, works alone cannot explain the total scope of war, which means that historians take from the scholarship, and input what they deem necessary to the explanation of war. The Western experiences of war shaped the outcome of further study into warfare. Authors like Victor Davis Hanson, John Lynn, John Keegan, Martin van Creveld, and Niall Ferguson explain in detail to what extent the Western way of war is superior to any other.
The goal in studying the Western way of war revolves around the concept of superiority in warfare. The comparison and distinction of Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture (2001), and John A. Lynn, Battle (2003), emphasized their overwhelming background in military research. Both historians possessed the adequate means to tell an incredible military story of which Hanson excelled at the ancient level with Greco-Roman history and Lynn as an expert of European history of the eighteenth and nineteenth century’s between the periods of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Hanson concluded that the Western way of war is far superior to that of the Eastern, and he begun his research with the Greek civilization and their early form of democracy. Alternatively, Lynn centered his research on the influences and/or limitations of the political and social aspects of warfare including that of the East.
The greatest single work to influence either historian was John Keegan’s book, A History of Warfare (1993). Lynn acknowledged the importance of Keegan’s thesis, but Hanson followed in the Western superiority theme originated by Keegan. Hanson published his work in 2001 before the 911 attacks and added an a...
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...usewitz, Genius, and the Rules.” The Journal of Military History Vol. 66, No.4 (Oct., 2002): 1167-1176. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093268
Rothenberg, Gunther E. Review of Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, by John A. Lynn. The Journal of Military History Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jul., 2004): 943-945. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3396733
Van Creveld, Martin. “The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War.”
Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 26, No. 3/4, The Impact of Western Nationalisms: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z. Laqueur on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday (Sep., 1991): 403-429. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260653
Wert, Hal Elliott. Review of Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, by Victor Davis Hanson. The Journal of Military History Vol. 67, No. 2 (Apr., 2003): 545-547. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093471
John Keegan, the author of “The Face of Battle” is allowing the reader to view different perspective of history, from the eyes of the soldier. Although by his own account, Keegan acknowledges, “I have never been in a battle. And I grow increasingly convinced that I have very little idea of what a battle can be like.” Keegan scorns historians for pointing the finger of failure after an evolution occurs and not examining the soldier’s point of view while the battle is transpiring.
Leahy, Stephen M. "The Historical Battle over Dispatching American Troops." USA Today (Farmingdale). July 1999: 10-12. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 07 May. 2014.
Morillo, Stephen, Jeremy Black and Paul Lococo. War In World History: Society, Technology, and War from Ancient Times to the Present, Volume 2, McGraw-Hill, 2008
Works Cited Horne, Alistair. A.S.A. & Co. To Lose a Battle: France, 1940. New York: Penguin, 1990. Jackson, Julian.
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
...aphy. More importantly, it will show the students how Dulbrek enhanced military history to not only focus on technical details but to also take into account the contextual, social and economic aspects as well. He was also an advocate of history with pragmatic applications, and was able, to a degree, bring this into academia despite staunch initial rejeciton by the scholarly community; however, as this paper had earlier examined, pragamtic applications of history conflicts with histiography and this issue remains unresolved. Another reading that I was seriously considering was Carl von Clausewitz's On War, the first military historian that employed “war theory” and had the instigated the first historical shift in military histiography, but I chose Dulbrek's since his influence on the change in military historiography was the most important as this paper had examined.
More than two thousand years ago, a Chinese strategist known as Sun Tzu wrote one of the enduring classics of military theory. Most likely written during a period of Chinese history referred to as the ‘Warring States’ period, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has continued to be studied by military strategists for millennia. Even today, The Art of War is required reading for Naval Officer Candidates. At nearly the same time in the fourth century B.C., the Greek city-states were facing invasion from the mighty Persian army. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks eventually triumphed by defeating their enemies at Plataea, but not before fighting one of history’s greatest military stands at Thermopylae. By using Sun Tzu’s classic text to analyze the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea, it is possible to gain a better understanding not only of the battles themselves, but also of the reasons why The Art of War has remained such an influential and respected text over the centuries.
Trapp, James. The art of war: a new translation. New York: Chartwell Books, 2012. Print.
BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy. (1997). Part I, warfare, weapons, and the
Works Cited 1. What is the difference between a. and Allen, Thomas B. -. “One Revolution, Two Wars.” Military History. 27.5 (2011): 58-63.
Samuel B. Griffith’s translation of “Sun Tzu: The Art of War” is an inside look at military practices of today. I did not find one technique that is not or would not be utilized in modern military maneuver, leadership, or training. The most astounding fact is that the Art of War was written well over two thousand years ago, even at the most conservative date. Although most of the techniques in this text are already in practice today, the value of “The Art of War” is a never-ending treasure chest of knowledge, and it deserves a place as a required reading for anyone seeking knowledge about war fighting or the history of war.
The only other references used to compound this thesis will be statements from former heads of state, as corresponding to the subject of war. War is an indispensable part of civilization an is found at every chapter of human history. It is the culmination of the basic survival instinct when provoked. In the early centuries, traditional warfare employed the use of hoplite soldiers and cavalry who met at a scheduled location and fought reciprocally. The seventeenth century changed the rules of warfare, beginning with Napoleon, who increased the scale of battle in the Baradino church in 1812.
Clausewitz's On War, first published in 1832, until now remains one of the most influential studies in understanding character, nature and conditions of warfare. In his book Clausewitz not only traced an interaction of intension and planning with the realities of combat, but by exploring the relationship of war to policy, politics and society gave a new philosophical justification to the art of war. (Heuser, 2002)
As modern military historians debate on the founder of military strategy, two military theorists emerge in the period after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War: the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini. In modern military philosophy, the theoretical traditions established by each of these military theorist has significantly impacted our military thinking and their teaching has become essential in the education of modern military leaders. Clausewitz and Jomini have become required reading for today's military professional officer. Frequently, these military theorists are often presented as opposite each other in terms of military theory; however, these two individuals are mere contemporaries who approached the study of war from two separate positions and for different ambitions: one an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of war and the other a reduction of war to a set of prescriptive techniques for the conduct of war. In this great debate, military historians suggest a schism within the annals of military theory in the use of the terms “Clausewitzian” and “Jominian.” While these unfair characterizations served little purpose in this debate, this essay will demonstrate that Carl von Clausewitz deserves the title of Father of Modern Military Strategy.