How Did Patton's Plan To Conquer Sicily

On the 17th of July 1943, the allied coalition had secured the southern beaches of Sicily during Operation HUSKY and began movement to Messina. During the campaign, Lieutenant General George S. Patton commanded the 7th Army was tasked to protect General Bernard Montgomery’s 8th Army assault up to Messina. The decision to have the US forces as the supporting effort was displeasing to Patton. The result of which was Patton’s decision to advance to the Sicilian Capital, Palermo. What would have resulted if Patton had followed the original plan to support Montgomery’s advance to Messina rather than advance west to Palermo? Given the Italian and German resistance the allies had faced in Sicily, Patton’s control of Palermo was irrelevant to the campaign’s plan to conquer Sicily. This made clearer by examining the initial allied plan for Sicily, what the German plan was in Sicily and if their only intent was to evacuate the island, and looking at the actual outcomes of Patton’s decision.

Originally, Patton’s 7th army was to capture the beach heads Licata and Gela and set up ports until further guidance by General Alexander. He had then decided to push out by two phase lines (Yellow then Blue) in order to have control of the plateau to help conduct further operations. At this time the island was split by a single boundary between the

7th army controlling the west and the 8th army controlling the east leading up to Messina, the decisive point of the operation. Patton’s two units were organized with the II Corps under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley leading the bulk of the assault on the right flank through Gela and the 3rd infantry division leading the assault through Licata.
On 15 July 1943 after Patton’s units had secured the Yellow line, the Provisional Corps was formed. It consisted of the 3rd Division, reinforced by the 3rd Ranger Battalion, Fifth Armored Field Artillery Group and the 82nd Airborne Division. Their initial objective was to “secure the highway from Canicatti-San Cataldo” and remain there until needed by July 19. The 82nd was tasked to push westward of the island on 17 July. During that time, Patton’s units had faced minimal resistance from the Axis units. They had dealt mostly with minefields and bridge and road demolitions placed by withdrawing enemy units. By the July 19, the 7th army had captured over 26,000 enemy and over 6500 killed and wounded. Montgomery’s 8th army had dealt with the more difficult task of advancing northward to Messina. They faced heavy resistance from the Italian and German units fortified at their beach landings in Syracuse and attempting to counter them as they did on the American flanks once they had secured the beach.
The 8th army continued facing heavy resistance from German and Italian tank and paratrooper units countering their advance on Catania. At that time, the American forces would have had to continue providing reconnaissance and preventing enemy forces from countering the 8th army advance from the west as they moved towards the Messina Peninsula. The plan was for Patton’s forces to continue moving north in line with Montgomery’s advance in order to protect the left flank. Although their presence was necessary for the 8th army to operate freely, the 7th army was only encountering minimal to no resistance. To further understand the situation, examining the Axis’ plans and objectives during the operation is necessary in showing why his advance on Palermo made little difference.
In order to understand the significance of whether Patton’s decision was relevant to campaign’s outcome, the Axis plan must be addressed.

What the Axis mission was and if their goals were must be made aware of in order to understand the capture of Palermo. According to the personal memoirs of German General Frido Von Senger Und Etterlin and Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, we can see the Axis situation before the allied landing and the options they faced before the eventual Axis withdrawal from the Island. It seemed that the Axis had already been defeateded by the lack of preparation and willingness to fight before the allies had

landed.
As indicated in both Eterlin and Kesselring’s accounts, they had both discussed the failure in the axis command structure and the incompetence of the Italian defenses during the initial invasion. There is no mention in the chapters covering the invasion of Sicily of the capture of Palermo. This indicates that either the invasion of Palermo was not significant enough to be discussed or that it was such a significant loss to the axis that both generals found the subject to be a humiliation on their military careers. The likelihood that the invasion was seen to be an embarrassment is unlikely. The Germans had said the majority of troops on the island were Italian and not under their command. Additionally, both generals are unlikely to deliberately avoid discussing the matter since the entire operation to defend Sicily was a failure. Therefore, it is likely that both accounts see that Palermo was not significant in the grand scheme of the operation. Thus further indicating that Patton’s drive to Palermo had little effect on the campaign. Patton’s decision is further discussed through the evidence of what occurred during the capture of Palermo.
The irrelevance of Patton’s advance is further examined through the objectives he assigned to the Provisional Corps and his intent on capturing Palermo. On 17th of July, Patton successfully argued his case to Alexander to push his units west and capture Palermo. He convinced Alexander that the push west was the best way to ensure the security of his forces on the 8th army flank. Palermo was one of the few port cities in Sicily, making it a priority for the army to control in order for troops on the western flank to be resupplied. Additionally, and more importantly to Patton, Palermo was the capital of Sicily.
Patton reassigned his units into the Provisional Crops he had taken direct command of to lead the charge north towards Palermo. By the 19th of July, the Provisional Corps was given the task to advance on Palermo along with the 2nd Armored division that would push further westward. The Palermo area only had light opposition when Patton attacked the city. The 2nd armored division and the 82nd airborne under the command of General Keyes swept through the city with relative ease. The minimal resistance allowed Keyes to deploy the 2nd armored division through the city due to the low risk of the tanks being ambushed. They had encountered ‘spotty’ Italian resistance where most of the city was ready to surrender. The US forces formally accepted the city’s surrender at approximately 1900 on the 22nd of July. The American forces sustained the 3 killed and over 2,000 Italian prisoners were captured, with a cumulative of 22000 prisoners captured at that point. The little of challenge face by Patton’s forces entering Palermo does raise questions to why Patton would want to take the city.
General Alexander was hesitant to allow Patton loose on to Palermo. By the time he recalled Patton, the city was ready to surrender. Patton’s haste to take the city was an indication of his strive to gain a reputation for himself and his forces by capturing the capital city. Understandably, Alexander gave Patton an almost unneeded supporting role for the majority of the operation given the size of Patton’s units. This was due to the lack of confidence the British had in the American fighting capabilities that they had witnessed in Tunisia. His presence otherwise would have made little difference. Palermo is a port city and the Italian regime had toppled shortly after the city’s capture. Regardless, this would have made little difference since the axis were aware that they had been defeat as soon as the allies landed in Sicily. Patton knew that capturing a major city in such a magnificent style with little risk of casualties would only boost his reputation as a commander and give himself more credit for the invasion of Sicily as a result of his the American’s limited role during the conflict. Patton’s decision to capture Palermo and the honest insignificance of it is further discussed through General Omar Bradley, who at the time was in command of the II Corps.
In General Bradley’s personal account, he admits that Montgomery had the more difficult task of pushing up the east coasts in comparison to Patton who faced emptied territory left by the Italian and German. Bradley goes on to further support the claim that the capture of Palermo was irrelevant. He mentions that Palermo would become essential for logistical support, but the western flank was still irrelevant to the campaign. He also indicated the dissatisfaction Patton’s staff had felt for being given the smaller task while Montgomery “finishes the war”. Furthermore, he indicates that US soldiers had been roaming around the countryside with minimal risk as a result of the axis evacuation. This indicates the extent to which the west flank of Sicily was unthreatening with little to gain through conquest. Similar to Kesselring and Etterlin accounts, Bradley only brief mentions Palermo as a target for the 45th Division. This emphasizes the irrelevance Palermo had on the success of the campaign where it was clear that Patton mainly sought personal glory for his decision to capture it.
The argument can be made that Patton’s reputation did improve as a result of his spectacular feat or that he may have not beat Montgomery to Messina had he not taken Palermo first. Although the evidence suggests that due to the lack resistance on the island and the Axis’ unwillingness to push back the invaders, Patton could do any other action and still have probably had the same outcome had he not advanced on Palermo.
The evidence suggest that Patton’s advance on Palermo was irrelevant in changing the outcome of the campaign. This was due to the Italian unwillingness before the allies had landed in Sicily and the German objective to evacuate the island of all non-native personnel before the allies had arrived. Patton’s decision was his effort to prove the US army’s effectiveness and relevance in the campaign. As Bradly had put it, ‘there was no glory in the capture of hills, docile peasants, and spiritless soldiers.’ Although the political implications of his easy advance are apparent with the fall of the Mussolini, the fascists’ days were already numbered. It would have made little difference to the strategic outcome of the battle had he not captured it. Patton would later be remembered for his drive to Messina, which arguably may have had a different outcome had he not been in Palermo first.