Hobbes Leviathan And Locke's Second Treatise Of Government

Hobbes’ Leviathan and Locke’s Second Treatise of Government are considered prevalent political writings, posing crucial theories, particularly the concept of a social contract; both philosophers reiterate the importance of transitioning from differing States of Nature to governed societies, but essentially vary as to the reason of ‘escaping’ the State of Nature. I argue the basis of the disparities between some of their theories lie in their definitions of human nature, which attributes to their descriptions of the State of Nature (and its compositions), which ultimately forms the foundations of their respective social contracts. This progressive effect stimulates the identification of key differences to which this response will discuss.

The State of Nature for both these 17th century English philosophers constitutes the conditions prior to the formation of civil societies, “where there is no common power” (Hobbes 188). Yet so, this state is described differently, with Hobbes portraying the life of men as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (186). Whereas, for Locke, the State of Nature is a “State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation” – a direct opposite to Hobbes’ (280). One could argue this juxtaposition of states is a consequence of human nature, which contrasts in depiction significantly between Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes, in the initial chapters of Leviathan, begins a discussion into human appetites, aversions, and their links to Voluntary motions, which all combine together to establish a mechanistic human nature. Hobbes explains the concepts of Liberty and Deliberation, which has a profound effect on human nature, as men have the liberty (reason), via their appetites and aversions, of either doing or omitting; this basis of human nature thus presents conflict, in accordance to Hobbes, as “if any two men desire the same thing, [possess the same appetite], which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies [… and] endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other” (184). Henceforth, it can be inferred that the “solitary, poore […] brutish” (Hobbes 186) State of Nature in which man inhabits is of this description due to the essences of human nature. The exclusive self-interested human nature is Hobbes’ pivotal argument in favour of the “mutuall transferring of Right” to create a social contract (Hobbes 192).

Nonetheless, Locke presents an alternate view of human nature, one where the relationship between man and morality already exists, hence the pro-social nature of man allows for the State of Nature to be peaceful. Nevertheless, unlike Hobbes, the Law of Nature is both to defend life, liberty and property, as well as “preserve the rest of Mankind” (Locke 271). This significant Law of Nature, which administers the right of “Persevering all Mankind” is arguably the reason as to why Locke’s State of Nature is different to Hobbes’ (Locke 274); by the notion of unified self and collective preservation, whilst still being held by the restraints of the Laws of Nature (given to man through reason by God), the state and its people are at is peace and at relative liberty.

Moreover, another difference, as a result of human nature, between the two theorists is that for Hobbes, in the State of Nature, since there is no common power, men are at constant war, “during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” (185). As Hobbes declares, the “perpetuall feare alwayes accompanying mankind”, as a result of the anarchic State of Warre, is the prime reason for leaving the State of Nature; submitting yourself to establishing a civil society, under the reign of an absolute monarch is what Hobbes asserts is best for man and his safety.

Conversely, Locke explicitly enforces in Chapter 3 that there is a difference between a State of War and the State of Nature, “And here we have the plain difference between the State of Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men have confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction are one from another” (Locke 280).

This thus explains how Locke acknowledges that a State of War is still possible, as mutual assistance can easily alter into mutual destruction, due to mans overarching, innate desires. Locke later continues to reinforce how due to the absence of authority in the State of Nature, a State of War will continue since there is no possibility of man being able to appeal. It is here where one can identify a key contrast between the two modern thinkers; Hobbes urges the rational man to ‘escape’ the egotistical State of Nature in order to procure “the safety of his own Body” (394), and the fear attached with its disturbance. Nevertheless, Locke postulates that by having “One Body Politick under one Government” (332), where life, liberty and property are secure, is the only fathomable way to avoid a State of War, “To avoid this State of War […] where there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders […] is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature” (Locke

282).