Hobbes Justification Of Absolute Authority Analysis

Hobbes’ justification of absolute authority:

From a state of nature to justifying collective slavery

Hobbes’ political philosophy can be understood as a precursor of the social contract

tradition. Characteristic of his approach is an attempt to justify absolute political authority by an appeal to our rational nature, i.e., in order to avoid a state of war, the appointment of such an authority is considered to be in our best rational interest. By this is implied that we are to collectively give up our naturally endowed freedom in order to ascertain a prolonged existence. This allows for Hobbes to grant such an authority unbounded and absolute power: as long as this authority ensures our continued existence—which reflects our most fundamental drive—rebellion is strictly forbidden. Since the guarantee of our continued existence seems to function as the only criterion for a legitimate authority, one can question some of its implications.

In what follows, I will first briefly analyze Hobbes’ argument pertaining t o the transition from a state of war to the justification of absolute authority. Second, it will be argued that the assurance of our continued existence as a sole criterion for a legitimate authority is in fact contrary to our rational interests. That is, the possible scenario of collective slavery by means of such authority cannot merely be considered an unsatisfying implication: the acceptance of slavery on behalf of a continued existence is absurd, and as such may not be in our rational interest. A reference to Rousseau will be employed here. Finally, I will end with the observation that Rawls’ approach in this context seems more intuitive and as such able to avoid the unwanted scenario of collective slavery.

A st...

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...ish existence. Assuming such a scenario, it is not evident whether one would rationally prefer bare existence over nonexistence—. It can be argued that the— demarcation between a slavish life and nonexistence itself is at least psychologically nonexistent. Furthermore, a slavish life may reflect a position that is qualitatively worse than that of a life within—a state of nature. In the latter scenario— one retains his freedom, which may be valued or be in our rational interest more than the uncertainties inherent in such a life. Consensus pertaining to the institution of collective slavery would

guaranteesnotexistbetweenignoranceagentsofone’slocalizedownstatus,intheandoriginal position, since the veil of ignorance it is argued that the possibility of a slavish life cannot be in our rational interest.

Inleiding Sociale en Politieke Filosofie – Bert van den Brink 6