Gregg Death Penalty Case Summary

Story:

The death penalty case, Gregg vs. Georgia, commenced in 1976 when Mr. Troy Gregg, was accused of armed robbery and committing murder. In the initial trial period of Georgia's divided or bifurcated system, the jury found Gregg guilty on two counts of manslaughter and two counts of armed robbery. During the penalty stage, the magistrate counseled the jury by informing them of their options of punishing with life imprisonment or the death penalty on the following counts: that it was open to cogitate extenuating or aggravating situations in the event the involved persons presented any they will not be permitted to choose a death sentencing with the exception of reasonable doubt.

Reasonable doubt that (1) the murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of other capital

felonies, viz., the armed robberies of the victims; (2) that he committed the murder for the purpose of receiving the victims' money and automobile; or (3) that the murder was "outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" in that it "involved the depravity of [the] mind of the defendant." (Cornell).
The magistrate in charge of the trial, acquiesced charges of manslaughter to the jury for felony-murder and non-felony-murder concepts. He gave guidance on the subject matter of self-defense, but refused to offer instruction on murder. Two theories were submitted on robbery as well: a minor count of robbery by intimidation and armed robbery was presented to the jury. (http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/gregg.html). Verdict:
The jury established that Gregg was guilty on both counts of armed robbery and both counts of manslaughter. The jury did not change during the penalty stage and no new evidence was presented by Gregg’s lawyer or the district attorney. Both counsel’s offered extensive point of views that applied to the rules of capital punishment under the settings set forth and how the evidence of placed fault. Again, the judge told the jury that they could advise life imprisonment or a death sentence on both counts. The jury agreed on the first and the second reasonable doubt claims and the verdict was death on both counts. The Supreme Court of Georgia declared the conviction and the process of the death sentence for murder. A petitioner's request of writ of certiorari would place a limitation to his contest to the process of the death sentences, in this circumstance as "cruel and unusual" punishment would violate the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments (Cornell).
Opinion of the Court: MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, declared by MR. JUSTICE STEWART represented the Ruling of the Court and opinion. The concern was whether the implication of the death sentence for the wrongdoing of murder under Georgia law, undermines the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On November 21, 1973, the Gregg and another party named Floyd Allen were hitching a ride in Florida and a driver named Bob Moore and Fred Simmons picked them up. Simmons had to buy another car due to the initial car breaking down. While traveling in Florida, another hitchhiker named Dennis Weaver was picked up and they all rode to Atlanta then let him out around 11:00 PM. Shortly after, the remaining four men stopped their travels to get some rest at a rest stop. The following morning, the bodies of Moore and Simmons were revealed in a close by ditch (Justia).
Two days later, Weaver called the Gwinnett County police department after reading about the killings in the Atlanta newspaper.

He informed the police about his travels with the victims and told them what the car looked like and Gregg and Allen were arrested the following afternoon. While searching Gregg, a .25-caliber pistol was found in his pocket. It was revealed later to be the weapon that took the life of Moore and Simmons. After hearing the Miranda rights, Gregg signed a written renunciation of his rights, the petitioner signed a statement in which he admitted shooting, then robbing Simmons and Moore. He justified the slayings on grounds of self-defense. The next day, Allen gave his story of what took place and the detective narrated the matter of Allen's reports about the killings and indicated that Allen’s statement was correct. Gregg attested in his own defense by agreeing that Allen did attest the reports in question by the investigator, but disclaimed its truth or ever confessing to the truthfulness of the story. He reported that he shot Simmons and Moore in self-defense and out of fear. He claimed that they had assaulted Allen and himself

(Cornell).
Dissenting Opinion:
Even though Furman did not indicate that the death penalty disrupts the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, it did distinguish that the punishment of death is unlike other punishments executed under our criminal justice organization. Due to the unique nature of the death penalty, Furman concluded that it could not be obligated under sentencing trials that formed a considerable threat that it would be imposed in a subjective an unpredictable way. MR. JUSTICE WHITE determined that "the death penalty is obtained with great irregularity even for the most brutal misconducts. Furman commands that where preferences are allowed, a condemning presence on a matter as severe as determining whether someone’s life should be taken or spared, that decision must be appropriately guided with limitations in an effort to reduce the possibility of solely capricious and unpredictable act. Jury punishing has been presumed necessary in capital cases in order "to preserve a connection between modern community morals and the punitive system - a relationship without the determination of sentence could barely replicate 'the developing principles of decorum that reveal the advancement of a growing culture.'" (Cornell).
The trepidations articulated in Furman that the punishment of death cannot be forced in a subjective or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing power is given sufficient evidence and guidance. They are not implying that only the procedures above would be permitted under Furman or that any penalizing scheme built along these universal lines would unavoidably mollify the fears of Furman. Every distinctive system must be observed on a separate base. For the explanations articulated in this judgment, they rule that the legal system under which Gregg was penalized to death does not violate the Constitution. It was decided that the death sentence is not prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment (Cornell).
In a seven to two verdict, the Court concluded that a sentence of death does not encroach upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under every situation (Oyvez). In risky illicit circumstances, to include a perpetrator has been sentenced of intentionally murdering someone else, the cautious and sensible usage of the death penalty may be suitable if handled correctly. The Court was not ready to override the Georgia legislature's discovery that capital punishment aids as a beneficial deterrent to forthcoming capital misconducts and a suitable means of social justice against its most severe criminals (Oyez).

Works Cited
Cornell University Law School. Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153. 31 March 1976. Web. September 3, 2016.
Gregg v. Georgia." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, n.d. Web. Sep 19, 2016. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-6257.
Justia US Supreme Court." Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 2016. Web. Sep 19, 2016. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/428/153/.