There is no substantial difference between Goldman's Causal theory of knowing and the Nyaya account of knowledge and neither of them fully satisfy the distinction between believing a thing and knowing a thing.
Goldman's requirement that we must have a causal connection explaining that some proposition is true and one's believing that a proposition is true is required to avert the Gettier problems, according to Goldman. “Jones owns a Ford” is a proposition which Goldman makes in an example that he uses to explain how this causal connection is required in order to avoid the Gettier problem. In the example he lays out a disjunction which says that Smith, the believing person, believes that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona”.
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If it turns out that Jones did not own a Ford but had offered a ride to Smith in a Ford that was merely a rental. By chance Brown was in Barcelona unbeknown to Smith. It is clear here that Smith, though his disjunction is true, does not have knowledge of its truth because there is no causal connection between them. The Nyaya account for knowledge has three main criteria. The first is that knowledge is a truth-hitting episod. The second is that it is non-dubious in the sense that no reasonable ground for doubting its truth has appeared. The third criteria is that the known proposition is born of a faultless 'causal' or 'justification' factor or, it is born of an 'unfailing or 'non-deviating' causal factor. As can be seen from the last criteria you can play semantics with the Nyaya criteria and the Goldman requirement but in the end they both require some causal connection. A counter question is that if Jones owned a Ford and Brown was in Barcelona were both true and Smith had received a postcard from Brown postmarked from Barcelona and Ford had shown Smith the title for the Ford would Smith know the answer to the disjunction? Suppose that by time Smith received the postcard Brown had flew to Germany and Jones had sold the Ford. Smith can believe the disjunction and have very good cause to believe it, but he does not 'know' it to be true. This case would be non-dubious and causally related. However, to say that the Nyaya first criteria is not met because it is not truth-hitting is a moot point. If something happens to be true or not violates the third criteria in that either one has cause to believe or they do not but the truth-hood of a proposition and its rational belief are not in themselves causally related in anyway are rely on nothing more than happenstance. For this reason the first of the three criteria can be excluded from the Nyaya requirements in further examples unless to give further support of its need for exclusion. Goldman argues that one can know a thing based on inference.
The example he gives is that of a fire in his fireplace to which he could infer that there was smoke coming from his chimney. “I know that smoke was coming out of my chimney last night. I know this because I remember perceiving a fire in my fireplace last night, and I infer that the fire caused smoke to rise out of the chimney.” This all assumes that there is no backward causation. “The analysis requires that there be a causal connection between p and S's belief, not necessarily that p be a cause of S's belief. p and S's belief of p can also be causally connected in a way that yields knowledge if both p and S's belief of p have a common cause.” This comes down to weakening causal relations between a knowledge event and one's belief in the event so as to include examples in which an event and one's belief in the event are causally related. This is to say that there can be a causal relation between fire and smoke being produced, from past experience, the fact that if one sees a fire in a fireplace they can then use the prior causal connection of seeing smoke coming from fire and conclude that this fire is also producing smoke and in short it is venting out of the …show more content…
chimney. The Nyaya criteria are also met in the previous case as it is non-dubious and causally connected. The causal connection is the same as given by Goldman and the non-dubious is covered by there not being any defeters. However, in the Nyaya and Goldman accounts a counter example can still be given to defeat the account. To say that smoke was coming out of the chimney would imply that it was coming out at all times when the fire was burning. Goldman would have to say that most of the time smoke was coming out of the chimney to be accurate. If one has ever watched a chimney they will have noticed that there are short times which smoke is not coming out of the chimney. For example when the door of a stove is opened or in the case of a fireplace when doors in the house are opened causing a change in pressure inside the chimney. This can also happen with wind outside causing a pressure change. I know you may say Goldman is correct because he covered the whole night. Let say that someone took a picture of Goldman's house which showed the fireplace ablaze and let us suppose that at the time of the photo there was a pressure change causing the smoke to not come out of the chimney. Then one would have very good cause to believe and prove that Goldman's fireplace does not produce smoke when the fireplace is lit. Goldman argues that justification is not needed when he asserts his Abraham Lincoln birthday analogy. For Goldman the fact that it was grounded by a warranted inference, now lost, is a sufficient causal connection. Thu he believed his causal chain does not demand that the knower be justified or give supporting evidence of a known proposition for it to be knowledge. “I know now, for example, that Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809. I originally came to know this fact, let us suppose, by reading an encyclopedia article.” “I remember that Lincoln was born in 1809, but not that this is stated in a certain encyclopedia.” Again the Nyaya account is in line with Goldman's causally theory of knowing in that there is no need for justification. The Nyaya position take a negative stance on the issue stating that the knowable event needs to be born of a faultless 'causal' factor or 'non-deviating causal factor. By “negative stance” it is meant in the way that an atheist who states that they do not believe in a god is different than an Atheist which states that they believe that there is no god. The first being a negative atheist or low-case 'a' atheist and the latter being a positive Atheist or capital 'A' Atheist. In either case the two attempted accounts for knowledge are essentially the same. However, aside from Nyaya's truth-hitting by accident account, which cannot be known, all accounts fail in this case if for any reason the encyclopedia was incorrect. Whether the information was mistaken to Abraham Lincoln himself or a misprint or misreading by the writer of the encyclopedia in each case it is only a belief that the causal chain of knowledge is unbroken and correct from the start. In each case a syllogism can be made that one could say would be propositionally true.
In other words, if the premises are true, then the conclusion would follow. Either one owns a Ford, is in Barcelona, has smoke coming from their chimney etc. or they do not. In any case there are way that one can be wrong or another would have cause to belief that they are wrong and in both cases it is only a belief that they are right, not knowledge. So, the premises can not be proven beyond a doubt and are thus not knowledge. In every case of a proposition there is some presupposition. To say “I” presupposes that one thing is separate from other things, that external things exist etc. I propose that in such cases, one can say that they have propositionally conditioned knowledge. If a thing is definitionally or tautologically true (Av~A) then and only then can they have what most call “knowledge”.
If one holds that such a position would limit what we know to too great a degree, I would have to say that if I am right then what can they do about it. If the premises are true and we do not know many things but rather believe many things only then that is the state of the world and there is nothing that they can do to change the facts. From a practical stance, however, believing things from logical deduction or inference does not mean that they do not work for us most of the time. Maybe truth-hitting would be better explained as being close enough to the truth to work in a practical
way.
The purpose of this paper is to show that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge does not solve the Gettier problem. First, I will reiterate the Gettier problem. Second, I will show how Goldman's theory attempts to solve the Gettier problem. Next, I will show how over determination points out a major flaw for Goldman's theory. Finally, I will demonstrate that Goldman's theory does not work if the world we live in is not one of absolute truth and void of deception.
Overall, memories does not provide certainty because what we see or remember may not be reality. Also, the way we remember something can be changed throughout time and that memory will eventually fade away. Although certainty is blessing because it provides us warmth, comfort and secure, it is more of a great danger because it gives out false information and tricks our mind into believing something that is not real or true. Therefore, I am fully convinced by Gould’s essay because I completely doubt what people observe or remember since memories does not provide certainty.
... you cannot put words with everything, just feel what is right and go with it. However, he provides a wonderful example of the fact that denying a connection puts one in a situation in which one is likely to make just such a connection without realizing it.
Later Hume asserts that we cannot perceive causation because all we perceive is the “contiguity” and “succession” of events, but not of causation itself. For example, of two events, event A (person A pushing person B) and event B (person B’s falling back), Hume argues that all we are perceiving here are causes and effects; in other words, we here are perceiving the “contiguity” and “succession” of events, but not of causation itself. This is due to Hume’s idea that events are conjoined with one another. Hume argues that when event A occurs, event B happens simultaneously along with event A. For example, the event in which person A pushes person B, and the event where person B fal...
In this essay I shall argue that Paul Rée is correct in saying that free will is just an illusion. Throughout the reading entitled “The Illusion of Free Will,” Rée makes numerous great points about how we believe we have free will but we really do not. He discusses how one’s childhood upbringing determines his actions for the rest of his life, which, as a result, diminishes his freedom of will. He brings about the major issues with the common thought that since you could have acted in a different way than you actually did, you have free will. Another main argument was the proof of the reality of the law of causality, which can also be referred to as determinism.
Zagzebski defines knowledge by expressing the relationship between the subject and the truth proposition. A truth claim becomes knowledge when your state of belief makes cognitive contact with reality. What it is to know that you understand something is different from having a relationship with something. Propositional knowledge, that can be known or believed, is her focus due to simplicity. The criteria required for belief is to have a thought, followed by augmentation with experience. The minimal criteria for a definition of knowledge must incorporate two types of “good”; a moral and an ethical. These truths are implemented to develop the foundation on which Zagzebski later builds her definition.
In support of this claims, he issues in a physical cause and effect concept that ideally relates to the human agents. Therefore, it can be deduced that necessity based causation arises from the uniformity observable operations of an individual, where one’s minds is jointly determined by a moral obligation. Further, the philosopher offers two dispositions to help explain the notion of Compatibilism. The first part supposes that there is a constant combination of two similar events, whereas the second one presumes that human’s consequence can be inferred from one to the other. On the contrary, he argues that still his concept is universally accepted as an abstract knowledge among beings though people may not see a necessity combination between a cause and effect
The tracking theory of knowledge has four steps. The first step is a proposition is true . Step two is that someone believes the proposition. He states that a connection between truth and belief act as justification. This connection is steps three and four. Step three is that if the proposition is false, then someone will not believe it . While step four states that if the proposition is true, then someone will believe it . An additional fifth step is added later in the text which states that we must only use one method when coming gaining knowledge as the two or more methods may contradict each other and not allow us to have a proper knowledge of the subject .
Nozick takes this further, however, with his “tracking theory”. Nozick adds conditions to the requirements of truth and belief. His conditions are as follows: (1) P is true (2) S believes that P (3) if it were not the case that P, S would not believe P (4) If it were the case that P, then S would believe P. Through this, Nozick means to show that knowledge is a belief that tracks the truth in a reliable fashion. Closure, the idea that we ...
Truth, what is truth? This question itself has a thousand answers, no person can ever be sure of what truth is rather, truth can be justified, it can checked for reliability with strong evidences and logic. If the evidence proves to be accurate then it can be established that a certain answer is the truth. However, have we ever tried to think about what intrigues us to seek the truth? To think about a question and set foot firmly on the path of knowledge. Definitely it has! That was the very cause itself which is why this world has witnessed some of the greatest philosophers like Aristotle, Plato and Socrates etc. along with the school of thought. The ability to think and reason is one of the greatest ability humans have, it is what distinguishes us from the animals. It is what gives us free will, the ability to control our own outcomes. However, it is that ability to ‘think’ itself which has caused men to rebel with the myths and statements established about the unseen and natural forces since the beginning of time. It gave rise to questions such as: Do aliens exist? Is there a world of the unseen? Life after Death and the most popular question since the beginning of times, Does God exists? And the answer is ‘yes’. Here is how I will justify my stance.
The Design Argument For The Existence Of God This argument is also called the teleological argument, it argues that the universe did not come around by mere chance, but some one or something designed it. This thing was God. This argument is a prosteriori because the observation of the natural world is taken into the mind to conclude that there is a designer. The belief that the universe was designed by God was triggered by things like the four seasons; summer, spring, autumn and winter, that change through the year.
Beliefs unlike our knowledge of things have the quality of either being true or false. Like with all information of things, persons, places or objects we either know of their existence or we do not. There does not exist a state of mind where there exists truth or falsehood associated with something that is known by the existence of that thing. We could be wrong about the knowledge we have of things but that knowledge could not be deceptive in nature, you either know of the existence of a thing or you do not. This means that while belief can be true or false knowledge of things does not have this property. Conversely we know that beliefs can both be true or false as many people can have widely varying opinions on the same subject that contradict
...mergent property of which is liquidity, neurons in the brain come together to form the brain, an emergent property of which is deliberative processes. The difference between water and the brain, however, is that the brain has downward causal powers, i.e. the ability to affect other parts of the body by making decisions and choices, and by causing events. In this sense, accepting that agent-caused actions are not inconsistent with basic physical laws does not require that we accept dualism. The emergent physical properties within the brain are deliberative processes which cause events through an agent. Without accepting dualism, we have agent causation as a consistent aspect of physical law.
In this situation, there is no “logical universe” that helps to justify a belief, but rather shows perspectives that are common in everyday life. This basically explains the set of rules that individuals go by to have a more practical and normal life. An individual would learn that the situation they may go through is not based on correspondence between a belief and a fact in society, but coherence between a belief and other beliefs in a single individual. In other words, the exposed truth is a property of other congruent beliefs one has thought in their minds before experiencing something in the present. This is the coherence theory of justification; when something is signified as true with this justification, then this strongly has the official truth even if the opposing individual argues.
Whether someone's belief is true is not a prerequisite for belief. On the other hand, if something is actually known, then it categorically cannot be false. For example, if a person believes that a bridge is safe enough to support him, and attempts to cross it, but the bridge then collapses under his weight, it could be said that he believed that the bridge was safe but that his belief was mistaken. It would not be accurate to say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. By contrast, if the bridge actually supported his weight, then he might say that he had believed that the bridge was safe, whereas now, after proving it to himself, he knows it was