Going against the FLO

Living in America, we have a need to be constantly “on-the-go” while glued to a piece of technology, and worrying about the future. We worry about what it holds, the aspects we cannot control, and how the choices we make or do not make could affect it. According to Donald Marquis in his paper “Why Abortion is Immoral,” he argues killing a fetus is wrong because it deprives it of a “FLO,” or a future like ours. Robbing someone of this is the worst kind of loss a person could inflict on another, and it is determined killing is “prima facie wrong.” However, Marquis assumes futures are the same and generalizes fetuses in the U.S. have a certain kind of future and assumes this future to all. Futures of fetuses may not be just like ours, but are very different and are value specific to the individual. Abortion is prima facie wrong, but is incorrect it is also a sufficient condition to show abortion is "seriously morally wrong” in most cases because futures are value specific to the individual

Marquis’s overall argument is abortion is seriously morally wrong because it involves killing. He states this is wrong because it robs a human of a natural property, which is a “future like ours,” or a FLO. It “deprives one of all experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one’s future.” Killing someone is wrong because it inflicts a great loss on the victim. He states describing this as a loss of life can be misleading because a change in a biological state does not make killing wrong, it is the effect of the killing, making one lose all of the experiences which would otherwise have been possible. The activities are valuable and are the means to something else, like a potential life, which would make ...

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...ough it would be awesome, the best we can do is make inferences for small sets of people and our judgments must be held with caution.

The argument against abortion using the concept of a future-just-like-ours may be a necessary condition for abortion but it is in not a sufficient condition for a decision. This is especially seen when Marquis assumes futures are the same and generalizes fetuses in the U.S. have a certain kind of future and assumes this future to all. These assumptions include all futures are good and worthy of having, along with being only one kind of future. Futures of fetuses may not be just like ours, but are very different and are value specific to the individual.

Works Cited

Barnes, Jonathan. The ontological argument. London: Macmillan;, 1972. Print.

Marquis, Donald. "Why Abortion is Immoral." Journal of Philosophy 86 (1986): 183-202. Print