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Power elite model of power
Power elite model of power
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4. Theoretical framework and concepts George Tsebelis, in his veto players theory (2002), discusses the right or the ability of an individual or multiple corporate actors to block a certain policy process, which is seen as an explanatory factor for policy change because they can either block change in favor of status quo or support change by blocking decisions in other areas and claiming change on a given issue in exchange for relinquishing the veto power. Because only few actors or institutions have a factual power (either by means of the law, or by huge power asymmetries), these factors are usually not reported when we analyze policy matters. The study will use this theory, which was first analyzed in 1995 in The British Journal of Political …show more content…
In this regard, he says that the veto players theory is effective when it deals with cohesive and/or disciplined parties, not when the study cases deal with non-cohesive parties and individual preferences, as we cannot have detailed information in order to accurately predict their political actions. Ganghof also presents the problem of identification of the veto players, as it is in the case of minority cabinets that don't have much power in the parliament to challende the status quo. In this context, Tsebelis counts only the cabinets as veto players and not the party or parties that support the minority cabinets to make a policy change . Ganghof and Bräuninger consider the role of these supporting parties as essential. According to Merkel, Tsebelis should have put an emphasis on the distinction between larger and smaller veto players as they have different power resources regarding the ability to change policies, and in most cases a larger coalition has a greater veto potential than a smaller one. In addition to this, Merkel address the problem of measuring the policy congruence between the veto players or their cohesiveness, suggesting that a simple approach of policies in terms of one dimension, for example the right-left ideology, which doesn't compliment the various contexts and policies that might …show more content…
However, for this study I consider the elite power model a more suitable framework in order to analyze and understand who the powerful elite groups are that impose their will against any attempt of policy change in Pakistan with regards to the controversial blasphemy laws. Theoreticians of the power elite approach, such as Mosca, Pareto and C. Wright Mills, analyzed the concept of power either by using the theory of "circulating elites" that can go from the elitist status to the non-elitist one based on various political and economic circumstances, or Mills who introduced the idea of a power elite triangle that encompasses groups from the political, economic and military field, which impose their will to satisfy their interests. However, there are elite theorists that defend the idea of elite groups defined by "combinations of social status, economic resources, and institutional positions, who achieve a degree of unity through common backgrounds, coinciding interests, and social
As seen quite often in the Obama administration, legislation gets stuck and lost in Congress due to the polarization of the parties in recent years. In Obama’s case, he has frequently threatened to go around the House and Senate if they could not reach an agreement or would shoot down his plans. Cato’s Pilon points out, however, that the hurdles of Congress are no mistake. Pilot states that the framer’s of the Constitution knew what they were doing, and this was intended to keep the checks and balances as well as accountability to the public (Lyons,
“ … we… need an alternative to winner-take-all majoritarianism… with Nikolas’s help… I call [this] the ‘principle of taking turns.’ [It] does better than simple majority rule… it accommodates the values of self-government, fairness, deliberation, compromise, and consensus that lie at the heart of the democratic ideal” (para.
Shapiro, Ian, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds. Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Debating which constitutional form of government best serves democratic nations is discussed by political scientist Juan Linz in his essay “The Perils of Presidentialism”. Linz compares parliamentary systems with presidential systems as they govern democracies. As the title of Linz’s essay implies, he sees Presidentialism as potentially dangerous. Linz points out the flaws as presidentialism as he sees them and sites rigidity of fixed terms, the zero-sum game and political legitimacy coupled with lack of incentive to form alliances as issues to support his theory that the parliamentary system is superior to presidentialism.
In conspiracy theories, the elite represent the individuals and groups who have power. This small population has access to a large amount of money and resources, giving them an advantage over anyone who lacks this access. The elite can represent the conflict between high class versus the low and working class. Also, the government and any governing leadership can be considered the elite over the rest of the nation. This distinction will be important when discussing why people invest in conspiracy theories.
Power elite: a. A small group of people that have high influence and power in society.
Making in the Pre-Cloture Senate.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 758-74. JSTOR. Web. 17 Mar. 2014.
Garner, R., Ferdinand, P., & Lawson, S. (2009). Introduction to politics. Oxford, England: Oxford UP.
These pluralistic interest groups are free to operate and lobby in the political arena, fighting against the majority and other competing factions for voice in Congress. With the influence of multiple factions operating throughout the political system, a balance of power is created (Kernell 2000, 429). This is much like the international theory of sovereign states balancing each other’s power to create a political system that focuses on stability, yet is always in a constant flux of power. With this in mind, special interest groups are constantly contending for power by raising money, campaigning, and lobbying in Congress. When a special interest group is threatened by a competing policy, the group will organize efforts to balance, or transcend the power of the competing group.
Danziger, James N. Understanding the Political World: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science. New Jersey: Pearson, 2013. Print.
The political incentives that spawned parties are transparent. In any system where collective choices are made by voting, organization pays. When action requires winning majorities on a continuing basis in multiple settings, organization is absolutely essential. The Constitution’s provisions for enacting laws and electing leaders therefore put a huge premium on building majority alliances across institutions and electoral units. Parties grew out of the efforts of political entrepreneurs to build such alliances and to coordinate the collective activity necessary to gain control of and use machinery of government. One of the incentives for building political parties is to build stable legislative and electoral alliances. To control policy consistently, then,
Roll call votes, number of bills signed and the numbers of presidential vetoes present an interesting method of measuring success. They are quantitative in nature and present a statistical relationship . As Dr. Whitlock put it: “There is a reason Americans prefer football over soccer – we love score. “ Although focus on success is frequent and relatively easy to measure, some scholars including (Collier 1959) have argued that it fails to capture the full picture surrounding the passage of a piece of legislation. For example, as (Collier 1959) remarked, the passage of a piece of legislation signed by the president may be different than the original bill introduced in the Congress. Yet, the president can still claim political victory after the bill passes. In addition, during divided government, when party control is divided between the branches, success in terms of outcomes measures may fail to capture the full picture of which player was really preventing the objective of the
People think of the members of the higher levels in terms of what they own and what they have, their possessions. The elite however are not defined only by those who have an abundance because if it were not for their stature they would not have these possessions that people speak of.
Although it is accepted that pressure groups indeed pressure politics in certain directions, it is quite a different task to describe how pressure groups link public opinion to government action. Apparently the driving force behind action is not as cut and dry as the image of “the lobbyist who speaks for a united following, determined in its aims and prepared to reward its friends and punish its enemies at the polls.” In reality, it may appear that spokesmen of mass-membership pressure groups are “unrepresentative of the opinions of their members.” This perception, however, does not take into account the wide potential for variability in policy opinion that can occur within large groups. On the contrary, it is not a “wicked betrayal” or a “deliberate departure from the mass mandate;” it is more likely that there are other theorems with which to explain this phenomenon. Alike to all other human groups, “opinions…do not fall into blacks and whites.” In Keys’ essay, he attempts to hypothesize that there are naturally stratified layers of activism and pacifism within group membership. “It may be nature of mass groups that attachment to the positions voiced by the peak spokesmen varies with the attachment to and involvement in the group.” When the functioning of these groups are looked upon in this manner, it is logical to assume that special interest groups “invar...
Parsons, Talcott. (1938). The Role of Theory in Social Research. American Sociological Review. 3(1), 13-20.