G. E. Moore begins his paper by stating that many perfectly rigorous arguments can be given to prove the existence of the external world. Suppose that he raises one hand and says, “here is one hand”; and then raises the other and says, “here is another”. To Moore, this is rigorous proof of the proposition “there now exists two hands”. His proof that the external world exists, rests on the assumption that he does know that “here is a hand”. Perhaps he can make this assumption because there is no reason for thinking otherwise, thus the premise “here is a hand, and here is another hand”, though itself unproven, leads conclusively to: “therefore there exists an external world” (Moore 1993, pp. 165-6). Many critics have accused Moore’s argument …show more content…
The first is that the premise must differ from the conclusion. It is true, as there could be two human hands that exist at the moment even if it is false that “here is one hand and here is another”. The second requirement is that the premise must be known, that he knows “here is one hand and here is another”. He says it would be absurd to suggest otherwise. Moore recognizes that there might be some sceptical philosophers who would think the premise to be false, as it is true that you may be dreaming you have hands. The third requirement is that the conclusion of the proof must follow from the premise, and if the premise “here is a hand” is true, then surely the conclusion “a hand exists” is true. Moore says that if this argument is a rigorous one, then it is obvious that many more can be given (Moore 1993 pp. 165-6). The conditions Moore says the proof satisfies, is sufficient in believing there is an external world. As when it comes down to a comparison of plausibility, it is much more reasonable to believe that my hands exist, than believing I am being controlled by some sort of demon, or that I am dreaming. This however, is not a very compelling argument to the sceptic, who would reject the second condition on the basis that Moore cannot know whether he is even awake or not, thus he cannot really know if he is raising his hands, or whether they exist at all (Descartes …show more content…
In that, the sceptic can only dispute the second condition by exclaiming that Moore may be dreaming, or that Moore might be controlled by an evil demon – it would be far more reasonable to accept that although we can prove the existence of the external world, we can never know for certain if it indeed exists. Believing otherwise is contentious and an extremely debatable philosophical assumption. Whereas, like discussed earlier, Moore has exceptional grounds for his proposition: that he is looking right at his hands. When Moore’s argument is put under the microscope, he can be associated to a sceptic, but at the same time he is not. Rather, Moore transcends the sceptic, as he claims proof is possible without true knowledge. We cannot, under any circumstances, know for certain if material things exist, but we can certainly have proof of it, which can lead the individual towards the idea of knowing that it does
Within William Rowe’s Chapter two of “The Cosmological Argument”, Rowe reconstructs Samuel Clark's Cosmological Argument by making explicit the way in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or PSR, operates in the argument as well as providing contradictions of two important criticisms from Rowe’s argument.
The problem I hope to expose in this paper is the lack of evidence in The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supporting that A, a thought or feeling, is the only cause of B. Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self? Such as when a doctor hits your patellar tendon with a reflex hammer to test your knee-jerk reflex. Russell does not answer this question. He is only “highly probable” that we are to know other minds exist through his A is the cause of B postulate.
In “Proof of an External World,” Moore convincingly proves the existence of external objects by giving a simple example of holding up his hands and showing that it satisfies the three conditions of a rigorous, legitimate proof. He successfully combats potential criticisms from skeptics by attributing his knowledge that he is holding up his hands and saying “Here is my hand” (the premiss of his proof) to his faith, something
In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two responses to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those that you take to be your epistemic equal, effect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs?”. Kelly discusses two possible responses to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second the right reasons view (Elga, 2007 pg. 485). Kelly pursues the latter, and does not go further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these disputes with a first person perspective.
In his “Proof of an External World”, Moore puts forth several supported hypotheses in regards to the nature of the existence of things outside the self. Primarily, Moore discusses hands; his argument is that if he can produce two hands then it follows logically that two hands must exist. Furthermore, Moore puts forth the theory that if hands exist then this alone is proof of an external world. In opposition to Moore’s opinions will be found three main arguments: firstly that all of Moore’s evidence is based upon sensory input, secondly that the truth of one fact based on the truth of another fact forms an Epistemic Circle in this case, and finally that the evidence out forth by Moore, even if proved, does not necessarily prove the fact that he is attempting to prove.
... The point of doubt is to arrive at certainty, but to say that our beliefs are justified, we have to be able to base them on an idea that is definite. This could then provide a firm foundation on which all following beliefs are grounded and certified. If one believes in God, they perceive a certain knowledge that they stand by and accept is flawless. The meditator may be deceived about other ideas, but cannot help but determine God's existence to be so. Ultimately, they therefore cannot doubt their own existence without someone else actively doing the doubting. People’s perceptions may differ, so it only my own I must trust. I trust my senses, therefore I exist. When we think of ideas, we are thinking, even if we don't have bodies. The body we experience as our own is not irrefutable because we can doubt its existence, but we cannot doubt the existence of our minds.
The Proof of the Existence of God There are many arguments that try to prove the existence of God. In this essay I will look at the ontological argument, the cosmological. argument, empirical arguments such as the avoidance of error and the argument from the design of the. There are many criticisms of each of these that would say the existence of God can’t be proven that are perhaps.
Here’s a way to visualize this concept of existing: suppose that everything you think you know about the physical world is false. Instead, there is an evil genius who is
Second, Descartes raised a more systematic method for doubting the legitimacy of all sensory perception. Since my most vivid dreams are internally indistinguishible from waking experience, he argued, it is possible that everything I now "perceive" to be part of the physical world outside me is in fact nothing more than a fanciful fabrication of my own imagination. On this supposition, it is possible to doubt that any physical thing really exists, that there is an external world at all. (Med. I)
To conceive – or to think in terms of concepts – is to make an epistemic claim, which may not be the same as attributing of something that it possibly exists in reality. The philosophy of the mind remains indebted to Kripke’s distinction between epistemic possibility (how things could conceivably be) and metaphysical possibility (how things could really be).[4] What could conceivably be the case might be metaphysically impossible (i.e.: impossible to instantiate in a possible world), and this is to be known a posteriori rather than a priori. What do the problem of ethnocentrism, the problem of obstacle-concepts, and the problem of conceivability have in common? Firstly, they invoke a belief in a set of concepts which they purport to be the best available description of the world.[5] Secondly, they involve a certain bias that awaits critical reflection. In ethnocentrism, it is the cultural bias of the Western or Westernized researcher; in the philosophy of science, it is the sociological bias of the prevalent scientific community; in the philosophy of the mind, it is the bias of the individual mind questing after a mind-independent reality. Finally, these biases are smuggled into the
“[Even a] fool, when he hears of… a being than which nothing greater can be conceived… understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding…. and Assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in understanding along. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality;...
Cartesian Skepticism, created by René Descartes, is the process of doubting ones’ beliefs of what they happen to consider as true in the hopes of uncovering the absolute truths in life. This methodology is used to distinguish between what is the truth and what is false, with anything that cannot be considered an absolute truth being considered a reasonable doubt. Anything which then becomes categorized as a reasonable doubt is perceived as false. As Descartes goes through this process, he then realizes that the one thing that can be considered an absolutely truth is his and every other individual’s existence. Along with the ideology of Cartesian skepticism, through the thinking process, we are capable of the ability to doubt that which is surrounding them. This ability to think logically and doubt is what leads us to the confirmation of our existence.
... So following all of this, if the 'sensible objects' that we perceive are of the mind, then we can not claim that there is an external world (class, lecture) (James, 2).
Some of the first major philosophical works that I read were Descartes’ Meditations. In his first Meditation, Descartes writes about the idea of skepticism. This is when I was exposed to the topic of skepticism and I found myself interested in the idea right from the start. Skepticism is one of the most popular topics in epistemology. It is also not a topic that only appeals to philosophers. Skepticism is a topic that draws many people’s attention because it is an idea that rocks the cores of many of the beliefs that are closest to us. After all, some of the concepts that follow from the idea of skepticism are ones such as we might not actually have any knowledge of the world or the world, as we know it, might not actually be real. Skeptical scenarios prove to be both intriguing and intimidating. Responses to skepticism usually turn out to be satisfying in some ways but carry unwanted baggage in other ways. Overall, skepticism is a topic that much thought has been dedicated to and one that has led to many philosophical developments. In this paper, I will touch upon
The argument that is used in the idea of skepticism has comparable and incompatible views given from Augustine and Al-Ghazali. Both monologues cover and explain the doubts one should have, due to the