Wait a second!
More handpicked essays just for you.
More handpicked essays just for you.
Philosophy of the mind essays
The Concept of Mind
Functionalism physicalism mind body problem
Don’t take our word for it - see why 10 million students trust us with their essay needs.
Functionalism is a theory of contemporary philosophy of the mind, designed to provide a solution to behaviourism and identity theory, but more importantly a solution to the mind/body problem. In this essay I will discuss the theory of functionalism, and what solution it offers in resolving the mind/body problem. The mind/body problem examines the relationship between the mind and physical matter, more specifically the relationship between consciousness and the brain that other theories of the mind have failed to account for. Solutions to the mind body problem attempt to explain one’s subjective experience of an objective physical world.
Functionalist theory holds that the condition for being in a mental state should be given by the functional role of that state, this is, in terms of the standard causal relationships, rather than by supposed intrinsic functions of that state (Honderich, 1995). The role is normally visualised as being specified in terms of which mental states typically produce it and which other states and behavioural outputs will typically be produced by it when the state interacts with further mental states and perceptual inputs (Honderich, 1995). For example; Different pains we experience are normally caused by some sort of sustained bodily damage, and tend to result in avoidance behaviour (Routlege, 2000).
The theory forged by David Armstrong and Hilary Putnam, improves on behaviourism as it identifies that behaviour results from mental states, it allows that the term for the state, for example ‘S’s pain’, to refer to a real condition that has a functional role (Honderich, 1995). The first formulation of a functionalist theory of the mind was proposed by Putnam, it was inspired by thought of the mind in rel...
... middle of paper ...
...ates, means the mind is multiply realisable in not only biological living organisms as discussed earlier, but within non biological-systems such as computers as argued by Putnam. That a silicon-based machine, such as my apple computer, could experience some sort of mental life similar to what I experience on a daily basis. This is assuming it has some sort of functional cognitive system in order that acts out real causal/functional roles. This is not to say that humans are machines that operate in response to what we are programmed to do, but rather that the mind shares a relationship with its material embodiments as does a computer with the software is runs. This is the fundamental part of functionalism’s solution to the mind body problem, in it’s ability to logically make sense of both the causal and the relational nature of the mind avoiding the mind body problem
Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.
Functionalism is basically a theory that describes the mental state of human beings through the combination of both behaviorism theory and the identity theory of the human mind. According to this theory, mental states of people are majorly identified or rather defined by what they frequently do and
The general point behind the homunculi-head introduces consideration to the possibility of brain functions being done by parts which could not together be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions which serve out a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block’s counter arguments shows such an account of
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
The two theoretical approaches I have chosen to compare to the study of crime are Functionalism and Marxism. I have done so, as I believe both theories are important/ significant to the study of crime and differentiate from each other. I will do this by writing a critique the advantages and disadvantages of both of the theories and thus, resulting in my own personal opinion in the conclusion.
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
The mind-body problem has troubled many thinkers for centuries because it is not clear if mind and body interact with each other and/or how they interact with each other. Dualists ' claim is that the mind is a non-physical thing because it is impossible to be explained by physics; therefore, mind is different from the body. However, Dualism does not clearly explain what a non-physical mind is, and it simply ignores the fact that many ideas were thought to be impossible one day but now they are proven by physics. In fact, it has been proven that human behaviors change when something, like a damage, occur in the brain. Even though laws of physics cannot explain mind in physical ways, it does not mean that mind is non-physical. Because science improves and discovers new things, it is possible and very likely that the mind will be explained by scientists one day and it will be proven that the mind is, in fact, physical. When scientists learn about the relationship between mind and body, they will be able to
Describe and evaluate the theories of Sigmund Freud's psycho dynamic approach as an explanation of human behaviour. In the evaluation summarise and evaluate the cognitive perspective as an alternative explanation of human behaviour.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
There are many criticisms of functionalism and their theories: Ø Functionalist ideas almost portray humans as being autonomous and that only socialisation determines our lives. They do not really see humans as the unpredictable creatures they are, not possible to stray away from the predictable ideas that functionalists have of people. Too much stress is placed on harmony and the potential for conflict and its affects are generally ignored. Ø There is no recognition of difference by class, region or ethnic group. The functionalist picture is simply reflective of happy middle-class American families.
Davis, Tom. The Theories of the Mind Lectures. Ed. G. Baston. Birmingham University. 9 Nov. 2000
Lets first understand the historical perceptive, from where its role started. While behaviorism was becoming the dominant psychological theory in the US, along with Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, the Gestalt perspective gained influence ...
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.