Essay On Provisional Partnership

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Common public thought today views Congress (at least those in the same party as the President) as subordinate to the executive branch. Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher once wrote, “In an effort to promote programs of the national party, the president’s party leaders typically assume the role of administration lieutenants in Congress” (Thurber165). The policy agenda of the president, thus, becomes the task of Congress to execute for him. As evidence of this phenomenon in the American public sphere, a reference may be made to the media firestorm that followed Harry Reid when he commented, “I don’t work for the president” (Thurber 165). The public saw this comment as a jab at the leadership of the president as opposed to the factual statement …show more content…

Baker believed that tensions between Congress and the president arose for several reasons: divergent bargaining strategies where presidents are willing to make deals with the opposition party to pass legislation even if it means circumventing the leaders of their own party; the institutional complexity of Congress where what the president wants may create problems for members of his own party and the party structure is much more convoluted; and the increasingly narrow margins by which majority parties control the House and Senate (Thurber 167-168). The relationship between Congress and the president is, thus, tenuous and subject to frequent change. Many presidents struggle to strike an effective provisional partnership which consequently makes passing their policy agenda increasingly more …show more content…

Neustadt’s book, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, reaffirms Baker’s concept of a provisional partnership by stressing the importance of persuasion in the office of the presidency. Neustadt argues that the most successful presidents rely heavily on persuasion – the act of convincing people that what the office of the White House wants is what they should do – in order to accomplish his policy agenda (30). While the president is given the advantage of authority and status (in many cases, neither is innate to the position and may be lost throughout the actions of the president), the relationship between the president and those who he may be asking something of (i.e. Congress, a Department, etc.) is still reciprocal and cannot be accomplished by the actions of the president alone. The president is “mutually dependent” on those with whom he brokers deals, effectively tempering the amount and size of his power (Neustadt 31). Thus, persuasion may be seen as a two-way street, like the provisional partnership of

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