Essay On Edmund Burke Absolutism Vs Traditionalism

Edmund Burke, as a conservative theorist, claims that England’s preference for restoration over revolution makes the Glorious Revolution more legitimate than the French Revolution. To substantiate this, Burke quips, “We are not the converts of Rousseau…” to hastily dismiss the French philosophe based on his Enlightenment reputation (75). In comparing Rousseau’s conservatism with Burke’s, it’s important to categorize conservative thought into two genera: foundationalism and traditionalism. While foundationalist conservatives believe that there is a distinct, morally correct way to govern, traditionalist conservatives are grounded in the continuity of government for the purpose of stability. While these two categories are reductionistic, the

dichotomy is useful to clarify that there are multiple ways to be conservative and introduces two archetypal paradigms within the monolithic label “conservatism.” Rousseau’s traditionalist conservatism is not significant, but his appeals to prudence mimic the foundationalist aspect of Burke’s conservatism. It is clear that Burke makes the same interpretive error as French revolutionaries: while Rousseau does believe the “general will” legitimizes political change, he further theorizes that the general will naturally begets moderation. These unexpected commonalities will elucidate the persistence of political polarization, and the subsequent speculative devaluation of the opposition’s position.
Burke and the French revolutionaries’ depiction of Rousseau alike were most likely based upon his views presented in the Discourse on Inequality, most succinctly summarized by “the uprising that ends in the strangulation or the dethronement of a sultan is as lawful an act as those by which he disposed of the lives and goods of his subjects the day before. Force alone maintained him; force alone brings him down” (90). Quotes such as this allow Burke and French revolutionaries alike to miscategorize Rousseau as unequivocally pro-revolution. Rousseau continues in his Social Contract to allude to his conditions for revolution, ideas eventually heralded by the French revolutionaries.
Rousseau’s conservative leanings can be understood by observing the commonalities in with Burke’s ideology. Furthermore, analyzing Rousseau’s work, French revolutionaries may have overlooked Rousseau’s moderate-to-conservative views for the sake of effective revolutionary propaganda. For a philosopher so flippantly discredited by Burke, Rousseau believes in a surprisingly similar sort of prudence in regime change. For example, pro-revolutionary propagandists, and years later, Burke, only familiar with Rousseau in the context of his influence on the French revolution, may interpret Rousseau’s claim in the Social Contract “when...the populace institutes a hereditary government… this is not a commitment in its entering. It is a provisional form that gives it the administration, until the populace is pleased to order it otherwise” to mean that the people have the power to shape the government, and part of that power is the right to reform if the current government does not please them (222). This interpretation, without context, seems to imply that governments can and should be reformed whenever there is a rogue dissatisfactory element. However, Rousseau’s next paragraph, situated within a chapter titled “The Means of Preventing Usurpations of the Government,” introduces the idea that revolution warrants moderation and isn’t universally useful, “It is true that these changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it becomes incompatible with the public good” (Ibid). This demonstrates that Rousseau isn’t categorically pro-revolution, as the revolution must be accompanied by the general will to establish itself as more legitimate than the rule of force. Rousseau’s hesitation to unconditionally endorse revolution gives him a claim to conservatism based on the general will as a foundational principle: if the general will is not revolution, then the revolution is illegitimate.
Burke believes that the means for the preservation and stability of a state lie within the territory of conservation and correction.

However, these two terms are not synonyms, and positing them as such creates a false equivalence, despite conservation one meaning to resist change, and correction to change. Despite this tension, both Burke and Rousseau include elements of both conservation and correction. Burke discounts Rousseau, but sounds remarkably similar to Rousseau in his support of revolution, followed by the condition of moderation. Clarifying that revolution would be advisable under some circumstances, Burke “do[es] most heartily wish that France may be animated by a spirit of rational liberty” believing that “a revolution will be the very last resource of the thinking and the good,” but cautioning that “the very idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us with disgust and horror” (4, 27). Burke further demonstrates his traditionalist views by cautioning, “A state without the means of some change is without the means of its own preservation,” demonstrating that the need for continuity is more significant than a need to respect foundational beliefs (19). Burke further demonstrates his conservatism when he explains the benefit of Britain’s ability to adapt (traditionalism), yet respect foundational principles: “in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete (30). Burke expresses that he fears change as much as he fears societal

decay.
However, Burke’s view that “[Change] not being done at that time is a proof that the nation was of opinion it ought not to be done at any time” is an example of his foundationalist conservatism (16). In this scenario, Burke doesn’t oppose change because of its radical effects, but rather because it would be morally improper to dissent from the country’s foundation. One could believe Burke’s “necessary deviation” as incompatible with his view that societies should conform to the founders’ design. Burke would respond to this criticism that “It is far from impossible to reconcile … the use both of a fixed rule and an occasional deviation: the sacredness of an hereditary principle of succession in our government with a power of change in its application in cases of extreme emergency” (19). Both political theorists share the idea that revolution should be regarded as dangerous, and thus avoided so long as the state isn’t actively harming its citizens.