EU Merger Control

2111 Words5 Pages

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 2

II. Substantive test - New test for the assessment of concentrations 3

1. The dominance test and the substantial lessen of competition (SLC) 4

2. The Green Paper 6

3. The Significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC test) 7

CRITICAL APPROACH TO EU MERGER CONTROL SINCE THE ADOPTION OF REGULATION 139/2004

I. Introduction

In 2004 Reg.139/2004 replaced the existing 4064/89 Merger Control Regulation, thus marking a milestone in EU merger control. The new regulation provided for the implementation of a new kind of substantive test as well as certain procedural changes. Compared to its practice prior to the defeats in the General Court in 2002, which was characterized by an interventionist tendency, the Commission demonstrated a more conservative and moderate approach.

Towards the end of the 90’s the growing dissatisfaction regarding the efficiency of the European’s Commission competition policy, especially in light of the imminent enlargement of the European Union, led to the publication of a White Paper that suggested several modifications to the competition policy’s function and structure. This process, also known as the modernization package of European merger, eventually led to the adoption of Council Regulation 139/2004 in early May 2004 (ECMR 04). It has been argued that the employment of such drastic changes came as a response to the overturning by the General Court of three sanctioning decisions of the DG for Competition. In these successful appeals, the General Court based its decision on the grounds that the DG for Competition applied the standard of proof of dominance in a very strict and rigid way. Consequently, in 2001 the European Commission published a Green Paper callin...

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...ies, Recital 29 of the new EUMR highlights their importance in the merger control assessment as a defense to mergers that might otherwise present problems in competition.

So as to define the impact of a merger on competition in the common market, it is suitable to consider the possible efficiencies claimed by the interested parties that might compensate the concentration’s negative effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers. If the efficiencies result in a balance between the “positive” and “negative” effects of a concentration, consequently the concentration might not significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it. To that end, the Commission should clarify the circumstances under which it may take efficiencies into account when determining the negative effects of a transaction.

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