We will interpret these few outcomes in a clockwise direction. The top left box shows both the Capitol and District 13 choosing to not create nuclear weapons, (nn). If this were the case, then the two districts would not combat in an arms race. Moving to the right, if the Capitol chose to not create nuclear weapons, but District 13 did choose to, (nc), then District 13 dominates the Capitol in power. However, if both districts decide to create weapons of mass destruction, (cc), then, the Capitol and District 13 are facing an arms race. Furthermore, if the Capitol chooses to create nuclear weapons, but District 13 does not, (cn), then the Capitol dominates District 13 in power. Now that we have dissected each possible outcome, lets look at …show more content…
To illustrate, if District 13 decides to not create nuclear weapons, the Capitol must determine if they will choose to create nuclear weapons, or not. If they choose to create nuclear weapons, then they receive their most preferred outcome, (cn), thus giving them the power advantage. In contrast, if District 13 chooses to create nuclear weapons, the Capitol faces a more difficult decision. However, they will decide to also create nuclear weapons (cc), since that is preferred over District 13 gaining power, (cc > nc), and it will provide them with a higher payoff than the alternative strategy. Furthermore, since the prisoner’s dilemma is symmetric, both the Capitol and District 13’s dominant strategy is to create nuclear weapons. Therefore, this game theory infers that the Capitol and District 13 are inclined to face a nuclear arms race, “we implicitly assume that the prisoners (players) can't attempt collusive agreement since they choose their actions simultaneously”(Ross, …show more content…
A cooperative game theory “assumes that promises made between actors are binding (meaning they will be kept)”(Mesquita, 2014). This would be useful in such a Nash equilibrium case, since neither player currently has an incentive to keep their promises. If an enforcing player were involved, than the Capitol and District 13 would be more likely to both not create nuclear weapons, since there would be a disciplinarian implementing their agreement. Without such an enforcer, the players have no reason to trust each other, and therefore do not choose to gamble on any agreement they may make, such as (nn). Without a judiciary figure, the Capitol and District 13 refuse to risk meeting their least desired outcome, where they present reservation and the other player gains nuclear
Walker gives three reasons why the perception that Truman faced a categorical choice between the atomic bomb and an
This investigation assesses the success of the policies of Henry Kissinger during the tense period of the Cold War and the sequential years, specifically pertaining to the peace summits with Russian officials in 1972 and 1973 with regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. This investigation evaluates Kissinger’s impact during the period of the SALT treaties on the reduction of nuclear arms and the implementation of détente. Specifically, how Kissinger got what he wanted, the risks involved, and the outcome of the treaties. The sources used, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, by Robert S. Litwak and Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year, by Alistair Horne, will then be evaluated for their origins, purposes, values, and limitations.
Maddox, Robert. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” Taking Sides: Clashing View in United States History. Ed. Larry Madaras & James SoRelle. 15th ed. New York, NY. 2012. 280-288.
In conclusion to the fall of the war and the dropping of both bombs, I believe that if we didn’t bring the war to an end that it would have gone on for a much longer time. Even though it destroyed both cities completely and many people died from it, I think many more people would have died if the United States wouldn’t have dropped it. With the creation of the department, we have further educated ourselves with nuclear weapons, and the United States have one of the defense system and a grand nuclear and energy department in today 's time since the creation of the Manhattan Project.
Weiler, Lawrence D. The Arms Race, Secret Negotiations and the Congress, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, 1976.
The Cold War is famous not only for its long engagement between the two super powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but also because of the heightened physical tension that nuclear power brought to the global stage. Winning the war at the cost of human annihilation was not abnormal political conversation, and from the 1940s onward, fear of global destruction became a daily concern (Granieri, 2011). The circumstances of the Cold War made it different than previous international conflicts because it was the first conflict that could potentially lead to massive, worldwide destruction. Without the dangers of nuclear power, the Cold War wouldn't have differed much from previous historical conflicts between powerful states.
In early August 1945 atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two bombs quickly yielded the surrender of Japan and the end of American involvement in World War II. By 1946 the two bombs caused the death of perhaps as many as 240,000 Japanese citizens1. The popular, or traditional, view that dominated the 1950s and 60s – put forth by President Harry Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson – was that the dropping of the bomb was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at intimating and gaining the upper hand in relations with Russia. Today, fifty-four years after the two bombings, with the advantage of historical hindsight and the advantage of new evidence, a third view, free of obscuring bias and passion, can be presented. First, the dropping of the bomb was born out of complex infinite military, domestic and diplomatic pressures and concerns. Second, many potentially viable alternatives to dropping the bombs were not explored by Truman and other men in power, as they probably should have been. Lastly, because these alternatives were never explored, we can only conjecture over whether or not Truman’s decision was a morally just one, and if indeed it was necessary to use atomic energy to win the war.
Power in politics is control over governmental decisions. The number of nations with which the U.S. has diplomatic relations has increased; the world has also become a much more dangerous place. Our government must always be aware of the possibility of nuclear war. Yet, the mere existence of great powers with effective thermonuclear weapons would not vastly increase our rate of interaction with most other nations. We are interested in what happens everywhere because we see these events as connected with larger interests, involving the possibility of ultimate destruction. Given the overrriding fact that the world is dangerous and that small causes are percieved to ...
middle of paper ... ... Unfortunately, this idea of a zero sum military power game does not match up with reality. Each state takes actions based on the given situation and neo-realism misses this nuance. Constructivism actually considers this more by analyzing the actors at play and their identities and interests.
..., 1993). Therefore, in order for the proponent of the deterrence argument to defend his or her argument, he or she is drawn into a swamp of problems where it doesn’t seem that any clear answers can be given (Reitan, 1993).
The Cuban Missile Crisis exhibits the struggle for power between the two dominant powers of the time. The realist theory believes that world politics is a repetitive struggle for power and or influence. Power, in politics is largely perceived as influence and military capability. Power in mass amounts are located in objects such as nuclear missiles that have an immense influence on others. (Schmidt, 2007; Sterling-Folker & Shinko, 2007). This is clearly depicted through the actions taken by both leaders, as the simple placement of a missile had such a tremendous effect.
The Cold War historiography, specifically the issue of nuclear deterrence has provided historians the classic dialectic of an original thesis that is challenged by an antithesis. Both then emerge in the resolution of a new synthesis. Unfortunately, each evolution of a new synthesis is quickly demolished with each political crisis and technological advance during the Cold War narrative. The traditional/orthodox views were often challenged by the conventional wisdom with the creation of synthesis or post revisionism. There appears to be a multiple historiographical trends on nuclear deterrence over the Cold War; each were dependent and shaped upon international events and technological developments. I have identified four major trends: the orthodox, the revisionist, the post revisionist, st and the New Left. Each of these different historical approaches had its proponents and opponents, both in the military as well as the political and
Many countries want to join “Nuclear Club.” They view it as prestigious. Keeping nuclear weapons encourages other countries to develop them, either for protection or prestige. Nevertheless, many countries will not have the means to develop weapons and there are many countries will not develop nuclear weapons just to get into a “club.” Countries would need to have other, stronger motives to develop the weapons. But, if some countries have nuclear weapons, others will feel the need to develop them for protection. Protection and safety would be a strong motive. If volatile nations develop nuclear weapons, they will pose a worldwide threat to everyone. Nonetheless, their activities can be detected and then promptly stopped. It would be quite difficult to develop nuclear weapons without detection. The volatile nations most likely will work in a secretive place. By the time they are detected, they may have already developed the weapons. T...
The security dilemma literatures suggest that cooperation with the other states could be a best solution to deal with the dilemma, and the states should decide when they need to enforce some strategies, such as enforce arms control and one sided defensive strategy to arms racing (Brown, Lynn-Jones, Miller 1995: 380).
Scott D. Sagan, the author of chapter two of “More Will Be Worse”, looks back on the deep political hostilities, numerous crises, and a prolonged arms race in of the cold war, and questions “Why should we expect that the experience of future nuclear powers will be any different?” The author talks about counter arguments among scholars on the subject that the world is better off without nuclear weapons. In this chapter a scholar named Kenneth Waltz argues that “The further spread of nuclear weapons may well be a stabilizing factor in international relations.” He believes that the spread of nuclear weapons will have a positive implications in which the likely-hood of war decreases and deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Although there