District 13 Create Nuclear Weapons Case Study

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We will interpret these few outcomes in a clockwise direction. The top left box shows both the Capitol and District 13 choosing to not create nuclear weapons, (nn). If this were the case, then the two districts would not combat in an arms race. Moving to the right, if the Capitol chose to not create nuclear weapons, but District 13 did choose to, (nc), then District 13 dominates the Capitol in power. However, if both districts decide to create weapons of mass destruction, (cc), then, the Capitol and District 13 are facing an arms race. Furthermore, if the Capitol chooses to create nuclear weapons, but District 13 does not, (cn), then the Capitol dominates District 13 in power. Now that we have dissected each possible outcome, lets look at …show more content…

To illustrate, if District 13 decides to not create nuclear weapons, the Capitol must determine if they will choose to create nuclear weapons, or not. If they choose to create nuclear weapons, then they receive their most preferred outcome, (cn), thus giving them the power advantage. In contrast, if District 13 chooses to create nuclear weapons, the Capitol faces a more difficult decision. However, they will decide to also create nuclear weapons (cc), since that is preferred over District 13 gaining power, (cc > nc), and it will provide them with a higher payoff than the alternative strategy. Furthermore, since the prisoner’s dilemma is symmetric, both the Capitol and District 13’s dominant strategy is to create nuclear weapons. Therefore, this game theory infers that the Capitol and District 13 are inclined to face a nuclear arms race, “we implicitly assume that the prisoners (players) can't attempt collusive agreement since they choose their actions simultaneously”(Ross, …show more content…

A cooperative game theory “assumes that promises made between actors are binding (meaning they will be kept)”(Mesquita, 2014). This would be useful in such a Nash equilibrium case, since neither player currently has an incentive to keep their promises. If an enforcing player were involved, than the Capitol and District 13 would be more likely to both not create nuclear weapons, since there would be a disciplinarian implementing their agreement. Without such an enforcer, the players have no reason to trust each other, and therefore do not choose to gamble on any agreement they may make, such as (nn). Without a judiciary figure, the Capitol and District 13 refuse to risk meeting their least desired outcome, where they present reservation and the other player gains nuclear

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