Descartes And Consent

Consent is a valid agreement, through explicit words or actions, that a person is willing to perform an action. To be valid, consent must be granted without coercion and under no mental impairment which would affect the grantor’s judgement on the matter. Examples of such impairment would be inebriation or social duress. For the purposes of this definition, explicit words or actions in the affirmative are those that one can reasonably interpret in conventional interactions as affirming the person’s willingness to engage. It should be noted that verbal permission is not necessary for consent; this definition includes clear actions such as saying “yes,” nodding, or beginning to engage in the action after being asked. It is also important to note

did not in fact know that Thelma consented by the definition of the concept above. According to Appiah, the Cartesian view on knowledge requires that in order to have knowledge of something, one must believe it to be true, it must in fact be true, and one must have some sort of indefeasible evidence supporting the belief (47). First, it is clear that J.D. believes that Thelma is consenting. This is evidenced by the fact that he has sex with her after gaining clear signals from her that she consents. J.D. only goes through with the act once Thelma reciprocates the action suggesting that J.D. is in fact looking for consent and believes he has it. What she gives him is in fact consent according to the definition provided earlier in the form of requiting his lustful action (Thelma & Louise). This satisfies the first two conditions for knowledge, but the third is where Descartes’ theory fails since it requires indefeasible evidence. If Descartes’ own theory of mind is to be believed, J.D. does not know the contents of Thelma’s mind and therefore cannot get indefeasible evidence—or any evidence for that matter—that Thelma consents. If another view on mind is used, it is still not possible to get indefeasible evidence to show that Thelma consents. This is because Thelma’s reaction J.D.’s initiation of the act can be perfectly consistent with her not consenting. Perhaps unbeknownst to J.D. there was a man in the closet who was threatening

to know that Thelma consents. Once again according to Appiah, Locke’s theory on knowledge requires that one must believe something to be true, that thing must in fact be true, and one must have some sort of defeasible evidence to justify the belief (53). Following the same reasoning as last time, it is clear that J.D. does believe that Thelma consents and Thelma does in fact consent. The third condition this time only requires defeasible evidence which J.D. has. It is clear that ever since meeting J.D., Thelma has had a great interest in him. This culminates in the motel room where, after J.D. suggests that he wants to have sex, Thelma reciprocates and merrily goes along (Thelma & Louise). This evidence certainly is not indefeasible: there could still be a person threatening Thelma in the closet which J.D. does not know about like in the last example. Locke’s theory, however, does not require that one has indefeasible evidence. The evidence which J.D. has is enough to justify his belief that Thelma consents. This, along with the other two premises being true, shows that J.D. does in fact know that Thelma consents if Locke’s view is taken as the