Dbq Reconstruction

April 1865 saw the end of the Civil War, and with it came the need for some sort of policy to reunify, restore or “reconstruct” the political, economic, and social relationship of the southern states with the rest of the Union. The period of this process of bringing the states of the Confederacy back into the Union is called Reconstruction.

It is impossible to fully understand Reconstruction without a grasp of the social and economic upheaval the war brought about. For the people living through the times, this upheaval created a situation that demanded immediate attention. Economically, the South had been shattered, with much of its capital—formerly invested in slaves—lost. Fields remained untilled and fallow. Capital that during the

war had been invested in manufacturing to a much larger extent than it had been before the war, was now laid to waste with many of the South’s factories in ruins. Beyond these tangible losses there was the devastating cost in human life. More than one-fifth of the South’s adult white-male population (some 260,000) was lost fighting for the Confederacy. In addition, the great majority of black soldiers who had fought and died in the Union army were from the South. Their losses in manpower, therefore, were incalculable.

Another consideration in post-bellum America was a new question to southern society: What would be the role of the newly freed black population of the South? What would be the social relationship between this new community and its former white masters? The south faced a newly freed workforce that grew more and more recalcitrant, refusing to work for former masters (very often with good cause), whatever the pay. Old habits of social interaction had to be reconsidered and, most often, unlearned. Thus even if the South could quickly show some signs of economic recovery, solving the problems posed by social reconstruction would prove to be a much more difficult and lengthy proposition.

The political process of Reconstruction, on the other hand, had begun before the war ended.

In some states—like Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana—where earlier Union 2, victories had been so complete as to effectively take them out of the Confederacy; the populations had already taken steps in the direction of re-establishing their former relations with the Union. To rebuild the trust and friendship between these states and the Union, Abraham Lincoln believed in granting generous terms of amnesty for former rebels, and in encouraging a speedy restoration of legitimate state governments within the formerly rebellious states. Lincoln believed in the justice of a merciful policy, but he also recognized that a swift procedure for reconstruction—taking place, in effect, as Union victories gradually spread throughout the South—would aid in the effort to bring the war to a speedy end. Since Lincoln believed that the purpose of the war was to bring the Southern states back into their former relationship with the Union, he saw little distinction between good war policy and wise reconstruction policy. Indeed, he preferred the term “Restoration” over
“Reconstruction” because he did not wish to imply that something new was being constructed. Reconstruction, he believed, should re-establish the authority of the

Constitution.

Of course, contributing to his thinking on these matters were the facts on the ground. With feelings so raw, there was little practical distinction between wartime sentiment and post-war sentiment. Many ex-Confederates were bitterly disappointed by their defeat and would maintain hostile feelings toward “Yankees” for decades, if not generations, to come. Skeptical about the motives of Northerners coming south to aid in Reconstruction efforts, many Southerners came to resent even the smallest of differences in manners or habits between themselves and the “Yankees.” Sometimes their resentment was justified—as when speculators would come South with the intention of exploiting the needs of a desperate populace. But this resentment caused some to develop elaborate theories, and many myths, about the nature of the differences between genteel Southerners and crass Yankees. These theories rivaled, but perhaps did not surpass, some of the more wild notions about race that had developed to justify slavery.

When it came to race, however, old habits died hard. It was true that the newly freed black population was now free of the obligations of servitude. At the same time, however, former slave owners considered themselves free of any duty to secure the welfare of their former property. Blacks were thus thrust into a world where the habits of slavery—namely, dependence and deference—would not serve them well. Former slave-owners were indignant at the suggestion that they should feel any obligation to help needy freedmen establish themselves. Yet they expressed no indignation at continued expressions of deference and even paternal respect from former slaves. In fact, this deference was often expected to the point of violent outrage in its absence. Self-assertion and independence among blacks, therefore, was simultaneously necessary and dangerous. When this contradictory fact of life combined itself with the inherent difficulties of achieving prosperity in a poverty-stricken and war-crippled region, it is easy to anticipate the difficulties that lay ahead of the South on this front.

In states where significant pro-Union sentiment carried the day at their constitutional conventions (largely because of restrictions on unpardoned confederates participating)—blacks enjoyed a large degree of political and social equality, even to the extent of sending the first black representatives to Congress. These gains, however, would be relatively short-lived. As Reconstruction progressed, more and more former confederates obtained amnesty, re-entered the political process, and were hostile to suggestions or policies of political rights for blacks. Eventually, as radicals in Congress gained control of Reconstruction efforts, their policies sought immediate and greater justice for the freedmen as well as harsher penalties for those who chose not to respect the equality of blacks before the law. But enforcing this noble sentiment was a challenge and the impatience and often intemperate rhetoric of this element in Congress and their emissaries in the South, may have caused already deep Southern resentment to solidify and, in some cases, to escalate. Violence became a common expression for this festering rage.