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Critic of A.J. Ayer verification principle
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Ayer published Language, Truth & Logic in 1936 when he was only 26 years of age. He was a part of the Vienna Circle; who were notoriously known for their philosophy of logical positivism. Logical positivism is a philosophical theory that holds meaningful only those non-tautological propositions that can be analyzed by the tools of logic into elementary propositions or are empirically verifiable. It therefore rejects metaphysics, theology, and sometimes ethics as meaningless . In Language, Truth & Logic, Ayer puts forth his own version of the verification principle. It is by this principle of verification in which these philosophers, including Ayer, assess whether or not propositions are meaningful. Furthermore it is by the principle of verification and the idea of the analytic-synthetic distinction in which the heart Ayer’s philosophy rests. Analytic propositions are propositions that are true or false in virtue of their meaning alone and synthetic propositions are propositions that are true or false in virtue of how the world is. Ayer’s logical positivist position and principle of verification is faulty and unreliable as shown by many criticisms ranging from self-refuting nature of the principle of verification to the collapse of the analytic-synthetic distinction by Quine.
To begin with, Ayer’s principle of verification goes as follows:
“a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its tr...
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... revise our analytic beliefs and if we are testing these and they are not true by definition and are by experience then the analytic-synthetic distinction collapses which is fatal for logical positivists such as Ayer.
To summarize, as a logical positivist, Ayer held to a principle of verification that stated a proposition is factually significant if and only if it is a tautology or if it is possible to be empirically observed under conditions that would allow it to be rendered true or false. This principle of verification is not only an impractical philosophy to follow due to its renouncement of ethics, aesthetics and science but it is also a self-refuting one due to the principle of verification being unable to be verified and not being a tautology. It is because of these reasons that Ayer’s principle of verification and logical positivism as a whole be rejected.
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Are the ideas of Metaphysics truly something that should be abandoned? Should we no longer think about that which is beyond our scope of reality, and simply trust that which we know to be true, or even false, just so long as either can be shown to be empirically verifiable? According to the readings from the excerpts of A.J. Ayer's book Language, Truth, and Logic one would be forced to agree that Metaphysics should be abandoned as a form of philosophy. Ayer uses may different backings to let forth his opinions on the ideas of metaphysics; using the very sentences that metaphysical philosophers write against them, and showing that if an idea cannot be formed through that which we can readily, or actively understand then the ideas themselves have no bearing on philosophy. Ayer states, "A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable."
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There have been attempts to answer the queries through the Justified-True-Belief Account of Knowledge (JTB), known to have been credited by Plato. According to the theory, knowledge is explained in some manner or way, a proposition known can’t be false, and the proposition must be accepted. The justified-true-belief account of knowledge, though, is considered to be a definition of knowledge where S, a person, knows that P, a proposition, if and only if: P is true, S believes that P is true, and S is justified in believing that P is true. However, this theory of knowledge challenges our understanding of propositional knowledge – like when people once thought they knew that the earth was flat; one could not know what was flat, only think that one knows it. The truth condition of the JTB of knowledge states that if you know that P, then P is true (Powerpoint, Lecture 4). Though P can be a claim that something else is false. Thus, the Gettier problems. In Edmund L. Gettier’s short article, “Is justified true belief knowledge?” he discusses the question about whether or not a piece of information with a faulty premise is knowledge. This innovative philosophical idea that Gettier wrote about, le...
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