Conventional Versus Irregular Warfare

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Conventional Versus Irregular Warfare: Is the MAGTF the Model to Answer Both?
When asked to compare and contrast U.S. military operations and capabilities for conventional versus irregular warfare, one cannot overlook the Marine Corps’ Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is the Marine Corps’ force protection aboard and how it contributes to the national security of this great nation. Five unique competencies allow the Marine Corps to do this successfully; however, they all focus on conventional warfare, with the exception of mainly one, warfighting culture and dynamic decision-making. Well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority.
Conventional Versus Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare is not a new tactic and has been referenced by some of the great strategists, such as, Jomini and Clausewitz. The titles may have evolved from guerrilla warfare, to insurgents, to terrorists, to the simple phase of unconventional forces; however, they are all representative of violence used to counter the conventional military forces of a nation-state. Conventional or traditional war is “waged by forces designed, trained, and equipped for major combat operations against a similar, peer enemy.” Conventional warfare, in its purest form, is a “violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states.” Irregular warfare supports indirect and asymmetric approaches and “refers to all unconventional methods of violence used to counter the traditional capabilities of a nation-state’s military forces; and to undermine the authority of a local government or in...

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...he most challenging threat to U.S. national objectives.
Conclusion
For the U.S. military, well-coordinated conventional operations and decentralized leadership combine to form a solid foundation for success in irregular warfare, therefore, conventional warfare should take priority in the preparation for future military operations. For the United States Marine Corps, this means fine-tuning the MAGTF for conventional operations. Like the great strategist Jomini highlights, when comparing the equipping of forces and battlefield success of regular forces and irregular forces, “experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend…it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization.”

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