Colonel George Armstrong Custer Failure

A few United States Soldiers have attached to their names more controversy than Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer. An 1861 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Custer became one of the Civil War’s generals at age 23 years old and received the nickname “Boy General.” His meteoric rise was based in no small degree upon his aggressiveness and reckless courage under fire.1 It was his reckless courage, however, that he was tragically defeated at the Battle of Little Bighorn, also commonly referred to as “Custer's Last Stand”. Custer failed to execute the operations process in which he failed to understand, visualize, describe, and direct his forces that ultimately resulted in his demise and cost the lives of

all the Soldiers under his command; had he effectively employed the operations process, he may have achieved a more desirable outcome and survived the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
The Battle of the Little Bighorn took place on June 25 and 26th, 1876, on the wind swept, rolling prairies between the Rosebud and Little Bighorn rivers in the Montana Territory.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment, led by Custer, advanced along the Little Bighorn pursuant to orders from Custer’s superior, Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry. Terry ordered Custer to pinpoint the location of the hostile Indians and wait for reinforcement before engaging in any battles. However, during a reconnaissance of the area, Custer’s scouts were spotted by a few Indians, which led him to believe that his position has been comprised. Custer believed he had lost his element of surprise, so he disobeyed Terry’s orders and rapidly devised and employed an assault on the Indians in hoping to still achieve his end state of capturing the Indians before they

escape.
Not knowing the size of the Indian force, Custer divided his regiment into three elements: three companies under Major Marcus Reno, three companies under Captain Frederick Benteen, and the remaining five companies under Custer himself.2 He ordered Benteen and his battalion to scout and block any avenues of escape on the southwest side of the encampment and ordered Reno to attack from the south while he would attack from the north. After a good size of Indians were spotted between the Little Bighorn River and the troops, Custer ordered Reno to attack and he would provide support. Reno, however, failed in his attack due to the overwhelming odds. While Reno fell back to a defensive position, instead of providing support as he had stated, Custer continued northeast to charge the Indians encampment, believing he can still achieve victory. Concurrently, Custer sent out a runner to retrieve Benteen and to bring more ammunition, but while he was waiting, he launched his attack against the Indian and quickly realized that he was strongly outnumbered and retreated to what is today known as Last Stand Hill where he and his entire command were massacred. Reno, later joined by Benteen, survived repeated attacks until relieved on the next day by Terry.3
Understanding the operational environment and the problem is fundamental to the commander’s decision-making.4 Custer failed to grasp the situation in that he underestimated the size of the enemy force despite being forewarned by his scouts.5 He also did not understand the culture and values of the Indians where he believed they would scatter once they see him; Custer was not aware that just a week earlier, his reinforcement, Major General George Crook and his 1,200 troops, were badly attacked by the Lakota and their Northern Cheyenne allies.6 Thus, Custer was unaware that the Indians were determined to fight rather than runaway as he anticipated.
Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state.7 Custer’s arrogance, complacency, and his preconceived belief that the Indians would fight as they always had, i.e., that they would scatter at the first sound of gunfire, led to his mistaken visualization of the operation. Custer arrogantly envisioned that he could “with all the Indians on the Continent with the 7th Cavalry.” 8 This arrogance, together with the belief that the Indians would fight as they always had, led Custer to decline to take additional cavalry enforcement when offered to him.9 He also declined to take a Gatling gun platoon, as he did not want to be slowed down by it.
Once commanders visualize their operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate their shared understanding and purpose.10 Central to describing the operation is the commander’s critical information requirement.11 As noted above, Custer was unaware of the size of the force he faced.12 It is also likely that he was unaware that the 2,000 or more warriors he faced were defending their women and children,13 that their morale was high and that many carried repeating weapons.14 Further, even when presented with an accurate estimate of the enemy’s strength, personal hubris blinded Custer to the enemy’s strengths and his limitations.15 Without the foregoing critical information, no matter how well Custer described his concept of the operation, such a description could not have been accurate.
Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their intent, setting of achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units.16 Custer’s direction of his command has been the subject of controversy for well over a century.

Custer’s faulty understanding of the environment, his preconceived notion of how his enemy would fight, his lack of certain critical information elements, as well as arrogance, and complacency led to poor decision-making and direction. Had he paid more attention to his scouts, he might not have divided his force to the point that no single element thereof could withstand the enemy onslaught. While the dispatch of Captain Benteen and his battalion to block the enemy’s avenue of escape was not itself unusual,17 dividing his forces to conduct the entrapment he had visualized and then ordering Reno’s element to attack was ill considered, if not foolhardy.18 Thus, Custer did not task organize his force in a way that it could be successful under the

circumstances.
Captain Benteen and Major Reno described the orders received from Custer similarly: “Benteen, come on; big village; be quick, bring packs.”19 In retrospect, one can make the case that Custer was urging Benteen to commit his reserve forces to the battle. However, the message is, at best, ambiguous. It does not say what specifically Benteen should do once he came up. It does not urge Benteen attack the Indians. That he is to bring up the ammunitions can be interpreted to mean Benteen was to do this task quickly, but not urgently. The point is moot, however, since Benteen was repulsed by superior numbers and withdrew to join with Reno in a defensive position.20
We shall never know what was going through Custer’s mind at his last stand. Neither is there any certainty that a strict compliance with the operational planning process would have prevented “Custer’s Last Stand.” However, much in hindsight the analysis may be, the operational planning process, properly implemented, would certainly have given him a break and may have dictated a different outcome.